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35. The point in controversy was not the existence or non-existence of that thing, but which of two adverse claimants was entitled to a vested interest in it, subject to a life estate in one of them. The fruits of success in this action which would be gathered in by a decree would be this vested remainder. The fruit of it which would be gathered in by a compromise might be something different, but in essence the same. What the agreement really does is to provide that the fruit, which may be either moveable or immoveable property, shall be divided in certain shares between the parties to the agreement. The terms of the compromise might have been that one half, or some other portion of the trust property, had to be given to the defendant by the plaintiffs, or that jewels which had been the property of the defendant for years might be given to the plaintiffs; the two lakhs of rupees that Me has given might all then have been in existence and in the defendants' possession, for years. No proof was given that the tenant for life was not possessed of this 21/2 lakhs of rupees, kept in his safe, or packed in his money bags long before the year 1907. On the face of Clause 12 its language points rather to existing things than to non-existing things, and the agreement embodied in it is entirely different in its nature and character from an agreement assigning for a certain sum what, for instance, some relative might leave a contracting party, but who might never leave him anything whatever. In India, of course, champerty or maintenance is not illegal. In Glegg v Bromley [1912] 3 K. B, 474, 490. Mr. Justice Parker, as he then was, stated the law upon this point, as was his custom, with great clearness and precision. In that case, according to the head note, one Mrs. G. was plaintiff in an action against one H. for false representation. She was also plaintiff in an action for slander against Lady Bromley She was at the time greatly indebted to her husband, and she executed in his favour a deed of assignment whereby, after reciting that he had requested her to give him further security, which she had agreed to do, she assigned to him, "all that the interest sum...or premises to which she is or may become entitled...under or by virtue of any verdict, compromise or agreement which she may obtain or to which she may become party in or consequent upon the said action (i e. Glegg v. Bromley) or otherwise howsoever, under or by reason of the same to hold the same...subject to redemption on payment of all moneys due to him." Both actions proceeded, that against H. resulting in a verdict for the defendant, with cost amounting to £218. That against Lady Bromley resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff Mrs. G. for £200 with costs. H. then took garnishee proceedings against Lady Bromley to attach this sum of £200, and Mrs. G.'s husband also claimed it under his assignment. It was held that the assignment was not an assignment of a mere expectancy or of a cause of action, but was an assignment of property that is of the fruit of an action as and when recovered, and that it was consequently not void under 13 Eliz. c.5. There is no distinction, and can he no distinction on this point between the fruits of an action which the plaintiff gets by compromise and the fruits he would receive by a decree or verdict in his favour At page 490 Mr. Justice Parker is reported to have said:--.

It is to be observed that an equitable assignee of a chose in action, whether it is legal or equitable, could institute proceedings and maintain proceedings for its recovery. The question was whether the subject-matter of the assign-ment was, in the view of the Court, property with an incidental remedy for its recovery, or was a bare right to bring an action either at law or in equity. With regard to the assignments of future property, they stand, I think, on a totally different footing. Nothing passes, even in equity, until the property comes into present existence. Only when this happens can the assignment attach and an interest pass... Even a solicitor who is conducting an action or suit may take a mortgage on the fruits for the purpose of securing the payment of his proper costs. He may not be able to purchase an interest in such fruits because of the doctrine of champerty.