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5. Contending contra the respondent's case is that an adequate opportunity was given to the petitioners to submit their objections. In fact the respond ent did not have any copies of the materials, which the police secured. On the other hand, they could only instruct themselves from the records obtained by the police and the gist of such information was passed onto the petitioners. It is claimed that in order to enable the petitioners to prepare their objections special arrangements were made for them to peruse the records, which were with the Superintendent of Police. It was the petitioners who failed to avail themselves of the said opportunity. The respondent states that the allegation that the petitioners were not in a position to examine the complicated accounts in the office of the Superin tendent of Police, which accounts related only to the business transactions, is an afterthought and made with ulterior motives. From time to time it was made clear that action was being taken on the pieces of materials secured by the respondent from the office of the Superintendent of Police, of which no written report was available with the respondent. The respondent, therefore, denies that no effective opportunity was given to the petitioners. Regarding the confidential nature of the voluntary disclosures made by the petitioners to the Commissioner of Income-tax the respondent's case is that it does not strictly arise, because the respondent wanted to bring to tax the escaped turnover, and, as the petitioners failed to prove that the goods imported were utilised for the manufacture of handloom cloth and as the proposal was based on information secured by the respondent from both the police department and the income-tax department, the proposal and ultimate levy of tax and penalty are justified. The petitioners never attempted to prove with reference to any acceptable data that they did not sell the whole or part of the goods at Madras. Their belated case that they have sold the licences, which were highly inconsistent with their original stand, was not even established. In any event the respondent states that, as the onus of proving that the transactions are without the taxing provi sions of the Madras General Sales Tax Act is on the petitioners, the conten tion of the petitioners to the contrary is untenable. The respondent concedes that the provision of law has been incorrectly noted in the final order as Section 12(3), whereas it is claimed that the penalty was levied under Section 16(2) of the Act. The mere misquoting of the correct provisions of law would not invalidate the proceeding. Thus the respondent's case is that the reopening of the assessment was made in the circumstances, which are justified both under the provisions of the statute and under the general law, and that an effective opportunity was given to the petitioners, and that the petitioners having failed to discharge their burden of proof the impugned order is well founded and rendered within the jurisdiction of the assessing authority.

6. The relevant facts in the other writ petitions are admitted to be similar excepting for the dates of the impugned orders.

7. We shall proceed to consider seriatim the relative contentions of the parties.

8. We shall first dispose of the argument that, as the impugned order specifically mentions the statutory provision as Section 12(3) and as the said provision cannot be invoked in the instant case the order in so far as it related to the imposition of penalty is illegal. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in the text and colour of Sections 12 and 16 there are distinctions, which primarily distinguish the scope and content of the statutory authority or the tribunals in the matter of levy of penalty. No doubt a certain hypothesis is projected under Section 12(2) of the Act, which would enable the assessing authority to assess the dealer to the best of its judgment and also direct the dealer to pay in addition to the tax assessed a penalty. But under Section 16 the content of authority on the assessing officer is wider ; whereas in Section 12(2), which postulates a case where no return has been submitted by the dealer as prescribed or if an incorrect or incomplete return is made by him, the best judgment formula and the consequential imposition of penalty are attracted, under Section 16, if the assessing authority is satisfied that if for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of a business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax, it may determine the escaped turnover to the best of its judgment. While exercising such jurisdiction under Section 16, if the assessing authority is satisfied that the escape from assessment is due to wilful non-disclosure of the assessable turnover by the dealer, then it has the authority to impose a penalty as prescribed in addition to the tax assessed. There is a certain amount of overlapping in the content of both the sections but the power under Section 16 is wider than that under Section 12(2). Except the prescrip tion as to the period of limitation set out in Section 16(1)(a) it appears to us that the power of the assessing authority under Section 16(1)(a) is wide enough so as to cover a case which may literally come under Section 12(2) as well. But it is argued that the jurisdiction under Section 16 depends on a jurisdictional fact, namely the initial discovery of any reason by the assessing authority that the whole or any part of the turnover of the business of a dealer has escaped assessment to tax. This may be so, but the distinction sought to be made out is without any difference. So long as the power is given to the assessing authority to reopen the assessment for any reason, which, though apparently subjective, should withstand the test of objectiveness as well, it cannot be said that the power exercised under Section 12 or under Section 16, in so far as the imposition of penalty is concerned is deeply divergent or irreconcilably different. It cannot be said that if the assessing authority quotes or misquotes one or the other of the above two sections while imposing the penalty, the order itself is vitiated, erroneous and ineffective in the eye of law.