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7. The Division Bench Judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ishwar Singh M. Rajput v. State of Gujarat reported in 1991 (2) Crimes 160 while dealing with the question of release of prisoners on parole or furlough with reference to Section 32A of the NDPS Act, 1985 held that since parole means suspension of sentence and furlough amounts to remission of sentence and in view of the clear mandate of the parliament under Section 32A of the NDPS Act not to suspend or remit sentence awarded in the said Act, the prisoners were not entitled to be released either on parole or furlough. The Division Bench was of the view that if the prisoner is released on parole, his sentence is suspended for the time being for a period for which he is released on parole and if he is released on furlough his sentence is suspended and remitted. The constitutional challenge to Section 32A of the Act was negatived.

Ultimately while summarising in para 33, it is laid down that the parole does not interrupt the period of detention and, thus, that period needs to be counted towards the total period of detention unless the terms for grant of parole, rules or instructions, prescribe otherwise.

11. Coming now to the judgment of the Apex Court in Dadu alias Tulsidas v. State of Maharasktra (cited supra) upon which heavy reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. It has been held that parole is not a suspension of the sentence as the convict continues to be serving the sentence despite granting of parole under the statute, rules, jail manual or the Government Orders. On the basis of this, it has been further held that it is thus clear that parole did not amount to suspension, remission or commutation of sentences which could be withheld under the garb of Section 32A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and notwithstanding the provisions of the offending section, a convict is entitled to parole, subject however, to the conditions governing the grant of it under the statute, if any, or the jail manual or government instructions. In this judgment, it was held that Section 32A of the NDPS Act insofar as it completely debars the jurisdiction of this Court to suspend the sentence awarded to the convict under the Act is unconstitutional. Therefore, the Apex Court directed that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 169 of 1999 shall be at liberty to apply for parole and his prayer be considered and dispose of in accordance with the statutory provisions, if any, jail manual or government instructions without implying Section 32A of the Act as a bar for consideration of prayer.