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1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the decision, dismissing his suit for recovery of possession of the property specified in the schedule attached to the plaint and in the plan. The plaintiff died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives, appellants 2 to 7, are brought on record and the appeal is continued by them.

2. The dispute relates to a piece of land, on which the Gaiety Theatre stands besides other structures. The plan attached to the plaint is marked as Ex. P. 1 and it contains the details of the properties sought to be recovered. The property in suit is B X Y A in the plan, bounded by Blacker's Road on the south, Dams Road on the west, a street on the north and the land belonging to Casino Theatre on the east. The space reserved for the parking of cars at the Gaiety Theatre is marked C X Y D. The Gaiety Theatre is in B C D A. The whole property B X Y A is enclosed by compound walls on all sides with gates on the south. Besides the superstructure of the Gaiety Theatre in the portion marked B C D A, there is what is described as a tiled shed P G H E, which contains a booking office and two rooms. Besides these structures, there arc certain other sheds in the north of the site and other modern conveniences for the benefit of those who witness cinema shows. There is also some open space on all sides of the structure of the theatre.

The facts of that case are somewhat interesting. The respondent was in possession of a farm of which a few acres, worth more than 10/- were within a borough; but there was no building on it. In order to acquire a qualification to vote, an electioneering-agent erected on that land a shed, made of wood, with four boarded sides and a boarded roof, all of which were supported by four posts. The question was whether it was a "building" so as to confer a qualification to vote within the meaning of Section 27 of the Reform Act. The revising-barrister held that it was; but the court reversed that decision. It was merely a ruse to defeat the provisions of the Act and to acquire a qualification to vote. Such devices are not uncommon in this country. The shed in question was not intended for the occupation of any person and was made of such frail stuff that it could be destroyed at any moment. There was therefore no sort of permanency or it was wholly unfit for residence. It has been held in -- 'Baladin v. Lakhan Singh', AIR 1927 All 214 (G) that a house in ruins was not a building or a house. Mere compound wall with a gate enclosing a space cannot, in view of the accepted interpretation, of the word 'building' in the decisions above cited, be considered as a building within the meaning of the Act. The extreme contention of Mr. Srinivasagopalachari for the respondent was that apart from other considerations which ought to enter into the decision of the question, even if we take into consideration the compound wall with the gates, that would itself constitute a "building" within the meaning of the Act. It is impossible to accept such an extreme view in the light of the decisions above cited.

24. The description of the premises in Exhibit P-9 as the preamble thereto shows is "that piece or parcel of land lying at and in No. 1/1 Blacker's road more particularly described in the schedule hereto annexed and the compound wall and certain buildings standing thereon". The description in the schedule is "that piece or parcel of land together with the buildings being a portion of the premises known as Blacker's road situate and bearing door No. 1/1, Blacker's road etc.,". It is urged by Mr. Muthukrishna Ayyar that the order in which the different parts of the premises demised as described--land and compound wall and buildings, as in the preamble, land together with the buildings as in the schedule--is significant as indicating the relative importance attached by the parties to the different parts. I am not prepared to say that the argument is altogether without force, 'prima facie'. At the same time it seems to me that that is a matter of detail of the form of conveyancing, while what has to be regarded on the whole is the substance of the subject matter demised. As observed by the learned Judge below, there is no evidence as regards the condition, nature and extent of the buildings belonging to the lessor within the compound wall, and it is difficult for us to say in what proportion of importance on a splitting up of the premises demised into land and buildings the land and the buildings would stand in relation to each other. As further observed by the learned Judge, it Is sufficient to say that there are some buildings within the premises and that from the year 1914 down to Exhibit P-9 the land and the buildings enclosed in the compound wall have been treated as one unit and have always been leased out as one property. These are considerations sufficient in my opinion to entail failure of the argument for the appellant as presented to us.

31. In my opinion the word 'building' is a more generic word than house. A building need have no roof while a house must have. A house is, according to Tomins' Law Dictionary, a place of dwelling or habitation which means ordinarily that there must be a roof for it which provides shelter. Of course neither building nor house need be of brick or stone as I have already remarked. It seems to me that even if "building" generally indicated a structure of brick or stone and with a roof, as defined by Lord Esher M. R. it may be that definitions under special Acts contemplate a building without a roof & a building not made of brick or stone. Such was the case for instance so far as the need of a roof is concerned in the decision reported in -- 'Public Prosecutor v. Kalia Perumal Naidu', 8 Mad LT 431 (W) wherein it was pointed out that by section 3 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, Act IV of 1884 "building" was defined as including a wall. So it was held that the word "building" in Clause (5) of Section 180 of the Act included mere walls built for the purpose of erecting a house and the construction of such walls without the license of the municipality rendered persons constructing them liable to the penalty prescribed in section 263, even though the house to support which the walls were designed had not been built. "Building" in the etymological sense means "any thing built", and there is no reason why if that is the intendment of the legislature in connection with a particular enactment, compound walls with the space inside may not be regarded as a building.