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3. We have heard, at some length, Mr. Chitnis, senior counsel appearing for the appellant. Mr. Chitnis has taken us through the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the Preamble of the MCOCA. He has also taken us through the relevant provisions of the MCOCA more particularly Sections 2(1)(d), 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f). Mr. Chitnis submitted that Section 2(1)(e) of the MCOCA describes "organized crime" as continuing unlawful activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of AJN violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means, with the object of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency. Mr. Chitnis submitted that if we read the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the MCOCA and the Preamble thereof and definition of the term "organized crime", it is clear that the continuing unlawful activity must be indulged in by use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits or gaining undue economic or other advantage. Mr. Chitnis submitted that pecuniary benefits is the main ingredient of this section and unless there is material to show that the continuing unlawful activity was carried out for pecuniary benefit, the provisions of the MCOCA cannot be attracted. In this connection, Mr. Chitnis relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in Sherbahadur Akram Khan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 ALL MR (Cri.) 1. Mr. Chitnis relied AJN upon the observations made by the Division Bench that the provisions of the MCOCA would be attracted only if it is established that unlawful activity is undertaken by a person with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or for promoting insurgency. Mr. Chitnis submitted that in this case this court has made it clear that the words in Section 2(1)(e) - "with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage" will have to be given some effective meaning and applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the words "other advantage" would have to be interpreted in the same manner as the previous terms "pecuniary benefits" or "undue economic advantage". On the doctrine of `ejusdem generis', Mr. Chitnis relied on R. & B. Falcon (A) PTY Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2008) 12 SCC 466 and the Commissioner of Income-tax v. McDowell & Co.

Bharat Gavhane is, therefore, not applicable to the present case. Judgment in Madan Gangwani will also not be applicable to this case because merely filing of two charge-sheets is not considered for application of the MCOCA. The object of the organized crime syndicate headed by the appellant is also to gain pecuniary advantage.

36. It was urged that the words "other advantage"

appearing in Section 2(1)(e) must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding objectives. Sherbahadur Khan was relied upon by Mr. Chitnis. In that case, the Division Bench of this court held that the words in Section AJN 2(1)(e) "with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits or gaining undue economic or other advantage" will have to be given some effective meaning. The Division Bench further observed that applying the principle of ejusdem generis, the words "other advantage" would have to be interpreted in the same manner as the previous terms "pecuniary benefits" or "undue economic advantage".

Abbott, 14 Q.B. 17); or something differnet. Lord Tenterden in Sandiman v. Breach, 7 B. & C. 99 : said, - "Where a statute, or other document, enumerates several classes of persons or things, and immediately following and classed with such enumeration the clause embraces "other" persons or things, -the word "other" will generally be read as "other such like", so that the persons or things therein comprised may be read as ejusdem generis with and not of a quality superior to, or different from, those specially enumerated. The principle of this rule as regards statutes was explained by Kenyon, C.J., in R. v. Wallis (5 T.R. 379), wherein he said that if the legislature had meant the general words to be applied without restriction it "would have used only one compendious word." Yet, on the other hand, though "it is very likely that in former days the doctrine was applied strictly, there are cases which show that the modern tendency is to reject a restricted construction". (per Esher, M.R. Anderson v. Anderson, 64 L.J.Q.B. 458; (1895) 1 Q.B. 749.) AJN The rule of ejusdem generis is by no means a rule of universal application, and its use is to carry out not to defeat, the legislative intent. When it can be seen that the particular word by which the general word is followed was inserted, not to give a coloring to the general word, but for a distinct object, then, to carry out the purpose of the statute, the general word ought to govern. It is a mistake to allow the rule to pervert the construction. (Words and Phrases.)

In Allen v. Emerson, (1944) 1 KB 362 Asquith, J., gave interesting examples of particular words followed by general words where the principle of ejusdem generis might or might not apply. We think that the following illustration will clear any difficulty. In the expression "books, pamphlets, newspapers and other documents" private letters may not be held included if "other documents" be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes before. But in a provision which reads "newspapers or other document likely to convey secrets to the enemy", the words "other document" would include document of any kind and would not take their colour from `news papers'. It follows, therefore, that interpretation ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis need not always be made when words showing particular classes are followed by general words. Before the general words can be so interpreted there must be a genus constituted or a category disclosed with reference to which the general words can and are intended to AJN be restricted."