National Consumer Disputes Redressal
The Manager, Tata Engineering & ... vs Bachchi Ram Dangwal on 16 March, 2009
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
FIRST
APPEAL NO. 276 OF 2004
(From the order dated 03/6/2004 in Complaint case No. 05 of 2003 of the
Uttaranchal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Dehradun)
1. The Manager
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd.
Jamshedpur
Having its SRO at
Saran Chambers, 2nd Floor
Park Road, Lucknow
2. Proprietor
Commercial Motor
53, Gandhi Road, Dehradun
Uttaranchal
3. Proprietor
Commercial Motor
Laxman Jhula Road, Rishikesh
Uttaranchal
Appellants
versus
1. Bachchi Ram Dangwal
Son of Late Bhawani Dutt Dangwal
Resident of Village Bagwan Patti
Hisriyakhal, Tehri Garhwal
Uttaranchal
2. Proprietor
MICO
15,
Tyagi Road, Dehradun
Uttaranchal
Respondents
BEFORE
HONBLE MR. JUSTICE R.C.
JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER
HONBLE
MR. ANUPAM DASGUPTA, MEMBER
For the Appellants Mr. Aditya Narain,
Ms. Astha Tyagi
and Ms. Shuchi Singh, Advocates
For
Respondent No.1 Mr.
Anil Kumar Sharma, Advocate
For
Respondent No.2
Mr. Ashutosh Sharma, Advocate
for Mr. V. Saxena, Advocate
Dated 16th March 2009
ORDER
ANUPAM DASGUPTA This appeal seeks to assail the order dated 03.06.2004 of the Uttaranchal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Dehradun (hereafter, the State Commission) in complaint case no.05/2003. By this order, the State Commission held the Opposite Parties (OPs) no.1, 2 and 4 (M/s Commercial Motor, Dehradun, M/s Commercial Motor, Rishikesh and M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotives Company, Jamshedpur respectively) guilty of supplying a truck with manufacturing defects to the purchaser, Bachchi Ram Dangwal, original complainant (respondent no.1 in this appeal and hereafter referred to as the complainant) and directed as under:
The claim petition is hereby allowed against opposite party no.1, 2 & 4 for refund of Rs.4,75,000/- (Rupees four lacs seventy five thousand only) and Rs.5,390/- (Rupees five thousand three hundred ninety only) along with interest on both the amounts @ 15% payable from 20.10.1999 till the actual date of payment. The vehicle is standing at the workshop of the opposite party no.1, the complainant will hand over the papers etc. along with the ignition key of the vehicle to the opposite party and if need be, he will also write transfer letter of the vehicle. The complainant shall get a sum of Rs.500/- (Rupees five hundred only) as cost of litigation from the opposite party. The complaint is hereby dismissed against opposite party no.3.
2. Aggrieved by the said order, M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (hereafter, TELCO) and proprietors of Commercial Motor, Dehradun and Commercial Motor, Rishikesh (OPs in the original complaint and hereafter referred to as such) have come up in this appeal. Respondent no.2 in this appeal was OP no.3 in the original complaint, the dealer of Motor Industries Company Ltd. (MICO) against which the complaint was dismissed.
3. We have heard Mr. Aditya Narain, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Anil Kumar Sharma, learned counsel for respondent no.1 (complainant) and considered the entire material brought on record. Ms Astha Tyagi and Ms Shuchi Singh assisted Mr. Narain. We have proceeded with the final hearing of the case in the absence of Mr. Vivek Saxena, learned counsel for respondent no.2 (OP no. 3) - who reportedly had some personal difficulty in remaining present despite notice - mainly in view of the fact that the State Commission had in any case dismissed the complaint against this party.
4. The case before the State Commission was as under:
(i) The complainant claimed that to enable his unemployed son to earn his livelihood, he purchased on 02.07.1999 the TATA truck in question (model 909) from OP no.1, the local dealer of such trucks, on payment of Rs.4,75,000/- In addition, he paid Rs.5,390/- as charges for the tools and spare tyre, which he did not receive. OP no.2 did the first servicing of the truck at Rishikesh on 07.08.1999. Soon thereafter, the complainant noticed several defects in the vehicle, like passing of oil into the coolant, pressure leakage and noise in the tappet, and informed OP no.2 on 10.08.1999. OP no.2, however, advised the complaint to take the truck to the workshop of OP no.1 because necessary spare parts were not available with OP no.2. The complainant took the vehicle on 16.08.1999 to the workshop of OP no.1. On 26.08.1999, OP no.1 repaired the vehicle, including changing a gasket but charged the complainant Rs. 1,000/- for keeping the truck there for 10 days. However, the vehicle continued to give trouble and unexpectedly stopped running on 14.09.1999.
