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17. Thus from the above it is clear that a Letter of Credit is only a means by which the payment of price for the sale of goods is secured and if the seller has complied with the terms of the Letter of Credit, there is an aboslute obligation upon the banker to pay irrespective of any disputes there may be between the buyer and the seller as to whether goods are up to contract or not. Emphasising the importance of the Letter of Credit in the International Trade, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed in the case of Tarapore & Co., supra that "an irrevocable Letter of Credit has a definite implication. It is a mechanism of great importance in international trade. Any interference with that mechanism is bound to have serious repercussions on the international trade of this country. Except under very exceptional circumstances, the Courts should not interfere with that mechanism." Thus the question that arises in the instant case is as to why Para 3 of the Public Notice dated 06-10-86 permitted import of deleted item i.e. Darchini (Bark) to the extent of irrevocable Letters of Credit already opened and established before the date of the Public Notice. Obviously because to save the mechanism of an irrevocable Letter of Credit and to avoid the serious repercussions on the international trade of our country and for this purpose providing saving in the Public Notice expressly laying down that no commitment other than that of a Bank, irrevocably securing the payment of the price by means of an irrevocable Letters of Credit already opened and established i.e. an absolute obligation upon the Banker to pay irrespective of any disputes between the buyer and the seller is recognised and comprehended. Consequently, the commitment or the obligation or a Bank for the issue of Letters of Credit prior to the publication of Public Notice in question was as much of an aboslute requirement - a condition precedent - as the conclusion of contracts for the consequential imports, to come within the exception made in Para 3 of the Public Notice in question. And once such contract by means of an irrevocable Letter of Credit is created, the issuing Bank is under absolute obligation to pay irrespective of any disputes there might be between the buyer and the seller. Likewise, if there is an amendment, in the Letter of Credit, subsequently with the consent of all the parties thereto which includes the issuing Bank also, the obligation of the issuing Bank to pay money to the seller in return for the shipping documents remains the same and that is exactly what has happened in the instant case. As stated above, an irrevocable Letter of Credit was already opened and established in favour of M/s. New York Traders, Hong Kong on 6-10-86 i.e. before the date of publication of the Public Notice in question and subsequently it was amended with the consent of all the parties thereto including the seller i.e. M/s. New York Traders and in pursuance of this amendment, M/s. Gold Dragon Enterprises who became the sellers on account of the amendment, supplied the imported goods under the said Letter of Credit No. BY-2231 dated 6-10-86 to the appellants and obtained the payment from the issuing Bank. Thus we hold that the amendment made in the irrevocable Letter of Credit already opened and established before the date of publication of the Public Notice in question is of no consequence for the purpose of Para 3 of the Public Notice in question and the reasonings of the Collector that there was no firm commitment with the supplier i.e. M/s. Gold Dragon Enterprises as on 6-10-86 is wrong in the light of the legal position discussed above. The case of Bansal Exports (P) Ltd. v. Union of India supra relied upon by the learned JDR, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. In that case, the petitioners entered into a contract dated 25-3-77 with the foreign buyers for the supply of 25 Tons of Indian Real Zari Badla. A part of the supply was made but before the remaining supply could be made, the Central Government changed the policy and issued a Public Notice dated 30-3-79 stating that the provision of paragraph 316 of the Hand Book of Import-Export Procedures will not be applicable to any "Pre-ban items". Consequent to this Public Notice, it was also said that all such cases of "Pre-ban commitments" will be decided "on merits only". On 12-9-79, another Public Notice setting out the new guidelines for deciding the "Pre-ban" or "Pre-control Cases" effected by the Public Notice dated 30-3-79 was issued. The Petitioners of that case challenged the validity of the said Public Notice dated 12-9-79 on the ground of promissory estoppel and also contended that the earlier contract dated 25-3-77 was a pre-control commitment in terms of paragraph 316 of the Hand Book of Import-Export Procedures. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court while upholding the validity of the said Public Notice also concluded that contract dated 25-3-77 is not a "pre-control commitment" in the sense in which the expression is used in paragraph 316 when tested on merits.