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purchaser at a private sale. Execution Purchasers. according to this decision, purchase the property subject to all the charges and encumbrances legal and equitable which would bind the debtor$. We do not agree with the view taken in this decision. We how,ever, do not consider it necessary to go into the matter at length because we find that this decision was expressly overruled by this Court in Laxmi Devi v. Mukand Kunwar(1) and the High Court, relying on this Court's decision, had also repelled a similar contention pressed on behalf of the Municipal Corporation there. This Court pointed out in Laxmi Devi's case(2) that the provi- sions of Section 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act prevail over Section 5 with the result that the provisions of Section 57 and those contained in Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act must apply to transfer, by operation of law. Section 100, it may be pointed out, falls in Chapter IV. Reliance was next placed on a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nawal Kishore v. The Municipal Board, Agra (1). According to this ,decision the question of constructive notice is a question of fact which falls to be determined on the evidence and circumstances of each case. But that Court felt that there was a principle on which question of constructive notice could rest, that principle being that all intending purchasers of the property in municipal areas where the property is subject to a municipal tax which has been made a charge on the property by statute have a constructive knowledge of the tax and of the possibility of some arrears being due with the result that it becomes their duty before acquiring the property to make enquiries as to the amount of tax which is due or which may be due and if they fail to make this enquiry such failure amounts to a wilful abstention or gross negligence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and notice must be imputed to them. The reference to the Full Bench in the reported case was necessitated because of conflict of judicial opinion between that Court and Oudh Chief Court. The earlier decision of a Division Bench in Municipal Board, Cawnpore v. Roop Chand Jain (2) was overruled and the Bench decision of Oudh High Court in Municipal Board, Lucknow v. Ramjilal (4) was approved. The next decision to which reference was made by Shri Desai is reported as Akhoy Kumar Banerjee v. Corporation of Calcutta (5). In this case, after distinguishing a mortgage from a charge, it was observed-that the statutory charge in that case could not be enforced against the property in the hands of bona fide purchaser for value without notice. While dealing with the question whether the appellants in that case were purchasers for value without notice, it was observed that they had (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 726.

"Mr. Pandya absent. The taxes have to be paid. The Receivers state that they can pay only by sale of some properties of the insolvent from which they want. Sanctioned. The property in which the insolvent stays should first be disposed of. The terms arc accordingly so authorised."

It is not known what happened thereafter. It is, however, difficult to appreciate why after having secured the necessary order from the court municipal taxes were not paid off by the receivers and why the municipal corporation did not pursue the matter and secure payment of the taxes due. May be that the municipal corporation thought that since these dues were a charge on the property they need not pursue the matter with the receivers and also need not approach the insolvency court. If so, then this, in our opinion, was not a proper attitude to adopt. In any event the plaintiff could not reasonably have thought that the municipal corporation had not cared to secure payment of the taxes due since 1949. On the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, we cannot hold that the plaintiff as a prudent and reasonable man was bound to enquire from the municipal corporation about the existence of any arrears of taxes due from the receivers. It appears from the record, however, that he did in fact make enquiries from the receivers but they did not give any intimation. The plaintiff made a statement on oath that when he purchased the building in question it was occupied by the tenants and the rent used to be recovered by the receivers. There is no rebuttal to this evidence. Now, if the receivers were receiving rent from the tenants, the reasonable assumption would be that the municipal taxes which were a charge on the property and which were also given priority under Section 61 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, had been duly paid by the receivers out of the rental income. The plaintiff could have no reasonable ground for assuming that they were in arrears. From the plaintiff's testimony it is clear that he did nevertheless make enquiries from the receivers if there were any dues against the property though the enquiry was not made specifically about municipal dues. Apparently he was not informed about the arrears of municipal taxes. This seems to us explainable on the ground that the receivers had, after securing appropriate orders, for some reasons not clear on the record, omitted to pay the arrears of municipal taxes and they were, therefore, reluctant to disclose this lapse on their part. On these facts and cir- cumstances we do not think that the plaintiff could reasonably be fixed with any constructive notice of the arrears of municipal taxes since 1949. So far as the legal position is concerned we are inclined to agree with the reasoning adopted by the Allahabad High Court in Roop Chand Jain's case (supra) in preference to the reasoning of the Full Bench of that Court in Nawal Kishore's case (supra) or of the Division Bench of Oudh Chief Court in Ramji Lal's case (supra). We do not think there is any principle or firm rule of law as suggested in Nawal Kishore's case (supra) imputing to all intending purchasers of property in municipal area where municipal taxes are a charge on the property, constructive knowledge of the existence of such municipal taxes and of the reasonable possibility of those taxes being in affears. The question of constructive knowledge or notice has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the Full Bench decision in Nawal Kishore's case (supra) also the question of constructive notice is a question of fact and we do not find that the material on the present record justifies that the plaintiff should be fixed, with any constructive notice of the arrears of municipal taxes.