The complainant came to the workshop of OP no.2 but he was again sent to OP no.1 from where he had to fetch a mechanic for which paid separately. The latter repaired the vehicle and brought it back in running condition. Thereafter, on 07.10.1999 the complainant took the vehicle for the second servicing at the workshop of OP no.1. Though the truck underwent the second servicing on 07.10.1999 serviced, it stopped running on 12.10.1999, at a place near Devaprayag, Tehri Garhwal. The complainant again approached the workshop of OP no.2 but the latter asked him to contact OP no.1. The complainant then came to the workshop of OP no.1 at Dehradun on 16.10.1999 and OP no. 1 deputed a mechanic to repair the truck. Despite the mechanic attending to the truck, it did not start. Hence, it was towed and brought on 20.10.1999 to the workshop of OP no.1 at Dehradun. On 21.10.1999, OP no.1 opened the engine of the truck and kept the fuel injection pump (FIP) in the office. They broke the seal of the pump and alleged that the truck had been attended to by some outsider. The FIP was sent to the workshop of the local dealer of Motor Industries Company (MICO) OP no.3. Because of these continuing problems with the truck so soon after its purchase and well within the warranty period, the complainant concluded that the truck suffered from manufacturing defects. Since the problems with the truck were not resolved satisfactorily by the OPs, he approached the State Commission with this complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter, the Act) and prayed that either the defects in the truck should be rectified or the OPs should be directed to replace the vehicle.
(ii) The OPs contested the complaint and filed their written statements denying all the substantive allegations. They contended that the truck was serviced duly when it was first brought to the workshop and the details of the works carried out were noted in the operators service book, which the complainant did not file with this complaint. Regarding the allegations of the complainant not receiving attention during 16-25.08.1999, they stated that on 16.08.1999, the complainant left the vehicle in the premises of OP no.1 without informing the latter of the nature of problems and opening the requisite job card. As a result, OP no.1 sent a registered letter to the complainant on 17.08.1999 to come to the workshop and open a work order, failing which garage charges @ Rs. 100/- per day would have to be paid. OP no. 1 sent a second registered letter on 21.08.1999 and informed the Police about the unauthorised parking of the vehicle since 16.08.1999. Hence, the necessary repairs could be carried out only on 26.08.1999. Thereafter, the complainant did not notify any defect or trouble with the truck nor was it correct to contend that on 14.09.1999, the complainant had to fetch a mechanic from the workshop of OP no.2 on some payment. The OPs further contended that when, on 07.10.1999, the complainant reported for the second servicing of the vehicle, he had no complaint regarding the engine and after the vehicle was serviced, the complainant was satisfied and took its delivery on 08.10.1999. Regarding the incident of 15.10.1999, a mechanic had to be sent for investigating the problems with the vehicle because the complainant could not bring it to the workshop. As the mechanic found that the engine could not be started due to damaged/broken valves, he advised the complainant to have the vehicle towed to the workshop of OP no.1. The complainant did so in the night of 20.10.1999. On 21.10.1999, the engine was opened, in the presence of the complainant/his representative. OP no. 1 informed the complainant by registered letter dated 22.10.1999 that the valves of cylinder no. 3 had failed due to over-revving of the engine (improper driving) and not because of any manufacturing defects. Moreover, the seal of the FIP had also been tampered with. Hence as per TELCO warranty, the defects could not be repaired free of charge and if the complainant so desired the necessary repairs could be done on payment. OP no. 1 sent another registered letter dated 02.11.1999 to repeat the reason (over revving) and inform that the MICO report on the FIP had confirmed tampering. Finally, by registered letter dated 03.11.1999, the complainant was asked to confirm in writing that he would pay the charges for necessary repairs to the failed engine or pay Rs.100/- per day as garage charges from 15.11.1999. The vehicle, parked by the complainant at the workshop of OP no.1 on 20 10.1999, had been standing idle there since then.
(iii) After considering the rival contentions and the material on record, the State Commission came to conclusions of manufacturing defect in the truck as well as deficiency in service on the part of OP no. 1 and 2 and made the award noted above.
