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Showing contexts for: basic structure constitution in Vithalrao Udhaorao Uttarwar And Ors. vs The State Of Maharashtra on 13 August, 1976Matching Fragments
dom of the individual as essential features of the Constitution. Shelat and Grover, JJ. have added to the list two other features; the mandate to build a welfare State, unity and integrity of the Nation. Hegde and Muk'herjee, JJ., added sovereign democratic republic, Parliamentary democracy and the three organs of the State form the basic structure of the Constitution. Khanna, J., held that fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure and therefore, they can be abrogated like any other provisions. He observed that basic structure indicates the broad outlines of the Constitution and since the right to property is a matter of details, it is not a part of that structure. The democratic form of Government, the secular character of the State and possibly judicial review are according to the brother Khanna a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is obvious that these are merely illustrations of what constitute the basic structure and are not intended to be exhaustive. Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hegde and Mukher-jee JJ., and Reddy J., say in their judgments that their list of essential features which form the basic structure of the Constitution is illustrative or incomplete. For determining whether a particular feature of the Constitution is a part of its basic structure, one has perforce to examine in each individual case the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of the Constitution as a fundamental instrument of country's governance. But it is needless for the purpose of these appeals to ransack every nook and cranny of the Constitution to discover the bricks of the basic structure. Those that are enumerated in the majority judgments are massive enough to cover the requirements of Shri Shanti Bhushan's challenge ....."
After referring to the summary extracted above at point No. (vii), the learned Judge in paragraph 252 observes thus;
"It has been stated by me on page 685 of the judgment (already reproduced above) that the secular character of the State, according to which the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the ground of religion only cannot likewise be done away with. The above observations show that the secular character of the Constitution and the rights guaranteed by Article 15 pertain to the basic structure of the Constitution. The above observations clearly militate against the contention that according to my judgment fundamental rights are not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, I also dealt with the matter at length to show that the right to property was not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, This would have been wholly unnecessary if none of the fundamental rights was a part of the basic structure of the Constitution."
It is thus obvious that while asking judicial review of the constitutional amendments the whole theory of basic structure or basic framework of the Constitution cannot be invoked. In the context of the problem posed, relevant principles alone will have to be examined and applied for finding out whether treating it as the basic structure or basic framework of the Constitution the amending Act could be said to be incompetently made.
59. It is enough to observe at this stage that this high holding of the Supreme Court shows that right to property is not a basic structure or basic framework, nor is it a basic principle of the Indian Constitutionalism. The very ratio of upholding the Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act in the BASIC STRUCTURE CASE by the Supreme Court clearly shows that this doctrine of basic structure cannot be usefully pressed in aid when the rights affected are rights in property and further when the laws affecting those rights are put under the Constitutional umbrella erected by Art. 31-B of the Constitution by amending Schedule IX. For the present purposes, therefore, it would suffice to observe that whatever is being questioned before us as a challenge to the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act which amended the Ninth Schedule and put the amended statute dealing with rights in property, under the protection of Art 31-B stands sufficiently negatived by the ratio in BASIC STRUCTURE CASE itself, and further as explained by the learned Judges in the ELECTION CASE . Reference to the laws in issue which have been put in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution by Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act is to the laws relating to land as an object of property and rights in or over the same. These nave been put under the constitutional umbrella The right to property being not basic structure of the Constitution, nor being the basic principle of the Indian Constitutionalism, the challenge to the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act on the basis of the basic structure theory cannot but be rejected,
The learned Chandrachud J. in paragraph 692 observed :
"... ... ... ... The argument regarding the invalidity of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 58 of 1974 and of the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, has however, no substance. The constitutional amendments may, on the ratio of the fundamental rights case, be tested on the anvil of basic structure. But apart from the principle that a case is only an authority for what it decides, it does not logically follow from the majority judgment in the Fundamental Rights case that ordinary legislation must also answer the same test as a constitutional amendment. Ordinary laws have to answer two tests for their validity: (1) The law must be within the legislative competence of the Legislature as defined and specified in Chapter I, Part XI of the Constitution and (2) it must not offend against the provisions of Article 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 'Basic structure' bv the majority judgment, is not a part of the fundamental rights nor indeed a provision of the Constitution. The theory of basic structure is woven out of the conspectus of the Constitution and the amending power is subjected to it because it is a constituent power. 'The power to amend the fundamental instrument cannot carry with it the power to destroy its essential features' -- this, in brief, is the arch of the theory of basic structure, it is wholly out of place in matters relating to the validity of ordinary laws made under the Constitution."