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40. Thus, according to Mr. Singla, the notice received by Dr. Dawar not being a six months‟ notice to quit fell foul of the provisions of the aforesaid section.

41. Reference was also made by Mr. Singla to sub-Section (1) to Section 15 of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947 whereby and whereunder, the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance, 1944, the New Delhi House Rent Control Order, 1939 and the Ajmer-Merwara Control of Rent Eviction Order, 1946 were repealed; and to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the said Act which provided that the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act [Punjab Act [X of 1941] shall cease to have effect in the province of Delhi. Mr. Singla contended that the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 was a temporary statute, and the law in respect of a temporary statute, as opposed to a repealed statute was quite different. In other words, what was sought to be contended was that despite the fact that the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 had ceased to have effect in Delhi (by virtue of the provisions of Section 15 of the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947), the tenancy of the original tenant could not have been terminated except by giving to him a notice of six months as envisaged by Section 10 of the Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1941. In order to emphasize the distinction between a temporary Statute and a repealed Statute, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose, AIR 1962 SC 945 and in particular referred to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the said decision which read as follows: -

"there is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed: the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matters of construction."

In this connection, it would be useful and interesting to consider the decision in the case of Steavenson, (1841) 151 E.R. 1024 at pp.1026-1027 itself. That case related to 6th Geo. 4, c. 133, section 4 which provided that every person who held a commission or warrant as surgeon or assistant surgeon in His Majesty's Navy or Army, should be entitled to practise as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. The statute itself was temporary and it expired on August 1, 1826. It was urged that a person who was entitled to practise as an apothecary under the Act would lose his right after August 1, 1826 because there was no saving provision in the statute and its expiration would bring to an end all the rights and liabilities created by it. The Court rejected this contention and held that the person who had acquired a right to practise as an apothecary, without having passed the usual examination, by virtue of the provision of the temporary Act, would not be deprived of his right after its expiration. In dealing with the question about the effect of the expiration of the temporary statute, Lord Abinger, C.B. observed that "it is by no means a consequence of an act of Parliament's expiring, that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. Take the case of a penalty imposed by an act of Parliament would not a person who had been guilty of the offence upon which the legislature had imposed the penalty while the Act was in force, be liable to pay it after its expiration ? The case of a right acquired under the Act is stronger. The 6 Geo. 4, C. 133, provides that parties who hold such warrants shall be entitled to practise as apothecaries; and we cannot engraft on the statute a new qualification, limiting that enactment." It is in support of the same conclusion that Parker, B. made the observations which we have already cited. "We must look at this act", observed Parker, B., "and see whether the restriction in the 11th clause, that the provisions of the statute are only to last for a limited time, is applicable to this privilege, in question. It seems to me that the meaning of the legislature was that all assistant-surgeons, who were such before the 1st of August, 1826, should be entitled to the same privileges of practising as apothecaries, as if they had been in actual practise as such on August 1, 1815, and that their privilege as such was of an executory nature, capable of being carried into effect after the August 1, 1826."

Take the case of a penalty imposed by a temporary statute for offences created by it. If a person is tried and convicted under the relevant provisions of the temporary statute and sentenced to undergo imprisonment, could it be said that as soon as the temporary statute expires by efflux of time, the detention of the offender in jail by virtue of the order of sentence imposed upon him would cease to be valid and legal ? In our opinion, the answer to this question has to be in the negative.

42. I am afraid there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the Punjab Rent Restriction Act being a temporary Statute would enure to the benefit of the original tenant, rendering invalid the notice to quit issued on 6th July, 1974, long after the said enactment had ceased to be in force. The interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the paragraphs 19 and 21 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhupendra Kumar Bose (supra) is entirely misplaced. The Supreme Court was dealing with the question as to whether certain proceedings had become infructuous in view of the lapse of an Ordinance which was a "temporary statute" and it was in this context that it was stated that the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of a special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it, will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. However, the Supreme Court went on to state that this was by no means an inflexible and universal rule. It further observed that, for this reason the legislature can, and often does avoid anomalous consequences by enacting in the temporary statute itself, a saving provision. Admittedly, there is no such saving provision enacted in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941 or even in the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. Hence, this argument is of no avail to the appellants.