5. It is not in doubt that the truck was well within the period of warranty when the alleged problems arose. In view of the objections raised by the OPs, the State Commission considered at length if the complainant could at all be treated as a consumer under the Act, because the truck was clearly used for commercial purpose. It concluded that the complainant would be a consumer because of the rulings of this Commission that a warranty amounted to a service under the Act and under the provisions of the Act (as they stood at the relevant time), the disqualifying exception relating to commercial purpose did not apply to consumers of services. It follows, therefore, that the allegations of deficiency in service against TELCO and OPs no. 2 and 3 have to be tested in terms of the warranty clauses.
6(i) In the course of hearing before us, Mr. Narain, learned counsel for the OPs, including TELCO has not at all raised the question of the status of the complainant as a consumer under the Act. He has limited his submissions to the warranty and drawn our attention to clauses no. 2, 3, 5 and 7 of the warranty document titled, TATA DIESEL VEHICLES WARRANTY, applicable to various types of TATA diesel trucks, including the truck in question. He has added that TELCO had filed this document before the State Commission along with its written statement against the complaint.
(ii) In brief, clause 2 of this document limits TELCOs warranty to free repairs to or replacement of parts, which in the opinion of TELCO are defective, provided the vehicle is brought to a TELCO dealer within the period of warranty. Clause 3 relates to parts/components that are outsourced, i.e., manufactured by others but procured and fitted in the vehicle by TELCO. In such cases, the buyer is entitled to exercise the rights of TELCO under the terms of warranty of those parties for the said parts/components. Clause 5, in turn, states that if the vehicle or any part thereof was repaired or altered otherwise than in accordance with TELCOs standard repair procedure or by any person other than TELCOs sales or service establishments, etc., the warranty shall not apply nor shall it apply if the vehicle is loaded in excess of the carrying capacity as certified by TELCO. Clause 7 stipulates that the warranty, inter alia, does not cover any damage due to negligent or improper operation or storage.
(iii) On the strength of this warranty, Mr. Narain has argued: (a) Refund of the price paid by the complainant for the new truck is not at all called for even if there were defects in any part ab initio. (b) The FIP was a component of the truck procured form MICO and its repairs or replacement was subject only to MICOs terms of warranty for repairs/replacement. The FIP had been tampered with and hence its free repair or replacement was not warranted. (c) The complainant is not entitled to the protection of TATAs own terms of warranty for the truck as he had not only tampered with the FIP but also converted the (so-called) half truck body converted into a full truck body, not by any of TELCOs dealer or service establishments. In support of the contention that the complainant had tampered with the MICO-manufactured FIP of the truck, Mr. Narain has relied on the detailed inspection report of the authorised dealer of MICO at Dehradun in respect of the FIP. The OPs filed this inspection report during the proceedings before the State Commission. OP no. 4 has also filed a photocopy of a handwritten cost estimate of one Bhanwara Engineering Works, Rishikesh for constructing full body of a Tata truck of the same model. (d) Finally, he has argued that the complainant left the truck at the premises of OP no. 1 on 20.10.1999 and refused to take it back even after two successive registered letters and this abandonment of the truck was an unwarranted conduct on his part.
7(i) (a) In respect of the FIP, the arguments have considerable merit. The MICO dealers detailed inspection report of 28.10.1999 was produced before the State Commission. We are surprised that this report has not been discussed at all by the State Commission in its order. The report clearly establishes the tampering of the FIP inasmuch as it records that the speed seal had been broken and, on inspection, the Governor Cutting in Speed was found to be in the range of 1600-1750 rpm (revolutions per minute) as against the rated range of 1475-1485. This could only be with the aim of revving up the engine of the truck beyond its rated capacity so that it could, at least for some time, carry higher-than-rated loads and yet not lose on speed.
(b) The complainants allegation that the staff of OP no. 1 tampered with the FIP is absurd. The OPs written version in response to the allegations in the complaint as well as the affidavit of Sanjay Tonk, Works Manger of OP no. 1 clearly state that the staff of OP no. 1 opened the engine of the truck on 21.10.1999 in the presence of Vinod Dangwal, the complainants son. The complainant filed a rejoinder to this written version but did not specifically rebut this explicit claim.
