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Showing contexts for: universal legatee in Natesa Sastrigal And Anr. vs Alamelu Achi By Power Agent, K.S. ... on 7 February, 1950Matching Fragments
In his commentary on the Civil Procedure Code, Mulla states that the definition in Section 2(11) settles the meaning of the term as explained in the case from which we have just quoted so extensively.
6. In support of his contention that a legatee is a legal representative, Mr. Srinivasan referred to four decisions, Subbarayudu v. Ramadasu, 45 Mad. 872 : (A.I.R. (10) 1923 Mad. 237); Abdul Aziz v. Dharmasay Jetha & Co., A. I. R. (27) 1940 Lah. 348 : (190 I. C. 506); Dwarak Singh v. Harihar Baksh Singh, 12 Luck 1 : (A. I. R. (23), 1936 Oudh 7) and Ram Narain v. Mt. Phula, A. I. R. (30) 1943 Oudh 24 : (203 I. C. 125). In Subbarayudu v. Ramadasu, 45 Mad. 872: (A. I. R. (10) 1923 Mad. 237), a decision given in this Court, the facts were that a mortgagee, who had obtained a preliminary decree for sale died leaving a will bequeathing the mortgage decree to A. The legatee A applied to be brought on record only after the expiration of the 90 days, which Article 176, Limitation Act, prescribes, "to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff .... made a party". It was contended in this Court that the appellant was not in the position of a legal representative of the deceased plaintiff within the meaning of Order 22, Rule 3, Civil P. C., but that contention was overruled. This decision, according to Mr. Srinivasan, is a direct authority for the position that a legatee is a legal representative of a deceased testator. In respect of this decision, we would first of all state that it does not appear that any executor had been appointed under the will of the deceased mortgagee with the result that apparently there was no one else competent to continue the proceedings. We also find that this decision has been overruled in Perumal Pillai v. Perumal Chetti, 51 Mad. 701 : (A. I. R. (15) 1928 Mad. 914 FB). Mr. Srinivasan attempted to argue that Subbarayudu v. Ramadasu, 45 Mad. 872 : (A. I. R. (10) 1923 Mad. 237) has not been overruled in respect of the principle he seeks to extract from it. Even if that be so, there can be no doubt that its authority stands considerably impaired. The decision in Abdul Aziz v. Dharmsay Jetha & Co., A. I. R. (27) 1940 Lah. 348 : (190 I. C. 506) merely laid down, what nobody seriously disputes, that a decree-holder can proceed against a legatee irrespective of whether the other properties of the deceased are, or are not sufficient to pay the debts of the decree-holder. The question for which it was cited as an authority, namely, whether a legatee is the legal representative of the deceased was not really decided there. In Dwark Singh v. Harihar Baksh Singh, 12 Luck. 1 : (A. I. R. (23) 1936 Oudh 7) it was decided that the universal legatee of a person is his legal representative within the meaning of Section 2(11), Civil P. C. It may be remarked that this decision does not lay down that a legatee of a part of the estate is the legal representative of the testator. Nevertheless, argued Mr. Srinivasan, if a single universal legatee can be the legal representative, why not all the legatees put together collectively and as a body be treated as legal representatives of the testator. If one who takes the whole can be a legal representative, why not all who together take the whole ? As a matter of pure logic this argument has some force; but there is a material difference between a universal legatee and the legatee of a part only of the estate, because he who takes the whole cannot but be its representative. A universal legatee is more than the arithmetical aggregate of a number of part legatees.
9. The result of this discussion may be shortly put. The persons or class of persons indicated by the expression "legal representative" would depend on the context. Subject to that qualification it includes properly appointed executors and administrators; it includes persons who have taken on themselves duties and responsibilities, which belong to the office of executor or administrator even though only in respect of part of the estate; it includes heirs-at-law, whether they take by succession or by survivorship: it includes reversioners where the action has been brought by or against the widow as representing her husband's estate; it includes a universal legatee, it may perhaps in some cases and for some purposes include persons in de facto possession of the entire estate of the deceased, though this Court has so far not endorsed this view; but it does not include trespassers; it does not include creditors who have received payments of the debts due from the estate of the deceased; it does not include persons dealing in the ordinary course of business with goods of the deceased received from another; it does not include persons who intervene merely for purposes of preserving the goods of the deceased or providing for his funeral or for the immediate necessities of his family; it does not include legatees of a part of the estate and it does not include those taking possession of the property of the deceased from the legatees of a part of the estate.