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24. prohibition of employment of children in factories, etc. -- No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment."

The word 'begar' is of Indian origin and is well understood in ordinary parlance. it is compulsory or involuntary labour with or without payment. This Court has approved the meaning of begar as accepted by the Bombay high Court in S Vasudevan & Ors. Vs. S.D. Mital & Ors. [AIR 1962 Bom. 53]. In S. Vasudevan's case there was challenge to the constitutional validity of the essential Services Maintenance Ordinance, 1960 prohibiting bank strikes, and one of the contentions raised was that the Ordinance made the petitioners work against their will at the threat of penal consequences and that amounted to a form of forced labour which clause (1) or Article 23 of the Constitution prohibited and that thus the Ordinance was bad in law as it contravened the provisions of Article 23(1). High Court did not agree and said: "This contention is also without any force. It omits to notice the force of the word 'similar' occurring in the clause. That clause prohibits (i) traffic in human beings (ii) begar and (iii) other similar forms of forced labour. It would be seen that every form of forced labour is not prohibited by the clause. In fact, clause (2) of Article 23 permits the State to impose on the citizens compulsory service for public purposes. What is prohibited by the first clause is imposing on the citizens forced labour which is similar in form to begar. It is true that is not defined but it is a well understood term which means making a person work against his will and without paying any remuneration therefor. Molesworth at page 580 gives the meaning of begar as 'Labour or service exacted by a Government or a person in power without giving remuneration for it'. In wilsons Glossary the meaning of the word is given as "Forced labour, one pressed to carry burden for individuals or to public, under old system when passed for public service, no pay was given." In our opinion, therefore,to bring the case within the mischief which clause (1) of Article 23 provides against, it must be established that a person is forced to work against his will and without payment. Such is not the case here. Even assuming tthat the threat of penal consequences provided in the Ordinance would have the effect of making the petitioners work against their will, it is beyond doubt that it was not intendedto make them work without any payment; on the other hand, they would be getting their full remuneration for the work they would be doing." This dictum was approved by this Court in the case of People's Union for Democratic Rights & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1982) 3 SCC 235].

24. Article 23 with which we are concerned is clearly designed to protect the individual not only against the State but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is not limited in its application against the State but it prohibits "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of forced labour" practised by anyone else and the Article strikes at such practices where they are found as its sweep is wide and unlimited. The Court said that the reason for enactment of this provision in the Chapter on fundamental rights is to be found in the socioeconomic conditions of the people at the time when the Constitution came to be enacted. The Court went into the question as to why the COnstitution makers thought it prudent to include a provision like Article 23 in the Chapter of Fundamental rights. There is good deal of discussion in paras 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment as to the true scope and meaning of the expression "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of forced labour". It is, thus, clear that this Court in unmistakable terms has said that every form of forced labour, begar or otherwise is within the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no difference whether the person who is forced to give his labour or service to another is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, i.e., labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion. This Court was considering the argument on behalf of the Union of India which laid some emphasis on the word "similar" and contended that it was not every form of forced labour which was prohibited by Article 23 butr only such form of forced labour as was similar to 'begar' and since 'begar' means labour or service which a person is forced to give without receiving any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited only to those forms of forced labour where labour or service is exacted from a person without paying any remuneration at all and if some remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would not fall within the works 'other similar forms of forced labour'. The Court said that this contention sought to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23 and was, in its opinion, not well founded. Thus, this court has held that under Article 23 no one shall be forced to provide labour or service against his will even though it be under a contract or service. Payment of full wages when labour exacted is forced will attract the prohibition contained in Article 23. It will not, therefore, be correct to say that this judgment merely holds that where a person provides labour or service to another on remuneration which is less than the minimum wages, the labour or service provided by him falls within the scope and ambit of the words "forced labour" under Article 23. As a matter of fact, what the judgements holds is where labour is forced on a person then irrespective of the fact that he is paid minimum remuneration as may be fixed or even higher than that, Article 23 will nevertheless be violated. Any amount of remuneration paid to a person will be immaterial if labour is forced upon him. Can it, therefore, be said that sentence of rigorous imprisonment is unconstitutional being violative of clause (1) of Article 23 because prisoner is forced to do hard labour and is saved only because of clause (2) of this Article? Can it be said that when a prisoner is made to do hard labour being part of his sentence, it is in the nature of compulsory service imposed by the State for public purpose? My answer to both these questions is in negative. Article 23 has no role to play. Here, a prisoner is forced to do hard labour as part of his punishment for the crime committed by him and this punishment is imposed upon him by a court competent jurisdiction in accordance with law.