(c) The State Commission has dealt with this as follows: Secondly also the vehicle was standing in the premises of the opposite party from 16.10.1999, it was opened on 21.10.1999, it is not known who has done it between 16.10.1999 and 21.10.1999. Even if it was brought to the workshop on 20.10.1999, then also there could have been malpractice or mischief between 20.10.1999 and 21.10.199 because definitely the relations between the parties were very strain (sic). These observations do not reflect an enquiry into the facts; they are more in the nature of repetition of an insinuated allegation. There are specific statements of OP no. 1 and averments of its officials that the complainant brought and left the truck at the workshop of OP no. 1 at 9 p.m. on 21.10.1999 and the engine was opened in the presence of Vinod Dangwal on 21.10.1999. To hold in these circumstances that OP no. 1 worked overnight to tamper with the FIP of the truck is indeed strange. As we have observed later, the tampering with the FIP has to be viewed in conjunction with the unauthorised alterations in the body of the truck; otherwise, tampering with the FIP by itself would not make any sense. It is fortunate that the State Commission did not believe that OP no.1, apart from tampering with the FIP, also had the body of the truck altered overnight while the truck was at its workshop.
(d) In our view, from the available evidence, there is every reason to believe that it was the complainant, his (so-called unemployed) son or their staff operating the truck that had caused the tampering of the FIP.
(ii)(a) It has to be also noted that there can be only one reason for such tampering with the FIP of a commercial transport vehicle. It is an unfortunate but rather widespread practice in various parts of the country to alter the load-carrying capacity of commercial vehicles, with a view to transporting (revenue-earning) goods heavier than what such vehicles are designed for and thereby earning more the proverbial quick buck. The body (loading space) of the vehicle is enlarged beyond its rating, along with corresponding changes in the load bearing supports, e.g., springs and suspension. In order for the engine to pull such higher-than-rated loads, the FIP (mainly, the speed governor settings) is then tampered with, so that the engine can be revved up unduly and generate more power. This leads to various types of damages to the engine, common among which are those to the fuel inlet and (spent gas - exhaust) outlet valves on the cylinder heads and stamping of the pistons. These phenomena were explained in detail but simple terms in the affidavit of Sanjay Tonk, the Works Manger of OP no. 1. In addition, the affidavits of R. R. Kant, Ashish Sharma and Sanjay Prasad were also before the State Commission.
(b) The State Commission, on the one hand, dismissed all the above-mentioned affidavits as those of interested parties affirming on the basis on records not on inspection of the vehicle at the relevant time and yet, on the other, held that the above-mentioned affidavits showed deponents admission of the defects in the truck. The logic is classic, Piston, valves and the major defects which are admitted by opposite party as well are indicative of the fact that there was manufacturing defect, otherwise the complainant has not to wrestle with the vehicle to bring the major defects. In fact, the affidavit of Sanjay Tonk is quite categorical that he was fully aware of the complainants vehicle since the time the vehicle had been brought to the workshop of OP no.1 and the job cards had been opened under his supervision.
(c) Per contra, the State Commission seems to have relied heavily on the report of one Kishore Kumar, who was the best witness in the opinion of the State Commission. We are, however, not told who this best witness Kishore Kumar was; whether the complainant produced the formers report on affidavit; what his technical qualifications were; how he happened to be there at the precise spot where the complainants truck stopped on 15.10.1999; how exactly he inspected the engine, specifically the FIP and the cylinder heads; or what his specific findings were. The State Commission has observed that this witness reported damages in the engine and that the vehicle could not be moved due to these defects, that he nowhere reported that these are due to reviving (sic) of FIP or that speed seal was broken. Just when the vehicle came in the hands of the workshop, these defects of driving were manipulated as a case to defeat the case of the complainant and that Kishore Kumar nowhere stated that these defects were due to misdriving (sic) of the vehicle or any mischief of the complainant. These are the words and the underlying logic in the State Commissions order - to put it mildly; they once again leave us surprised as examples of judicious appreciation of evidence.
(iii)(a) Before the State Commission, there were explicit averments by the OPs and other deponents from their side that the truck sold to the complainant was with a half-body, built in accordance with the load rating of the specific model. However, the complainant had it converted unauthorisedly into a full-body truck. The affidavits also referred, in this connection, to a cost estimate dated 18.06.1999 (i.e., about a fortnight before the complainant actually purchased the truck) for Rs. 25,000/- of one Bhanwara Engineering Works, Rishikesh for such conversion. The complainant himself produced this document among the papers that he filed. This hand-written cost estimate (in Hindi), titled Body for New Vehicle, referred specifically to 909 (i.e., the model no. of the truck sold to the complainant) and quoted Rs. 25,000/- as the cost for making new full body with all maal material.
