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2. Mr. Narasimhachariar, the learned vakil for the respondents, argues that though the prior order is not appealable, still it is a final order in the sense that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to extend the time given in that order and in support of his argument he has brought to my notice the following decisions : Idumbu Parayan v. Pethi Reddy (1920) 43 Mad. 357, C.R.P. No. 110 of 1922 and Gopala Aiyer v. Sannasi (1915) 3 L.W. 29. I do not desire to express any definite opinion on the question with regard to the interpretation of this order, because that will be a question which will legitimately arise before the District Judge when he considers the appeal on the merits. But since these decisions have been brought to my notice I might as well express my opinion with regard to their relevancy. It appears to me that the passage in Idumbu Parayan v. Pethi Reddy (1920) 43 Mad. 357, is only an obiter dictum and the actual decision in the case has nothing to do with the point now raised by the learned vakil for the respondent, and further the obiter dictum refers to the construction of a mortgage decree; and in that respect the order referred to by the learned Judges certainly is distinguishable from the order under appeal in this case. The same may be said about Gopala Aiyer v. Sannasi (1915) 3 L.W. 29. There the "default clause" was inserted in a decree for specific performance and it was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time conferred by the decree. That also is a case quite different from the present one, where we have nothing to do with the consideration of a decree passed in the suit. I might also observe that the decision in C.R.P. No. 110 of 1922 is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the present case, because, so far as the facts appear from the short notes, the learned Judge who disposed of that decision says that the application for extension of time was made after the expiration of the period mentioned in the order, thereby indicating that if the application was made before the expiration of the time, certainly the learned Judge would have dealt with it. In this ease all the parties, as well as the Court, treated the prior order as a conditional order, because it appears, as I have already pointed out, from the note on the order passed on the first occasion, that the petition was to be posted for the 13th September, 1923, meaning thereby that no final order has been passed upon it and the learned District Munsif would pass final orders only on that day, and the subsequent history of the application also shows that it was never intended to treat the order as a final one. The case is accordingly remanded to the District Judge to be disposed of according to law.