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3. It is that order which is challenged by the Gram Panchayat in this Letters Patent Appeal..

4. It has been contended by Mr. S. D. Shah who appears on behalf of the original petitioner that this appeal is not maintainable. The Special Civil Application was filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In order to answer the contention which has been raised before us. it is necessary to determine the nature of the order which was made by the Appeal Committee in appeal and by the Development Commissioner in revision. Section 290-A, inter alia, provides that the Appeal Committee of a district panchayat shall exercise the powers conferred upon the district panchayat under Ss. 93, 178 and 290 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and that the Appeal Committee shall consist of the President of the panchayat and four other members of the panchayat. It further provides that the State Government shall make rules consistent with the Act to regulate the procedure which the Appeal Committee shall follow in exercising its appellate powers and that such rules may, inter alia, provide for the mode of settling the differences which may arise between the members of the Bench. Sub-section (6) provides that the appellate powers of the Appeal Committee shall include the power to grant temporary injunction or to issue a direction to stay the execution of the decision or order appealed against until the disposal of the appeal or to make such other interlocutory order as may appear to be just and convenient and that such power may be exercised by the Chairman of the Appeal Committee. Section 290-A shows that the Appeal Committee which exercises powers conferred upon a district panchayat under Ss.93, 178 and 290 has the trappings of a Court. Sec 93 deals with the control on erection of buildings. Section 178 deals with the question of levy of taxes and fees by gram panchayats and nagar panchayats. S.290 provides for appeals against the orders of gram or nagar panchayats. The State Government has made in pursuance of this section Gujarat District Panchayats Appeal Committee (Procedure) Rules, 1968. Rule 5 provides for registration of an appeal. It, inter alia lays down that if the Secretary is satisfied that an appeal which has been presented suffers from some minor defects only, the Secretary shall register it. If an appeal has been filed beyond time, the secretary has with the approval of the Appeal Committee power to register an appeal if he is satisfied that on account of the non-communication of the order or decision and that, therefore, he could not prefer the appeal within the period of limitation. Sub-rule (3) of R.5 provides for return of appeal under certain circumstances. R. 6 provides that an appeal shall be served with notice before the appeal is decided on merits. It confers power upon the Chairman to call for all the material records and papers which are necessary for deciding the appeal. Next it also confers power upon the committee to examine any witness or to require any document to be produced in order to enable it to decide the appeal. It then provides that decision on merits shall be recorded by the Appeal Committee after the parties have been heard. Rule 8 which is the last rule provides that, in any matter not provide for in those rules, the procedure laid down in the Civil P.C. 1908, may, as far as applicable, be followed or that the appeal committee may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit. A glance at these rules makes it clear that the Appeal Committee which inter aila, has the power to examine witnesses is under an obligation to hear the parties before it decides the appeal on merits and that the Civil Procedure Code is as far as practicable applicable to regulate the procedure before the Appeal Committee. It also necessary to note that the function which the Appeal Committee performs is the function of deciding a dispute between a gram panchayat or nagar panchayat on one hand and the party aggrieved by the decision of the gram or nagar panchayat on the other hand. In other words, the decision of a gram or nagar panchayat becomes the subject-matter of lis between the gram or nagar panchayat on one hand and those who are aggrieved by it on the other hand and this lis between the parties is decided by the Appeal Committee performs the function of a judicial tribunal. It decides the lis between the parties and has also got trappings of a Civil Court. Therefore, the order which the Appeal Committee makes, in our opinion, is a judicial order.

These are the contours of the revisional jurisdiction which the State Government exercises under S. 305 Where a subordinate tribunal, such as the Appellate Committee has exercised judicial power by deciding the lis between the parties and if such a decision is challenged before the State Government under S.305, the State Government also exercises the judicial power, act as a judicial tribunal and decides the lis between the parties. It is, therefore, clear that the decision which the Appeal Committee or the revisional authority against the appellate decision of the Appeal Committee exercises a judicial in character. The decisions which they record are judicial decisions.

11. In our opinion, a judicial decision is one which is rendered by a Court or an authority which has no interest in the subject matter of the decision and which is rendered sifter hearing both the parties. In other words, when a Court or an authority howsoever it might have been described, decides lis between two contesting parties, to decision which it renders is a judicial decision. When such a decision is impugned before the High port, what the High Court: does is to revise it. While doing so, the High Court may confirm it, modify it or quash it. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court with in the meaning of that expression of used in Cl.15 of the Letters Patent embraces within its sweep all judicial orders made by Courts, Tribunals and other authorities howsoever they might have been described. Such a function may be performed by an officer of the State Government irrespective of who or which authority exercises this jurisdiction if the decision rendered by such an authority or tribunal is a judicial decision by which the lis or the contest between the parties is decided, the High Court in exercise of its power under Art.226 does nothing more than to revise that decision. It may quash it or it may confirm it. But essentially the jurisdiction which the High Court Exercises is that of revising the judicial decision impugned before it. Therefore, irrespective of whether such a decision has been impugned under Art.227 or Art.226, none of which makes any reference to a right of appeal, appeal against the decision of a learned single judge from such a decision is excluded by Cl.15 of the Letters Patent.

13. In our opinion, the test which is required to be applied wile determining whether an order made by a learned single Judge is appeasable to a Division Bench under C1. 15 of the Letters Patent is not whether the party has invoked Art. 226 or Art. 227 or whether one Article confers larger jurisdiction while the other Article does not do so. But the real test is whether what the learned single judge has done is to revise a judicial order. If the order which was challenged before him was a judicial order and he examined that order and recorded his decision, be did nothing else except to revise it. In case of an executive or administrative order, a Court of law does not exercise visional jurisdiction. We do not revise such orders. We may uphold their vacate them to be invalid and unlawful. We do not revise them in the sense that we not substitute our decisions for the of the executive orders impugned before as nor do we modify them. The expression revisional jurisdiction" used in C1. 15 of the Letters Patent has a reference to a judicial order and to no other orders. We have reproduced above Clause 15 of the Letters Patent in its entirety, When Clause 15 is read in its entirety, it leaves no doubt in our mind that it refers in judicial orders. Such a judicial order does not necessarily emanate from or original in a Civil Court. It may originate in a Tribunal or in the authority. As, stated above, the test whether a particular order is Judicial order or net lies in determining the fact whether the tribunal or authority below has dicided lis between the contesting parties and adjudicated upon their rights. A lis exists between the, parties when there is a preposition by one and opposition by another. The existence of such a lis, the decision by a tribunal or authority having no interest in the subject matter of the decision and adjudication of the rights of the contesting parties in that behalf lead to an irresistible inference that the order made by such tribunal or authority is a judicial order. If such a judicial order is challenged in this Court before a learned single judge, he revises it. He may do so either under Art.226 or Article 227. Now, when he exercises such a revisional jurisdiction irrespective of the fact whether it invoked under Art,227 or Article 226 his order is not appeasable to a Division Bench under Cl.15 of the Letters Patent. It is needless for us to say that the nature of an order, whether it is a judicial or quasijudicial order, is determined by the following tests: (I) whether the tribunal or the authority had decided lis between the parties, (ii) whether it had interest in the subject matter of the decision and (iii) whether the rights of the contesting parties had been adjudicated upon by it. If the answer to the first and the third questions is in the affirmative and the answer to the second question is in the negative, the decision which is rendered by a learned single judge in a petition either under Art. 226 or Art. 227 against such an order is not appeasable. The Tribunal or the authority may or may not have all the trappings of a Court. The appeal ability of a decision of a learned single judge before whom such an order is impugned in barred by Cl.15 of the Letters Patents.