(b) Dealing with this question, the State Commission has observed as follows: It was argued by the Learned Counsel for the opposite parties that the complainant has admitted that he got the truck converted from half dala to full dala and therefore he has changed the shape of the vehicle for overloading. There was no such allegation anywhere neither by the mechanic nor the experts of the opposite party. The opposite party has misread the letter of the complainant wherein he has written that the work of the vehicle has been done in full. The work has been done in full. It is not that half dala has been converted into full dala.
(c) It is factually erroneous to observe that there was no allegation of the OPs that the complainant had unauthorisedly converted the body of the truck. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Sanjay Tonk specifically details this contention. It is reiterated in paragraph 4 of the affidavit of R. R. Kant, Service Engineer, TELCO Regional Sales Office, Dehradun and paragraph 2 of the affidavit of Ashish Sharma, Service Manager, TELCO (TATA Motors), Area Office, Lucknow. Thus, had the State Commission tried to appreciate the significance of the evidence on conversion of the body of the truck in conjunction with that on tampering with the FIP, by calling for a physical examination of the truck body even during the complaint proceedings with the help of an independent technical agency, we trust it could have arrived at the correct conclusions.
(d) We may also observe that unauthorised altering of the specifications of important electro-mechanical parts of a registered motor vehicle is against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Chapters VII and VIII and the rules framed thereunder. Such acts are prejudicial to public safety. No Consumer Forum would, therefore, be justified in condoning such misconduct on the part of any person, whether a buyer of a motor vehicle (consumer under the Act) or otherwise.
(iv) The allegations in the complaint were essentially in two parts: manufacturing defect and deficiency in warranty-period services. In respect of allegations of manufacturing defect in a motor vehicle (or, for that matter, any other goods with similar manufacturing complexity), the Consumer Fora, in our view, need to hasten slowly before coming to a firm conclusion. For, the Act enjoins thus [vide section 13 (1) (c), read with section 18]:
13 (1) The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, if it relates to any goods,‑
(c) where the complaint alleges a defect in the goods which cannot be determined without proper analysis or test of the goods, the District Forum shall obtain a sample of the goods from the complainant, seal it and authenticate it in the manner prescribed and refer the sample so sealed to the appropriate laboratory with a direction that such laboratory make an analysis or test, whichever may be necessary, with a view to finding out whether such goods suffer from any defect alleged in the complaint or from any other defect and to report the findings thereon to the District Forum within a period of forty five days of receiving the reference or within such extended period as may be granted by the District Forum;
Clauses (d) to (g) of this sub-section further elaborate the process of adjudication in such cases.
(iv) Therefore, given the rival contentions of the parties, it was necessary for the State Commission to require an examination of the truck by an independent and technically competent agency to determine the issues, as specifically mandated under the Act. This was not done.
8. Thus, the reasons recorded by the State Commission for its findings on manufacturing defects in the truck do not appear to be grounded on due appreciation of facts aided by impartial logic. The discussion and conclusions betray a lack of understanding of the basic technicalities of an automobile engine. This by itself is not unusual in fact, to expect otherwise may be inadvisable. What is unusual, however, is the lack of awareness of this absence of knowledge and that notwithstanding, failure to take recourse to the explicit provisions of the Act when a Consumer Forum has the task of determining a technical issue like manufacturing defect in an automobile, in the face of serious contending claims. Secondly, it reflects a somewhat overzealous mindset, which is not conducive to judicial/judicious adjudication of consumer disputes. No doubt, the Act aims at protecting and promoting the rights of consumers buyers and users of goods and services. Nevertheless, it does not confer unfettered latitude to the consumers to do what they might choose in using such goods or services. With every right also comes the responsibility to act in good faith: in cases like these, to use a product or service honestly and in keeping with the specifications contracted. It is true that the warranties for goods and services provided by the manufacturers/dealers of goods or providers of services in our country are mostly pre-determined, pre-printed documents and the vast mass of unorganised consumers are left with no option except to accept them as they are. The remedy for that situation lies elsewhere, not with the Consumer Fora directly. What the Consumer Fora can and ought to do in such cases is, however, provided for in detail in the Act and the Rules and it would serve the interests of the consumers considerably if those provisions are enforced with equity on both parties.
