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(f) The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision reported in (2018) 9 - S.C.C. 49 (Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. vs. Girdhar Sondhi) has held that an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator. I have carefully perused the arbitral record and it is observed that as per Section 19(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, no procedure between the parties was agreed to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. It is further observed that the learned Arbitrator rightfully exercised the power vested in him under the mandate of Section 19(3) and 19(4) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. It is accordingly, held that the arbitral award is neither against the fundamental policy of India nor in contravention of law. The Learned Arbitrator is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure Com.A.S.No.31/2019 or by the Indian Evidence Act. All that is required of is that he follows the principles of natural justice and treats the parties impartially and gives them full and equal opportunity to present their case. From perusal of the arbitral records it is observed that the Learned Arbitrator did adhere to the principles of natural justice and treated the parties impartially and gave them full and equal opportunity to present their case. Therefore, the above-mentioned decisions relied on by the Advocate for the Plaintiff, reported in 1996 (4) - S.C.C. - 551 (Tamilnadu Electricity Board and another vs. N. Raju Reddiar and another) and 2012 (8) - S.C.C. - 148 (Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Another) are not applicable to the present case. Hence, the said ground is not available for the Plaintiff under Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (2-A) of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. Thus, the challenge flanked by the Plaintiff calling for the setting aside of Arbitral Award on this count is thwarted and rejected.

(a) In view of my discussion in respect of other grounds elsewhere in this Judgment, the said argument of the learned Advocate for the Plaintiff cannot be accepted. Moreover, this ground is in the nature and tenor of appeal. The position in law is well settled that this court while exercising power under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act does not sit as a court of appeal. The nature of proceedings under Section 34 of Com.A.S.No.31/2019 the Act is summary in nature as held in the decision reported in (2019) - S.C.C. Online - S.C. - 1244 = (2019) 9 - S.C.C. - 462 (Canara Nidhi Limited vs. M. Shashikala) . Hence, the said ground is not available for the Plaintiff under Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (2-A) of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. Thus, the challenge flanked by the Plaintiff calling for the setting aside of Arbitral Award on this count is thwarted and rejected.

24. The Fourteenth ground is that the Impugned Award passed by the learned Arbitrator is beyond the scope of the reference and is not maintainable in law and is liable to be set aside and that the Impugned Award is not valid, is opposed to Public Policy, contrary to law and is liable to be set aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

(a) In view of my discussion in respect of other grounds elsewhere in this Judgment, the said argument of the learned Advocate for the Plaintiff cannot be accepted. Moreover, this ground is in the nature and tenor of appeal. This Court is not sit as an Appellate Court. Hence, the said ground is not available for the Plaintiff under Sub-Section (2) and Sub-Section (2-A) of Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act. Thus, the Com.A.S.No.31/2019 challenge flanked by the Plaintiff calling for the setting aside of Arbitral Award on this count is thwarted and rejected.

25. Now I discuss about the grounds 1 to 4 mentioned above. The scope of this court is limited with regard to Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The position of law stands crystallized today, that findings, of fact as well as of law, of the learned Arbitrator are ordinarily not amenable to interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The scope of interference is only where the finding of the Tribunal is either contrary to the terms of the contract between the parties, or, ex facie, perverse, that interference, by this court, is absolutely necessary. The Arbitrator is the final arbiter on facts as well as in law, and even errors, factual or legal, which stops short of perversity, does not merit interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.