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7. The compromise decree is at Ex. 10 in the present suit. It is the contention of the present plaintiff that as per the compromise contained in the compromise decree 1/2 share was given to the present plaintiff; whereas the remaining 1/2 share was given to present defendants Nos. 3 and 4. It is the plaintiff's case that she executed the compromise decree and upon the execution she recovered possession of 1/2 share in S. No. 219 and 2 annas share in S. Nos. 420 to 423. It is her case that a panchnama to that effect was made. It is her further contention that thereafter present defendant No. 5, who was defendant No. 2 in the earlier suit, started dispossessing the plaintiff gradually and ultimately dispossessed her wholly of the suit lands. The present suit is, therefore, filed by her for possession of the said portion of the suit land.

14. After examining the entire evidence, oral and documentary, the learned Judge has arrived at the conclusion that the entire claim of the plaintiff was based upon the compromise decree, Ex. 10, dated 18-3-1959. He has held that the compromise decree was nothing but a transfer of title by Sonabai to her two daughters, defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and to her grand daughter defendant No. 4. He has held that there was no dispute much less a bona fide dispute amongst the parties to the compromise at all. He has, therefore, held that the compromise decree could not be looked at by the Court for finding the correctness of the plaintiff's title in view of the fact that the decree was not a registered document. According to the learned Judge, the compromise decree was a document of title and was brought into being in such a manner that the title which did not originally vest in the present plaintiff was sought to be transferred to her by the said document. Such a document, he held, was not valid unless it was duly registered. The plaintiff's suit which was based upon such a document, as a document of title, was, according to the learned Judge, therefore, not maintainable. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge found it unnecessary to go into the question as to whether defendant No. 5 was a tenant on the land before he entered into agreement with Rakhamabai for purchase of the same. He held that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove her title at all and to prove her right for possession of the suit lands. It is in these circumstances that he has dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.

15. Mrs. Kanade appearing before me for the plaintiff has contended that the learned Judge was in error in assuming that the plaintiff's suit was based on the compromise decree as a document of title. She contended that the suit was based on possessory title meaning thereby that it was the plaintiff's case that she was in possession of the suit lands, that she was dispossessed of the same by defendant No. 5 who had no right to be in possession of the same and, hence, she was entitled to the possession of the same back. Next Mrs. Kanade contended that even if the suit was not on possessory title, still the compromise decree dated 18-3-1959 was a perfectly valid decree. She contended that the decree did not require registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act 1908. Her contention is that the suit property was the subject-matter of the previous Civil Suit No. 94/1/58. She therefore, contends that under the said Section 17(2)(vi) the compromise decree is not required to be registered.

18. Coming to the second contention of Mrs. Kanade that the compromise decree did not require registration, having regard to the provisions of Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act what she has lost sight of is that Clause (vi) of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 postulates and contemplates a bona fide family settlement or bona fide compromise between the parties. In this connection what we have to note is that on the plaintiff's own showing she herself had not made any claim to the suit property at all in the previous suit. She has led no evidence whatsoever that there existed a dispute between herself on the one hand and any of the other contesting defendants Nos. 1 to 4 on the other hand concerning the suit property. A strange picture we have before us in this case. Mrs. Kanade has rightly conceded, having regard to the position of law as it then stood, that Sonabai was the sole heir of the property left by Ramkrishna and Vishnu: she may be also right in contending that there might have existed a dispute between Sonabai on the one hand and Rakhamabai on the other and it was on account of that dispute that Sonabai filed the previous suit against Rakhamabai. It appears to be a suit for declaration and possession against Rakhamabai. But it was nobody's case that the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 3 and 4 had any share in the suit property. What is conceivable is that these two widows, could have settled their claim and by virtue of the said settlement Sonabai could have taken 1/2 share and Rakhamabai could have taken the other 1/2 share of the property. I must say that if these two widows had recorded a compromise to this effect, the compromise could not be described as anything but a normal compromise and a decree passed in terms of the same, it could be legitimately contended, would have needed no registration. But what these two widows have done at the time of getting the decree is something remarkable. Evidently and presumably they wanted to. gift these properties to their own daughters. Rakhamabai, defendant No. 2, wanted to gift her share in the property to her daughter, the present plaintiff: whereas Sonabai wanted to gift her share to her daughters, present debts. 3 and 4. But this position could not be brought about except by a gift being executed by each one of the widows in favour of her daughters. They sought to bring about this gift by a compromise decree. In other words a transfer of the property sought to be brought about by document was camouflaged as compromise and title was thus sought to be transferred by this ingenious device. The compromise contemplated by Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act must be a bona fide compromise and it must be real compromise in respect of the genuine dispute between the parties to the compromise. In the instant case, we find that far from there being any bona fide dispute, there existed no dispute whatsoever at least amongst the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 and 3. By the compromise what has been done is that Sonabai who had entire title in the suit properly gets nothing under the compromise while the present plaintiff and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who admittedly had not a title of suit property get the entire property. Such a compromise cannot be described, except as a sham compromise brought about for the purpose of practising fraud upon the law relating to stamp duty and law relating to registration. Presumably it was a fraud upon defendant No. 6 who also would be having some share in the suit property after the death of Sonabai. We actually do not know the exact circumstances in which Sonabai thought it fit to disinherit defendant No. 6 and to gift the entire property to her two daughters only.