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"20. Independence and impartiality of the arbitrator are the hallmarks of any arbitration proceedings. Rule against bias is one of the fundamental principles of natural justice which applied to all judicial and quasi- judicial proceedings. It is for this reason that notwithstanding the fact that relationship between the parties to the arbitration and the arbitrators themselves are contractual in nature and the source of an arbitrator's appointment is deduced from the agreement entered into between the parties, notwithstanding the same non- independence and non-impartiality of such arbitrator (though contractually agreed upon) would render him ineligible to conduct the arbitration. The genesis behind this rational is that even when an arbitrator is appointed in terms of contract and by the parties to the contract, he is independent of the parties. Functions and duties require him to rise above the partisan interest of the parties and not to act in, or so as to further, the particular interest of either parties. After all, the arbitrator has adjudicatory role to perform and, therefore, he must be independent of parties as well as impartial. The United Kingdom Supreme Court has beautifully highlighted this aspect in Hashwani v. Jivraj [Hashwani v. Jivraj, (2011) 1 WLR 1872 : 2011 UKSC 40] in the following words:

32. The foundation of an arbitration agreement is the willingness of the parties to have the inter se disputes adjudicated by an independent and impartial arbitrator. A condition imposed that disputes cannot be referred to arbitration except on the condition that only one party retains the authority to determine the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, would militate against the said fundamental premise that arbitration is an alternate mechanism for a just and fair adjudication of disputes.

38. The aforesaid passages were referred to by the Supreme Court in its later decision in Union of India v. U.P. State Bridge Corpn. Ltd.:

(2015) 2 SCC 52 although in a different context. In Voestalpine Schienen GMBH (supra), the Supreme Court referred to various other decisions including the aforesaid decision and observed that:
"there are a number of judgments rendered by the Supreme Court prior to amendment of Section 12 of the A&C Act "where courts have appointed the arbitrators, giving a go-by to the agreed arbitration clause in certain contingencies and situations, having regard to the provisions of unamended Section 11(8) of the Act which, inter alia, provided that while appointing the arbitrator, Chief Justice, or the person or the institution designated by him, shall have regard to the other conditions as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator."

46. This principle would hold good equally in the context of the present case. After the enactment of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, it is statutorily recognized that circumstances as set out in Schedule Seven of the A&C Act would render a person ineligible to act as an arbitrator on account of justifiable doubts as to his impartiality and independence. Plainly, under such circumstances, the Court would have the power under Section 11 of the A&C Act to appoint an independent and impartial arbitrator. As held in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (supra) even in cases where the arbitration agreement provides for a procedure for appointment of an arbitrator, a court could appoint an independent arbitrator if there were reasonable grounds to doubt the independence and impartiality of the named arbitrator to be appointed in accordance with the procedure as stipulated under the arbitration agreement.