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12. On the question as to the authority of the fourth defendant to sell the suit properties, the learned Counsel for the appellants contends that the fourth defendant as the mother of defendants 1 and 2 is entitled to sell the properties on behalf of the minors for necessary and binding purposes or for benefit and that she had also obtained the requisite permission from the Court under Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. The learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao (1948) 2 M.L.J. 22 : 75 LA. 115 : I.L.R. (1949) Mad. 141, in support of his plea that the powers of the mother as a guardian to enter into a contract on behalf of her minor son for purposes binding on the minor cannot be disputed. The question for consideration in that case was with respect of a contract for sale entered into by the mother of a minor son as his guardian, who should be considered as the "transferor" within the meaning of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and the Judicial Committee held that the minor on whose behalf the contract was entered into by the guardian should be deemed to be the " transferor" within the meaning of that section and as such when the transferee was put into possession, the minor on attaining majority in debarred from obtaining possession of the property. Their Lordships observed:

25. Though we have held that the contract to sell entered into by the fourth defendant is valid, the question still is as to whether specific performance of such a contract entered into be the guardian for the sale of the minor's properties can be had by the plaintiffs in this case. In Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohammed Chowdhuri (1912) 21 M.LJ. 1156 : I.L.R. 39 Cal. 232 (P.C.), the Privy Council bad to consider the question whether a contract to purchase land entered into by the infant's mother was capable of being specifically enforced. It was held by the Judicial Committee that it was not within the competence of either of the manager of the minor's estate or of the guardian of the minor, to bind the minor or the minor's estate by a contract for the purchase of immoveable property, that as the minor was not bound by the contract as there was no mutuality and that consequently the minor could not obtain specific performance of the contract. This decision held the field for many years. But later the Judicial Committee in Subramanyam v. Subba Rao I.L.R. (1949) Mad. 141 : L.R. 75 LA. 115 : (1948) 2 M.L.J. 22 : A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 95, upheld the contention that a guardian's contract for the sale of the minor's immoveable property was specifically enforceable if the contract was beneficial to the minor. The apparent conflict between the said two decisions of the Privy Council was considered by Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Ramalingam v. Babanambal Ammal . That was a case where a guardian-mother of a Hindu minor had entered into a contract for the sale of the minor's immoveable property for purposes considered under the Hindu Law as necessary. Relying on the decision in Subrahmanyam v. Subba Rao, it was held that the minor was bound by the contract and such a contract is enforceable against him, and that the artificial doctrine of mutuality which was invoked in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohommed Chowdhuri, could no longer apply. According to the learned Judge the artificial doctrine of mutuality as evolved in English decisions was not applicable to cases of Hindu minors properly to presented by their guardians and that the doctrine of mutuality, "Illogical in form and in substance unjust" had been discarded by the Judicial Committee itself which was responsible for its introduction in India in its decision in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohammed Chowdhuri (1912) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 232 (P.C). The learned Judge concluded by saying that "the doctrine of mutuality need no longer cast its spell on Indian Courts and sterlise contracts of sale entered into by a guardian on behalf of his ward for the latter's interest or benefit." Though the case before the learned Judge was in respect of a contract for sale on behalf of the minors, it appears that the decision will equally apply to a contract for purchase on behalf of the minors. A similar view was taken by Mudholkar, J., in Gujoba Tulsiram v. Nilkanth , where the learned Judge opined that the true test for the validity and enforceability of a guardian's contract of sale on behalf of a minor was not the existence of mutuality in the contract but whether it was by a competent guardian and for legal necessity or benefit of the minor's estate.

26. The point was again considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Sitarama v. Venkatarama (1956) 1 M.L.J. 5 : I.L.R. (1956) Mad. 99. In that case two Hindu brothers of whom one was minor and the other acting for him, though not his legal guardian, purchased properties on 29th November, 1933, agreeing to reconvey the same to the vendors after attainment of majority by the minor. On a suit filed to enforce the agreement for reconveyance against both the brothers the minor who had attained majority pleaded that the reconveyance agreement would not bind him as his brother was neither his de jure guardian nor the manager of the joint family, that the agreement imposed an onerous obligation on him, and that for want of mutuality it was not enforceable against him. The Full Bench by a majority held that contracts entered into on behalf of a minor by his guardian or manager of his estate can be specifically enforced against the minor if the contract is one which is within the competence of the guardian or manager who had entered into it on behalf of the minor so as to bind him by it and if it is also for the benefit of the minor. Before the Fuh Bench reference was made to Mi Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohammed Chowdhuri (1912) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 232 (P.C) and the observations of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Ramalingam v. Babanambal . 431thereon. But the Full Bench was not inclined to accept the view of Viswanatha Sastri, J., and expressed that Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohammed Chowdhuri, was still good law in its applicability to contracts for the purchase of a property on behalf of a minor.

27. However, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Suryaprakasam v. Gangaraju (1955) An.W.R. 818: A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 33, while construing a similar question on similar facts expressed that the limit and extent of the guardian's capacity (authority) are conditioned by Hindu law, that they can only function within the doctrine of legal necessity or benefit that the validity of a transaction entered into by the guardian has to be judged with reference to the scope of his power to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor, that as either party to such a transaction can enforce the contract, the test of mutuality is satisfied and that since the guardian under the Hindu law has the legal competency to enter into a contract on behalf of the minor for necessity or for the benefit, the contract is valid and enforceable from the time of its inception. They opined that there cannot be any essential distinction between a contract of sale and contract of purchase, the difference being one of degree, and that the contract to sell or purchase property was transaction connected with dealings in immovable property by a guardian giving rise to obligations annexed to that property and that they cannot be equated with contracts of loans imposing personal obligations on the minor. The Full Bench held that the view expressed in Mir Sarwarjan v. Fakhruddin Mohammed Chowdhuri (1912) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 232, was no longer sound in view of the later Privy Council decision in Subramanyam v. Subba Rao (1948) 2 M.L.J. 22 : A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 95. Whether there was any difference between a guardians' contract to purchase and one for sale with reference to its enforceability or not, as regards the enforceability of a contract of sale entered into by a minor's guardian has been upheld by both the above Full Bench decisions. (Vide Ramalingam v. Babanambal . 431and Suryaprakasam v. Gangaraju (1955) An.W.R. 818 : A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 33. We have to therefore hold that the contract of sale entered into by the fourth defendant on behalf of the minor children for necessity and for their benefit can be specifically enforced against the minors.