9(i) Returning to the performance of the services under the warranty, however, we find that the conduct of OP no. 1 and 2 was not consumer-friendly. The run-around that the complainant had to go through, on one ground or the other, from the workshop of OP no. 2 to that of OP no. 1 and vice versa for repairs to the truck, is not usual. OP no. 1 had its workshop at Dehradun, that of OP no. 2 was in Rishikesh and the complainant was based somewhere in Garhwal. Despite their detailed written versions and affidavits, the division of responsibilities between OP no. 1 and no.2 in respect of the warranty services appears unclear. Secondly, the truck came up for servicing under the warranty on two occasions. The OPs claimed that the servicing was done satisfactorily. Yet, there is no job card of these before us though the insistence on job card being opened is writ large in the defence of OPs no. 1 and 2, particularly in the registered letters sent in the span of a few days after 21 October 1999. It was not enough for the OPs to contend that the details of the works done during servicing of the truck were entered in the operators service book. Surely, the OPs would have kept full, parallel records of the works/repairs done during the mandatory servicing under warranty. They did not produce any such document.
(ii) Further, apart from the contention regarding unauthorised alterations of the truck body, the OPs case hinges on the FIP having been tampered with. During his arguments, Mr. Narain has somehow omitted to point out that the MICO dealer at Dehradun had repaired the FIP free of charge this is borne out by letter dated 28.08.2000 of the said dealer, which is on record and is also confirmed in the affidavit of one N. Behra, an official of MICO. By that letter, the dealer had also advised OP no. 1 to take delivery of the FIP. The important point is that during the complaint proceedings, MICOs stand was that its local dealer did not insist on prior payment for the repairs to the FIP, though the complainant had tampered with it. Therefore, it was farfetched on the part of OPs no. 1 and 2 in particular to deny the warranty benefits to the complainant specifically on the ground that one of the crucial parts of the truck engine, viz., the FIP had been tampered with.
10(i) However, it would appear that at some point in the proceedings before the State Commission, there was an offer of repairing the truck and making it roadworthy and the cost of repairs estimated by the OPs was about Rs. 25,000/-. This figure finds mention in the State Commissions order. That notwithstanding, the State Commission went ahead with ordering full refund of the price of the truck to the complainant, with interest at the rather high rate of 15% per annum. This was mainly because the complainant had taken a loan for the truck, which he was unable to repay and there was no certainty, given the background of the case, that the OPs would give a good truck even if they were directed to replace the old one.
(ii) One more fact needs to be noted. By its order of 20.08.2004, this Commission admitted this appeal, directed the appellants (original OPs) to deposit Rs. 5 lakh as condition precedent to staying execution of the order of the State Commission and allowed the complainant to withdraw that amount against adequate security for restitution. The complainant withdrew the amount, as noticed in this Commissions order of 07.03.2005. The complainant appears to have utilised a part of the withdrawn deposit to repay the bank loan with interest due thereon.
11. In view of the preceding discussion, we find that there is no reliable expert evidence to hold that the truck suffered from any manufacturing defect. There was marginal deficiency in service on the part of OP no. 1 and 2 in that, in August 1999, they made the complainant run around from one workshop to the other. However, the conduct of the complainant in leaving the truck parked at the OPs workshop for a long period in August 1999 was unjustified and not that of an unemployed person interested in plying the truck for earning a livelihood. Moreover, the complainant had the body of the truck converted unauthorisedly and caused tampering with the fuel injection pump. By doing so, he violated the terms of the warranty. In such a situation, the order of the State Commission cannot be upheld nor, strictly speaking, can any indulgence be shown to the complainant.
12. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the State Commission and direct the complainant to refund to the appellants-OPs the amount of Rs. 5 lakh that he withdrew from the deposit. However, the appellants-OPs may not insist on any interest on that amount since the date of its withdrawal by the complainant. We further direct OPs no. 1 and 2 to have the truck fully repaired, made roadworthy and restored to the complainant after the latter pays the amount withdrawn from the deposit in one lump sum. This is the maximum indulgence that can be shown to the complainant, in the given facts and circumstances, considering that his was a case of a first-time entrepreneur-transporter. This dispensation given to the complainant will not, however, be cited as a precedent. The appeal is disposed of in these terms.
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[R. C. JAIN, J] ..........
[ANUPAM DASGUPTA]