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Showing contexts for: invocation of arbitration in Sarvesh Security Services Pvt Ltd vs Managing Director,Dsiidc on 16 March, 2018Matching Fragments
3. I may also note that during the currency of the second agreement, the respondent issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why the petitioner be not blacklisted and debarred from participating in future contracts for the next three years. The petitioner sent a detailed reply to the said show cause notice on 14.03.2014. In the reply the petitioner sought to invoke both the arbitration agreements i.e. Arbitration Agreements dated 01.03.2011 and 01.07.2013.
4. The respondent have filed replies to both the petitions and have opposed the same. In reply to Arb.Pet. No.196/2014, which pertains to the first agreement, the respondent have pointed out that during the term of the second agreement dated 01.07.2013, the respondent issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why the agreement be not terminated and the petitioner be not blacklisted. It is urged that in response to the said notice which pertains to the second agreement, the petitioner vide their reply dated 14.03.2014 have sought to invoke the arbitration clause. This show cause notice pertains only to the second agreement and hence, this arbitration petition (Arb.Pet. No.196/2014) which relates to the first agreement is not maintainable as there is no invocation of the Arbitration Agreement. It is further pleaded that the reply dated 14.03.2014 sent by the petitioner to the show cause notice dated 05.03.2014 cannot be termed to be an invocation of an Arbitration Agreement.
5. In Arb. Pet. No.181/2014 which pertains to the second agreement, it is reiterated that the reply dated 14.03.2014 to the show cause notice cannot be treated as an invocation of Arbitration Agreement. It is stated that the respondent is willing to appoint an arbitrator in terms of clause 60 of the contract once, a proper notice is given for appointment of an arbitrator identifying the „specific disputes‟.
6. The petitioner also filed OMP No.364/2014 under Section 9 of the Act seeking interim orders regarding the show cause notice dated 05.03.2014 issued by the respondent. This court on 24.03.2014 passed an order of status quo. However, prior to the said order itself, on 19.03.2014, the respondent issued an order of blacklisting the petitioner. The petitioner again filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act being OMP No. 368/2014. On 26.03.2014, a stay order was passed in favour of the petitioner.
The giving of such notice is a matter inter partes and is a procedural and not a decisive step. Accordingly, its form and terms do not call for excessively strict scrutiny. If, in substance, a party communicates (i) an intention to resort to arbitration, and (ii) a requirement that the other party should do something on his part in that regard, this will in general suffice to define the commencement of arbitration."
Clearly, no particular format is required for the purpose of invocation of the Arbitration Clause. The only requirement would be that with sufficient clarity petitioner should be able to communicate the invocation of the arbitration clause.
While interpreting the above clause, this court held as follows:
"8(i). In my opinion, there are two other reasons, and which are in addition to the reasoning given in the case of Saraswati Construction Co. (supra) for holding that a prior requirement to be complied with before seeking reference of disputes to the arbitration is only directory and not mandatory.
(ii) The first reason is that if the arbitration clause is read in a mandatory manner with respect to prior requirement to be complied with before invoking arbitration, the same can result in serious and grave prejudice to a party who is seeking to invoke arbitration because the time consumed in conciliation proceedings before seeking invocation of arbitration is not exempted from limitation under any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 including its Section 14. Once there is no provision to exclude the period spent in conciliation proceedings, it is perfectly possible that if conciliation proceedings continue when the limitation period expires the same will result in nullifying the arbitration clause on account of the same not capable of being invoked on account of bar of limitation i.e when proceedings for reference to arbitration are filed in court, the right to seek arbitration may end up being beyond three years of arising of the disputes and hence the petition for reference may be barred by limitation. Another example would make this position clear that suppose on the last date of limitation period of three years a party wants to invoke an arbitration clause but the arbitration clause contains the requirement of invoking the precondition of 'mutual discussion'. Surely, on the last date if a notice has to be given for invoking mutual discussion, no mutual discussion or conciliation can take place on the same date of the notice itself i.e., no mutual discussion can take place before expiry of the period of limitation which expires on that very day on which the notice for mutual discussion is given. Therefore, if the pre-condition of mutual discussion is treated as mandatory, valuable rights of getting disputes decided by arbitration will get extinguished and which is not a position which should be acceptable in law.