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4. It is contended in the second place that the liability under a decree passed by a Presidency Small Cause Court is not a 'debt' as defined in the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and consequently such a liability is outside the jurisdiction of Debt Settlement Boards altogether.

5. It appears to us that the only question really arising in the case is that of the validity of Sections 20 and 34, Debars Act, in the aspect concerned. The Division Bench before which the invalidity of only Section 20 appears to have been urged, has observed that if that question is determined in the petitioner's favour, a further question will arise as to whether the liability under the decree in the present case is or is not a 'debt' in the special sense of the Act. Before us, it was contended that not only Section 20, bull Section 34 also was invalid, in so far as it affected the execution of Presidency Small Cause Court decrees. In our opinion, if the first question be enlarged so as to embrace the invalidity of both Sections 20 and 34, the second question cannot arise, whether the first is decided in the petitioner's favour or against him. We shall, however, be the better able to explain our reasons for this opinion after we have dealt with the principal question.

7. The preamble of the Act stated its object to be "to provide for the relief of indebtedness of agricultural debtors and to amend the law governing the relations between agricultural debtors and their creditors." 'Debtor' was defined, leaving aside certain particulars, as a person whose primary means of livelihood was agriculture [Section 2(9)]. Barring certain exceptions which are not here material, 'debt' was defined as including "all liabilities of a debtor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured whether payable under a decree or order of a civil Court or otherwise...." [Section 2(8)]. The Act provided for the establishment of Boards for the settlement of 'debts' owed by 'debtors' and by Section 18 enacted that if any question arose as to the existence or amount of any debt, the Board should decide it, except in the case of a decree of a civil Court which would be conclusive evidence as to both the existence and the amount of the debt. Section 20 was in the following terms:

10. Section 20 of the Act, again, which authorised the Board to decide, should the question arise, whether a person was a debtor or not, did not give it such authority to decide whether a particular liability was or was not a debt. Nor did Section 18 contain any such provision. It was accordingly held in Nur Mia v. Noakhali Nath Bank Ltd. that on receipt of a notice under Section 34, a civil Court was entitled to decide for itself whether the liability, in respect of which the proceeding was pending before it, was a debt as defined in the Act and if it found it was not, to disregard the notice and go on with the proceeding. The decision was fol. lowed in numerous later cases. Lastly, since Section 34 did not mention the Appellate Officer, it was held that he could not give a notice under the section and even if he did, the civil Court, receiving it, would not be obliged to stay the proceedings before it.

36. But since the matter was argued before us at length, we might briefly indicate our Opinion thereon. In our opinion, whatever doubt there might have been on the question previously, there can be none, after the amending Act of 1940, that the liability under a decree of a Presidency Small Cause Court is not a debt within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The Act, by Section 2(8), defines 'debt' as including all liabilities of a debtor, "whether payable under a decree or order of a civil Court or otherwise." It was held in the case of Tarak Nath Kundu v. Panchanan Dutt that a decretal debt, if it did not come under the first part of the definition, for the reason that the Court which had passed the decree was not a civil Court, would not be drawn in by the phrase "or otherwise" occurring in the second part. A decretal debt would have to come under the definition as payable under a decree of a civil Court, or it would be outside the definition altogether. Previously the term 'civil Court,' which had not been defined in the Act, had been held to mean only the Courts established under the Civil Courts Act. The Legislature, by the amending Act, sought to meet the effect of these decisions only by adding a definition of 'civil Court' and including therein the High Court on its appellate side, but did not, in this respect, amend the definition of 'debt' in any way. In other words, it widened the content of the first part of the definition of 'debt' incorporating more decretal debts there through an enlarged definition of 'civil Court,' but made no use of the phrase 'or otherwise.' In the circumstances, it must be held that the Legislature accepted the view that a decretal debt could not be a debt within the meaning of the Act by virtue of the phrase 'or otherwise' but must come under the first part of the definition as a liability payable under a decree of a Court which is a 'civil Court.' It is a well-known rule of construction that if after a provision in an Act has been judicially construed, the Legislature amends the Act, but does not, by the amendment, override the construction adopted, it must be deemed to have accepted the construction. The definition of 'civil Court' now added, does not include the Presidency Small Cause Court and it follows that a liability, payable under a decree of that Court, is not a debt within the meaning of the Act.