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10. Counsel for the petitioner contended, that the first respondent, having entered into an agreement with open eyes with the petitioner, reserving the power of appointing an Engineer Officer of the choice of the Engineer-in-Chief as the Arbitrator, had no justification to file the petition under Sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act for revocation of the authority of the arbitrator, or to seek appointment of another arbitrator, he submitted that, assuming that such power is granted in cases in proved or reasonable likelihood of prejudice or bias in the arbitrator, he could only seek to remove that arbitrator and cannot seek and obtain an order repudiating the agreement whereunder the designated appointing authority was competent to choose another arbitrator. He further submitted that even assuming that Ext. PI petition was properly filed, and at the time of entertaining the same the 2nd respondent-Court had jurisdiction, the Court should have taken into consideration the subsequent events which took place during the pendency of the application, for moulding the reliefs to be granted. According to him, it was not as if the fact of resignation of the arbitrator, against whom objections were raised by the first respondent in the petition filed under Sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, could be completely ignored, because it took place subsequent to the filing of Ext. P1 petition. He submitted that the second respondent-Court was not justified in interfering with the power of the Engineer-in-Chief to appoint another arbitrator in place of the appointed arbitrator, since the power was subject to the terms of a consensual contract and such power was not liable to be lightly interfered with. He lay particular emphasis on the specific finding contained in Ext. P6 order, that "both the parties do not want supersession of the reference". The only course open for the Court, even assuming it had power under Sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, to revoke the authority of the appointed arbitrator and appoint another arbitrator, was to direct appointment of another Engineer Officer of the choice of the designated appointing authority as the arbitrator, without proceeding to arrogate to itself the power to appoint another arbitrator. In reply to the point relating to jurisdiction, it was submitted that this Court was entitled, and in fact, obliged to reach out at any illegality and injustice whenever any such was committed, and no technical plea would stand in the way of exercise of jurisdiction of this Court in appropriate cases.

19. To answer the third and fourth questions, we have to refer to the relevant Clauses of the agreement and Sections 5 and 12 of the Arbitration Act. The relevant provision of the agreement relating to appointment of the arbitrator is Clause 70, which has been extracted earlier. Evidently, the above Clause itself provides as to what shall happen in the case of resignation of the arbitrator or vacation of office, or his inability, or unwillingness to act due to any reason whatsoever, and enables the designated appointing authority to appoint a new arbitrator. Ordinarily, this power given to the designated authority by the contracting parties cannot be taken away by the filing of an application under' Section 5 of the Arbitration Act. According to the Courts of this country, an arbitration agreement providing for a summary determination of the disputes between the parties is always treated as inviolable; and to the extent possible, not subject to interference by Courts. The Courts had been leaving the parties to their bargains to the-extent possible and refusing to permit them to turn to courts when the consequences of the bargains entered with open eyes happened to be to their disadvantage. Resort to courts in matters covered by arbitration agreements is permitted only in very limited and exceptional cases and on strict compliance with the enabling provisions of the Arbitration Act. If. therefore, there is a power as per the agreement to appoint a substitute in the place of the appointed arbitrator on the happening of specified contingencies, the Courts shall not ordinarily interfere with the working out of the arbitration Clauses in the agreement in exercise of the power under Section 5 or 12 of the Arbitration Act.

"I regret, I am unable to subscribe to this view of the learned counsel. The jurisdiction once conferred upon the court under Section 5, cannot be set at naught because a party has chosen to defeat that jurisdiction by calling upon the arbitrator to resign and by making a fresh appointment of arbitrator. In a case where the contractor has some grievance against the State Government, because the arbitrator appointed by the latter is finding it difficult to enter into reference, due to extraneous influence exercised upon him and thus seeks to revoke his authority, so that recourse could be had under Section 12 for the Court to cancel the arbitration agreement itself, can such a contractor be defeated to have that recourse to cancellation of arbitration agreement under Section 12, for which he invoked jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, by enabling the State Government to ask for the resignation of the arbitrator and thereby rendering the application under Section 5 nugatory so that the Court's jurisdiciton is lost and no order can be passed under Section 12 of the Act? In my opinion such a situation cannot be permitted to exist. Therefore it would be a negation of justice if the jurisdiction of the Court is held to be lost under Section 5 simply because one of the parties has chosen, suo motu, to revoke the authority of the arbitrator by compelling him to resign."

29. In the present case, the basic postulate on which I have to proceed is that the court ordinarily is out of bounds in disputes, which, by consensus, have to be decided by arbitration; and that the court shall not ordinarily be anxious to oust that jurisdiction and revoke the authority of the appointed arbitrator, or to appoint a substitute in his place. That has to be done only as a last resort and only when manifest injustice would otherwise result. The fact that the appointed arbitrator against whom allegations of bias was made had removed himself from the field by his voluntary action seems to me to be an important subsequent event of exceptional nature which should compel the court to take that fact into consideration in moulding the relief. It shall not be as if the court shall be anxious to preserve a cause of action as on the date of institution so that it may have jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 12 of the Arbitration Act; and that could be done only on the exercise of its power to revoke the authority of the appointed arbitrator under Section 5 of the Act. No prejudice is caused to either party by taking that subsequent event into consideration, because both the parties had agreed that in case of unwillingness or inability of an arbitrator to proceed with the reference or his non-availability, the designated appointing authority shall appoint a substitute. The effect of holding that the subsequent event shall be taken into consideration is only that the provisions in Clause 70 of the agreement would become operative, and the dispute should be decided in accordance with the provisions contained in the arbitration agreement. According to me, it cannot be pleaded with any amount of success by the first respondent that resort to the provisions in Clause 70 of the agreement is likely to cause prejudice to him. I should reiterate that the ordinary rule is that the parties to the agreement shall be bound by the bargain and cannot ordinarily wriggle out of the arbitral tribunal chosen by them. If that be the basic rule, no prejudice is caused, or is likely to be caused to the first respondent by the court taking the subsequent event of resignation of the appointed arbitrator into consideration. I am not here dwelling so much on the question of propriety. To me it appears to be a question of jurisdiction of the court to act under Section 12 of the Arbitration Act. Had the court taken the relevant subsequent event into consideration, it would not have had jurisdiction to proceed under Section 12 of the Arbitration Act at all. The refusal to take that into consideration has resulted in the Court assuming jurisdiction which it otherwise would not have had.