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Showing contexts for: section 319 crpc in Sukhpal Singh Khaira vs The State Of Punjab on 10 May, 2019Matching Fragments
6. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, accused appellants have approached this Court through these Special Leave Petitions.
7. Heard learned counsels appearing for both parties. Mr. P. S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the accusedappellant in SLP (Crl) No. 9063 of 2017 contended by relying upon the Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 to state that, the power under Section 319 (1) CrPC can be exercised at any time after the filing of the chargesheet and before the pronouncement of the judgment. In the present case, the aforesaid summoning order passed after the order of conviction is in clear breach of the principles laid down in the Hardeep Singh Case (supra). The counsel further contended that when the Hardeep Singh Case (supra), has clearly prescribed the stage at which an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C, can be entertained, the aforesaid violation is not merely procedural but is rather a substantial one. Lastly, the counsel contended that the moment the trial is concluded and the matter is reserved for judgment, then the stage for exercising power under Section 319 CrPC, ends and the court becomes functus officio.
But in the present case, allowing such application under Section 319 Cr.P.C, goes to the root of fair trial, as the court has already considered such evidence and has proceeded to speak on it. It is the same evidence which would be reappreciated, and the inclusion of such evidence vitiates the principles of fair trial.
9. Mr. Harin P. Raval, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State in SLP (Crl.) No. 9063 of 2017 argued that even if it is assumed that the summoning order was passed subsequent to the conviction order, the relevant consideration is that application of mind was within the prescribed time limit under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. The process of application of mind and pronouncement of summoning order are separate under Section 319, Cr.P.C, and it is the time of application of mind which is relevant. The counsel further drew our attention to the fact that undisputedly, the application under Section 319 CrPC was filed and heard during the pendency of the trial, and the order thereon was reserved. In this context, the counsel submitted that, the application under Section 319, Cr.P.C was separated from the trial by the direction of the High Court so as to complete the trial expeditiously in a time bound manner. Now the aforesaid fact cannot be used to prejudice the case of the State. Lastly, the counsel maintained that the summoning order under Section 319, CrPC was passed on the same day, simultaneously, along with the final judgment convicting the other accused. Therefore, there is no procedural irregularity committed. Moreover, he emphasized that the trial in this case could not be said to be completed unless a decision was given in respect of all the accused fully. This submission was based on the fact that the trial had been bifurcated and was pending in respect of the other absconding accused, which would sustain the exercise of power under Section 319.
11. In light of the facts and arguments presented before us, the following questions arise for our consideration: I. Whether the order of the Sessions Judge summoning the appellants herein as additional accused was in breach of Section 319, CrPC?
II. If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, could the order of the courts below still be sustained under the Code?
12. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that Section 319 Cr.P.C reflects two important objectives; firstly, the Courts duty to bring home the guilt of all the accused and render complete justice and secondly, the duty of the State to take every criminal prosecution to its logical end. This Court in a catena of judgments has defined Section 319 CrPC as an enabling provision, especially in the circumstances where the investigating agency had failed to array any person as an accused. This provision empowers the courts for calling such persons to face the trial. The Section stipulates that a ‘Court’ may summon any additional accused if it appears from the ‘evidence’, during the course of any inquiry or trial, that such an individual, not being an accused, has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the named accused. Subsection 4 of Section 319 of CrPC indicates that the proceeding with respect to the summoned individual, as per Clause (1) of Section 319 of CrPC, may be denovo or joint trial.
23. It was contended that the question of law herein is unique to the present case, and the earlier judgment of Hardeep Singh (supra) did not have an opportunity to cast any light about the validity of summoning orders pronounced after the passing of the judgment. They further argued that, the Hardeep Singh Case (supra), treats Section 319 in an isolated manner without taking into consideration the spirit and the mandate of the Code.
24. To strengthen the aforesaid submission, the State further contended that Section 465, Cr.P.C was introduced to provide for a balanced mechanism under the Criminal Justice System and to stop the Courts from getting into hyper technicalities and committing serious violations. This Court in Hardeep Singh Case (supra) has not considered the above principles or the issues which could possibly arise before the trial court while dealing with applications under Section 319, Cr.P.C. The State therefore submitted that, Section 319, Cr.P.C. should not be treated as an isolated island and should instead be given a pragmatic interpretation by keeping in view the entire mandate of the Code to render complete justice.