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3. It is contended by Mr. V. L. Narasimhamur-thy, learned Counsel for the Appellant, that the accession of Mysore to the Indian Union by virtue of the Constitution, "which came into force on 26th January 1950, cannot have the effect of converting such foreign decrees into valid and executable ones in the Mysore Courts. He urges that the proviso to S. 6 of the Part B States Laws Act No. III of 1951 expressly provides that the repeal of any law corresponding to any of the Acts extended to the State by virtue of the powers conferred on the Central Government to do so under the Constitution shall not affect the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered therein or any right, privilege, obligation or liability accrued or incurred under any law so repealed, that Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principles of International Law were the only factors governing the recognition of such foreign decrees and that the introduction into Mysore of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure Act V of 1908 cannot operate retrospectively so as to render such decrees which were made before 26th January 1950 executable in Mysore. He further urges that Article 261(3) of the Constitution on which reliance has been placed by the Court below declares that final judgments or orders delivered or passed by Civil Courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law cannot operate retrospectively so as to validate and render executable in Mysore those otherwise in-executable decrees.

5. Mr. Narasimhamurthy has urged that these are cases of merger, meaning apparently thereby that the distinction between the decrees of those Native States and of the Bombay Court had ceased to exist. It may be so though I am not very much impressed with that argument. The Bombay cases do not, in my opinion however, recognise the cardinal principle by which such foreign ex parte decrees were not being allowed to be executed by the Courts of another State. They were nullities in the latter territory according to International Law and neither could they have been sued upon nor executed in the foreign Court; see 'VEERAKA-GHAVA AIYAR v. J. D. MUGA SEIT, 27 Mad LJ 535; 'GURDYAL SINGH v. RAJAH OF FARIDKOTE', 22 Cal 222 and 'JWAPPA TAMAPPA v. JEERJI MURGEAPPA', 40 Bom 551. They were recognized as valid decrees only within the State whose Court passed them by virtue of S. 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure; see 'RAMBKAT v. SHANKAR BASWANT', 25 Bom 528; 'GAEKWAR BARODA STATE RLY. v. HABIB ULLLAH', 56 All 828 and 'ANNAMALAI CHETTY v. MCJRUGASA CHETTY', Mad 544 (PC).

7. The other grounds on which 'CHUNNILAL KASTURCHAND v. DUKDAPPA DAMAPPA', proceeds are that the Belgaum Court was not a foreign Court when the execution was taken out as by an Act of state Jamkhandi had become a part of the Indian Territory and that as a result of such an Act of State the judgment-debtor had lost his former status as a subject of Jamkhandi State and having become a national of the Indian Union and citizen oi the Dominion of India, a decree of the Court of the Indian Union was fully binding on him on the concerned date viz., when execution was to be ordered. In the latter Pull Bench case also Chagla C. J. bases his decision on the ground that prejudice, if any, has been caused by an Act of State which altered the status of Akalkot and of the defendant and made the Akalkot Court a Municipal Court and the defendant a citizen whereas the Akalkot Court before was a foreign Court and the defendant a foreigner. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the two Bombay cases I think the way in which this question has to be approached is to see whether such decrees, which when passed were according to International law nullities in the foreign State where they were to be enforced, have, by reason of any subsequent change in the status either of the Native State or of its former subject, become executable.

That the words enclosed in brackets do not invest the decree with any validity in a Court of a foreign State is apparent from the succeeding paragraph:

"These are 'doctrines laid down by the leading authorities on international law...... and no exception is made to them in favour of the exercise of jurisdiction against the defendant not otherwise subject to it by the Courts of the country in which the cause of action arose or (in cases of contracts) by the Courts of locus solutions. In these cases as well as all Ors. where the action is personal the Courts of the country in which a defendant resides have power and they ought to be resorted to, to do justice.' In many of the important decisions relating to executability of foreign decrees this case is cited as an authority to hold that it is an "Absolute nullity" and as such inexecutable. I do not think that the "nullity" is limited or lessened on account of the Court in the foreign State being competent to pass it under the law governing it.