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rkfy;k A mRrj es o iwoZ es jkLrk nf{k.k es cSjkxh ukuwjke ukFkwflag dk edku if'pe es ekyh dk [ksr A Ex. 2 is the order of the Jagir Commissioner and it is dated 6-11-58. I may lead this order in full:

jktLFkku ljdkj dk;kZy; tkxhj deh'kuj jktLFkku ] t;iqjA dzekad 13763 tk@,M@d@58 fnukad 6&11&68 tkxhjnkj fBdkuk lkMkl Jh dY;k.k flag th }kjk dysDVj egksn; tkxhj fpRrkSMx< A fo"k;% futh lEifRr dk Lohd`fr i= vkidh tkxhj iqu% xzg.k gksus tkus jktLFkku lwph lq/kkj ,oa tkxhj iqu% xzg.k dh /kkjk 23 ds vuqlkj vius futh lEifRr dh iwthZ tfj;s fnukad fuy dh dysDVj lkgc ---------------ds ikl izLrqr dh Fkh AfuEufyf[kr lEifRr vkidks futh lEifRr dh x.kuk es vkrh gS Avr% bl lEifRr dh ekU;rk /kkjk 23@2 ds vuqlkj nh tkrh gS rFkk vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS A 1& lwph ,d ftles 13 vkbZVEl gS edkukr rfy;s A 2& lwph ,d [kqnkdk'r ftles 52 jdcs gS {ks=Qy 482 A g0 vaxzsth tkxhj deh'ku jktLFkku t;iqj A Ex. 3 is a report of the Tehsildar Gangrar. It appears therefrom that the guardian of the plaintiff who was then minor had made an application before the Jagir Commissioner on 17-2-55 that the Gram Panchayat Sadas was disposing of certain house sites inspite of the fact that Jagirdar had applied for inclusion of such house site in his private property under Section 23 of the Act. On this the Tehsildar had made an inquiry and had also taken a reply from the Gram Panchayat. The Gram Panchayat had taken the position that the items. 1 to 3 were in the possession of the Thikana (Jdgirdar). The Jagirdar was also in possession of item No. 4. Regarding items Nos. 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 13 it was stated that the Jagirdar was not in possession thereof. About items Nos. 5, 8 and 9 (we are concerned with item No. 8), the Gram Panchayat reported that the Thikana was not in possession of these plots and the Jagirdar had filed an objection before the Gram Panchayat, but had not adduced any evidence to substantiate his objection and after the objection was dismissed the plots were sold at an auction. Thereafter the Thikana had gone in appeal to the Tehsil Panchayat and the appeal had been dismissed. Thus, according to the Gram Panchayat the Jagirdar's claim with respect to these items of house sites was not correct. Having narrated this the TehsiJdar recommended that these items may be declared the private property of the ex-Jagirdar. This report was sent to the Deputy Collector Jagir, Chittorgarh who forwarded the same to the Jagir Commissioner and it was thereafter that the Jagir Commissioner passed the order Ex. 4. Thus, it is evident that before the Jagir Commissioner had passed any order declaring the property in dispute to be the private property of the Jagirdar, the Panchayat had already sold the same by a public auction and the defendant being the highest bidder at the public auction was given a patta of this property for Rs. 185/-. It further appears that when the defendant apprehended that he would be dispossessed by the ex-Jagirdar, he filed a suit against the plaintiff ex-Jagirdar for restraining him from interfering with his possession. The suit was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, Chittorgarh on 29-7-61. The ex-Jagirdar went up in appeal to the court of the District Judge, Partabgarh, but the appeal was dismissed. There is thus no doubt that it was the defendant who was in possession of the disputed plot having been inducted by the Gram Panchayat in pursuance of the Patta granted by it. It is in this context that the question has to be considered whether the validity of the order of the Jagir Commissioner could be examined by the civil court. If the order of the Jagir Commissioner is found to be void then I should think the civil court will not be precluded from examining it & pronouncing its invalidity. As to when an order is void or voidable is not always an easy question to answer. Recently there has been much discussion over this question in the Modern Law Review and I may refer to 1968 Modern Law Review Vol. 31. It has been observed that many of the rules of English administrative law are based on the analogy of rules governing judicial decisions and in particular, the question whether a defect in an administrative act renders that act void or voidable is unusually answered by applying the corresponding rules applicable to defects in judicial decisions. There was first the traditional rule laid down by Coke in the Marshalsea, a judgment is void if only made without jurisdiction, other defects merely render the judgment voidable. As was explained in Marshalsea's case the voidable judgment is by definition open to direct attack, but it is not open to collateral attack; only a void judgment may be impugned in collateral as well as direct proceedings. But, as the author has explained the Courts have not applied these rules in a consistent manner. He has noticed that breach of the rules of natural justice will render a decision void. According to the author the explanation is that the word "void" has often been loosely used as a synonym for "defective", thus including the concept of voidable. He pointed out that the terminology has become more precise in modern cases. Then he has pointed out several cases in which the effect of breach of the rule had been noticed.