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60. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in K. L. Gauba's case (1942 (43) Cri LJ 599) (supra) had taken the view that truth is no defence in an action for contempt of Court, and the contemner cannot lead evidence in support of his allegations. That case related to certain scandallous allegations of improper and corrupt motives attributed to Judges of the Lahore High Court in a book written by a barrister. In finding the barrister guilty of gross contempt, the Full Bench followed the view expressed by the Privy Council in William Rainy v. The Justices of Sierra Leone, (1852-53) 8 Moore PC 47, that every Court of record is the sole and exclusive Judge of what amounts to a contempt of Court. Even while seeking an ordinary remedy by way of an appeal no person should indulge in scandallous allegations and if he were to do so, he would be guilty of contempt was the rule laid down in Baradakanta's case, (1974 Cri LJ 631) (SC) (supra). Courts have consistently taken the view that truth is no defence in an action for contempt : vide Advocate General, A.P. v. Lakshminarayana, , Advocate General, A.P. v. Seshagiri Rao, (1966 Cri LJ 642) (AP) (supra), Advocate General, A.P. v. Ramana Rao, and Barada Kantha's case (1974 Cri LJ 631) (SC) (supra).

The Supreme Court, thus, did not hold that good faith is a defence in a proceeding for contempt, nor can it be said that the Supreme Court laid down that truth is a defence. That issue did not arise for decision. The Supreme Court did not intend to lay down the rule that truth is a defence in contempt proceedings. This is clear from a later decision of a five Judge Bench in Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P., which was also rendered by the very same Judge, B. K., Mukherjee, J., wherein it was held :

"it may be that pleas of justification of privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings." 62. After the rulings in Brahma Prakash's case (1954 Cri LJ 238) (SC) (supra), C. K. Daphtary's case (1971 Cri LJ 844) (SC) (supra) and Baradakanta's case (1974 Cri LJ 631) (SC) (supra), it is not open to any contemner to take the plea that truth of the allegations is a justification. When a Court tries a contempt application, if it were to permit the contemner to establish the truth of the allegation, it would have to act as an appellate Court and then decide the allegation, and that is not the function of the Court trying a petition for contempt : vide C. K. Daphtary's case (supra).
"If we were to grant an opportunity to establish the truth that would have aggravated the contempt. A reckless and malicious person like the contemner could have borrowed the support of some disgruntled litigants of his own feather to aid and abet him."

Same situation might result if we accept the plea of the respondent to lead evidence and cross-examine the deponent of the affidavits filed in support of these contempt cases.

63. The respondent has requested us to peruse certain articles published in news papers and journals. In our considered view they are not relevant for deciding the questions at issue before us.