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1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the father of a girl, who was at the relevant time studying in the school of the fourth respondent. She appeared for the 9th standard examination in March 1988 and the fourth respondent declared her as having failed. It was the case of the petitioner that despite having been declared as failed, his daughter was entitled to the benefit of a rule to be found in appendix seven of the Secondary Schools Code. This rule provides for certain grace marks to be given in the case of students who failed. The maximum of the grace marks is also specified in the said rule. According to the petitioner, if this rule is followed, his daughter would have to be declared as having passed the 9th standard examination and would have been entitled to be promoted to the 10th standard.

3. There was no compliance with this requirement on the part of the fourth respondent which led the petitioner to file this petition. It has been prayed in the petition that this Court should issue a writ setting aside the order which has failed the petitioner's daughter and requiring the fourth respondent to promote the petitioner's daughter to the 10th standard after allowing to her the grace marks as required by the rule in appendix seven to the Secondary Schools Code. Ad-interim relief was also prayed for.

4. When the petition came up for admission before Daud J. on August 26, 1988, Daud J. passed a speaking order tentatively agreeing with the petitioner's contention and directing the fourth respondent to give a passing certificate which would enable the petitioner's daughter to seek admission to the 10th standard in another school. It was brought to the notice of Daud J. that another school, on what can be regarded as a proper interpretation of the aforesaid rule, thought that the petitioner's daughter was entitled to be declared as passed in the 9th standard examination and on that account the other school was prepared to admit the petitioner's daughter in the 10th standard. It has been mentioned that in compliance with this order of Daud J. the fourth respondent has already given a passing certificate, which has been availed of by the petitioner's daughter who has joined another school in 10th standard. Nevertheless, the question has been raised by the petitioner as to whether the fourth respondent, which is a private unaided school, can be compelled by a writ to be issued by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to follow a rule which finds its place in the Secondary Schools Code. In this question there are two more questions involved, in the first place, whether the fourth respondent is a State or an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Secondly, whether the rules constituting the Secondary Schools Code are statutory rules which can be enforced by a student against a school or for that matter against any other person.

12. Before I part with this judgment it must be recorded that Dr. Chandrachud has stated that the passing certificate, which has been issued by the fourth respondent in favour of the petitioner's daughter pursuant to the interim order passed by this Court, will not be recalled irrespective of the decision of this petition. This necessarily means that the petitioner's daughter, who has alredy been promoted to 10th standard in another school, will continue to be in that standard.

13. It must also be recorded that Dr. Chandrachud wanted to argue that the direction which has been issued in the instant case by the education officer in purported exercise of the authority under the Secondary Schools Code could not be issued against the fourth respondent, the fourth respondent being a minority institution. Several arguments based upon the minority character of the fourth respondent were pressed into service for resisting the claim of the petitioner in this petition as well as the exercise of the authority by he education officer under the Secondary Schools Code. In view of the fact that I am holding that the petition must fail on the ground which I have already indicated above, it is not necessary to decide the questions arising out of these submissions.