If we further analyse the discussions of constituent Assembly on Article 23, it is significant that it was aimed at prohibiting abuses from forced labour which ryots were compelled to render to big zamindars or to royalty of the erstwhile Indian States. In this connection, a part of speech of Shri Raj Bahadur in the Constituent Assembly may be of some relevance:

"Mr. Vice-President, Sir, begar like slavery has dark and dismal history behind it. As a man coming from an Indian State, I know what this begar, this extortion of forced labour, has meant to the down-trodden and dumb people of the Indian States. If the whole story of this begar is written, it will be replete, with human misery, human suffering, blood and tears. I know how some of the Princes have indulged in their pomp and luxury, in their reckless life, at the expense of the ordinary man, how they have used the downtrodden labourrers and dumb ignorant people for the sake of their pleasure."

It was stressed that Article 23, when it originally stood, contained the works 'except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted" but these words have since been omitted. On this arguments were based that a prisoner is entitled to wages for work done by him otherwise it will be violative of the Article. I do not think the matter is as simple as that. This is no way to interpret a provision when there is no ambiguity. Superfluous and unnecessary words are avoided in drafting a statute when otherwise language used gives full meaning to the provision. Article 23 contains prohibition. What it prohibits is, as is relevant for our purpose 'begar' and other similar forms of forced labour. Now it cannot be said that a prisoner sentenced to undergo imprisonment with hard labour would be doing 'begar' if prison authorities put him to hard labour. It cannot also be "other similar forms of forced labour". During the debates of the Constituent Assembly or of any of its Committees it was never suggested, even remotely, that sentence of rigorous imprisonment is akin to 'begar' or other similar kind of forced labour. This Court has rightly applied the meanings of all these words to cases where labourers are paid at a rate lower than that fixed under the Minimum Wages Act. In those cases labourers though entitled to minimum wages were forced to accept remuneration at a lower rate because of poverty, unemployment or other similar circumstances. Here the prison authorities are obliged to put the prisoners to hard work otherwise they will be disobeying the court mandate and may be liable for courts' wrath. Now if the prisoners are not paid, can the authorities be accused of violating Article 23 of the Constitution? Would they be committing any offence punishable in accordance with law? In this connection we may refer to section 374 IPC which prescribes that whoever unlawfully compels any person to labour against the will of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both. It ccannot be said that prrison authorities are unlawfully "compelling the prisoners to do the work" . the issue may be approached from different angle as well. Prison authorities are obliged to put the prrisoners to work under the orders of the court and at the same time bound to pay wages to the prisoner because of the prohibition of Article 23. It is really a paradoxical situation. Both work and payment must go together whether the authorities have funds to pay or not. If they have no funds and they are not putting the prisoner to work they would be violating the court's order. If, on the other hand, they put the prisoner to work and have no funds to make payment they are violating Article 23. Article 23 is to be given purposive interpretation. No one has questioned the constitutional validity of the Prisons Act or the rules framed thereunder or punishment of rigorous imprisonment which means hard labour. Here, hard labour is a part of sentence and not of any contract. Nobody ever said that during pre-constitutional period, sentence of imprisonment with hard labour was 'begar' or other forms of forced labour'.