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Calcutta High Court

Rajat Agarwal & Ors vs Spartan Online Private Limited & Ors on 25 April, 2017

Author: Soumen Sen

Bench: Soumen Sen

                IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
               ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
                          ORIGINAL SIDE

BEFORE:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SOUMEN SEN

                            G.A.No.1208 of 2017
                             C.S. No.35 of 2017

                     RAJAT AGARWAL & ORS.
                               VS.
              SPARTAN ONLINE PRIVATE LIMITED & ORS.


For the Petitioners                  : Mr. Pratap Chatterjee, Sr. Adv.,
                                       Mr. Ranjan Bachawat, Sr. Adv.,
                                       Mr. P. Sinha, Adv.,
                                       Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Adv.,
                                       Mr. S. Sengupta, Adv.,
                                       Mrs. Arunima Lala Sengupta, Adv.,
                                       Mr. Ayan Dey, Adv.

For the Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 : Mr. S.K. Kapur, Sr. Adv.,
                                    Mr. M. K. Singh, Adv.,
                                    Mr. Suman Kr. Mukherjee, Adv.

For the Respondent No.7              : Mr. Tilak Bose, Sr. Adv.,
                                       Mr. Anindya Basu, Adv.,
                                       Mr. Supriya Ranjan Saha, Adv.


Heard On                             : 27.02.2017, 07.03.2017, 20.03.2017,
                                     07.04.2017.


Judgment On                          : 25th April, 2017



      Soumen Sen, J. : - This is an application filed by the defendant No.7

for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.


      The grounds for revocation are three-fold, namely:-
         (a) No part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of

           this Court.


        (b) Forum inconvenience.


        (c) Accessibility of website within the jurisdiction in law cannot confer

           jurisdiction on this Court.


        It is submitted that the defendant No.7 is having its registered office at

5/19, Poddar Nagar, Kolkata - 700 068 and also has a corporate office at

504-505, Crescent Tower, Village : Oshiwara. Off: New Line Road, Andheri

(West), Mumbai - 400 053, both situated outside the jurisdiction of this

Court. The main business activities are carried out from Mumbai Corporate

Office with regard to present registered office at Poddar Nagar, Kolkata. The

defendant No.7 is planning to shift its office to some place not within the

Original Side Jurisdiction of this Court.      All the directors of the company

function from its corporate office at Andheri (West), Mumbai outside the

jurisdiction of this Court. The suit against the defendant No.7 is principally

seeking to challenge removal of the plaintiff No.1 as director of the defendant

No.7.    The plaintiff No.1 has already been removed by Extra Ordinary

General Meeting (EOGM) held on 25th February, 2017 at its corporate office

at Mumbai.


        Mr. Rajat Agarwal made the application for registration of the domain

name "www.spartanpoker.com" with Bigrock on behalf of the defendant No.7

from his Mumbai residence.         All the trademark applications filed by the

defendant No.7 since 2014 with regard to the registration of various
 trademarks including "Spartan" is pending in the Mumbai Trademark

Registry. Rajat Agarwal used to operate its business from Mumbai at the

address at Chambur and looked after financial matter of the company from

its office at Andheri (West), Mumbai. The address of the plaintiff No.1 stated

in the cause title of the plaint, namely, at 137, Biplabi Rashbehari Basu

Road, Kolkata - 700 001 is irrelevant for the purpose of jurisdiction

inasmuch as there is no question of any copyright of the plaintiff No.1. The

plaintiff No.1 has since initiated trade mark objection to the trade mark

application of the defendant No.1 Company in Mumbai in October, 2016.

The plaintiff No.3 is a company registered at New Alipore, Kolkata - 700 053,

outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 both reside

in New Alipore outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In view thereof, it is

contended that no dispute has arisen between the parties within the

jurisdiction of this Court and no event took place within the jurisdiction of

this Court. All activities including the registration of domain names and the

trade mark, removal of the directors have taken place in Mumbai, outside

the jurisdiction of this Court.    The natural forum for adjudicating the

disputes as against the defendant No.7, therefore, is also in Mumbai. In a

desperate attempt to attract jurisdiction the plaintiffs have even alleged that

business of the defendant No.7 is carried out at 21, Hemanta Basu Sarani.

Such allegation is false and not even alleged in the cause title.          The

defendant No.7 has never mentioned 21, Hemanta Basu Sarani (wrongly

mentioned as 10, Hemanata Basu Sarani) as its place of business.           The

allegation that all website is accessible within the jurisdiction of this Court

cannot confer jurisdiction of this Court.
       The petitioner in the alternative has prayed for deletion of the

defendant No.7 from the array of defendants.


      It is a trite law that in considering an application in the nature of

demurer, the averments made in the plaint are taken to be true and correct.

Leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is a discretionary relief. This

High Court being a chartered High Court assumes jurisdiction under Clause

12 of the Letters Patent to try, adjudicate and determine a suit. The Court

in an appropriate situation like forum convenience or situs of the dispute is

more inextricably connected with the other forum may revoke leave under

Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.     Unlike Section 20 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, the Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent assumes

jurisdiction if the defendant carries on business within the jurisdiction of

this Court irrespective of the fact that whether a cause of action has arisen

within or not. The registered office of the defendant need not to be within

the jurisdiction in order to attract Clause 12 of the Letters Patent.       The

person applying for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent

on the ground of forum inconvenience has to establish that the other forum

is inextricably connected with the dispute and the trial in this Court would

be inconvenient, oppressive and result in hardship.


      In order to decide the said issue, it is necessary to refer to some of the

Paragraphs in the plaint on the basis of which leave was granted.


      The said Paragraphs are:-
 "20.   The parties hereto put in enormous effort, skill and labour for

establishing the business of the joint ventures, by reason, inter alia, of

the persistence, hard work and labour put in by the plaintiff No.1 the

site, spartanpoker.com, was launched on 25th March, 2015. The said

spartanpoker.com is a webpage accessible from within the jurisdiction

of this Hon'ble Court.


50.    The defendants no.2 to 5 in the meantime purported to cause a

new company to be incorporated on December 9, 2016, i.e. the

defendant No.1, which is situated within the jurisdiction of this

Hon'ble Court, with the object of diverting the partnership business.

The defendant nos.2 to 5 are the shareholders and directors thereof

and own and control the said company. It appears that the said joint

venture business has been diverted to the defendant No.1 which has

started   operating      the   same    facilities   under   the    name,

"thespartanpoker" and using the same and/or a deceptively similar

Spartan helmet logo. Use of the same is in violation of the plaintiff's

rights as also an infringement of copyright thereon.


74.    The plaintiffs and the defendant Nos.2 to 6 have unequivocally

agreed that the joint venture partners would not enter into any

competitive business and/or in the same line of business as that of

the joint venture.    The said clause in the agreement is an express

negative covenant and the defendants have breached the said

covenant by incorporating the defendant No. 1 and the domain name,

"thespartanpoker.com" having similar name as that of the website
 platform of the joint venture business and/or the domain name which

has been permitted by the plaintiffs to be used by the said joint

venture.


88.   Inasmuch as the plaintiffs are the owner of the artistic work

"Spartanpoker" and carrying on business at 137, Biplabi Rashbehari

Basu Road, Kolkata - 700 001, which is within the jurisdiction of this

Hon'ble Court, and this Hon'ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction

to try, entertain and determine the instant suit under Section 62 of

the Copyright Act, 1957.      Further, the defendant No.7 has its

registered office at 21, Hemanta Basu Sarani, Centre Point, Police

Station Hare Street, Kolkata - 700 001 and is seeking to infringe the

plaintiff's trademark "Spartanpoker" and pass off its business from

the web page "www.spartanpoker.com" from the said address, this

Hon'ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try, entertain and

determine the instant suit.       The defendant no.1 on and from

December 9, 2016 has in any event filched the entire business of the

joint venture to the prejudice of the plaintiffs, from 21, Hemanta Basu

Sarani, Centre Paints, Kolkata - 700 001, within the jurisdiction of

this Hon'ble Court.


89.   Further,        the   web     page     of    the     defendants

"www.thespartanpoker.com", which is accessible from various places

within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, namely, Park Street,

Esplanade area, Bidhan Sarani, Old Court House Corner, Central

Avenue, Chandni Chowk and various other places and upon clicking
       of the said website the link by which online poker games can be

      played is accessible from the aforesaid addresses within the

      jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court and the contents can also be

      downloaded there from.          The said website is an interactive website

      accessible at various places within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble

      Court. As such this Hon'ble Court has the territorial jurisdiction to

      try, entertain and determine the instant suit. (emphasis added)


      In Paragraph 88 of the plaint, however, in the second sentence the

defendant No.1 has been wrongly described as defendant No.7.


      The registered office of the applicant/defendant is at Alipore outside

the original jurisdiction of this Court. The case of the plaintiff is that the

entire business of the defendant No.7 is now being carried out at the

registered office of the defendant No.1 situated within the jurisdiction of this

Court.    The plaintiffs claimed to be the owner of the artistic work

"Spartanpoker" and carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this

Court. The defendant No.7 is seeking to infringe the plaintiff's trademark

"Spartanpoker"    and    pass   off     its   business   from   the   web   page

"www.spartanpoker.com" from its office address at 21, Hemanta Basu

Sarani within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. The web page of the

defendants "www.thespartanpoker.com" is accessible from various places

within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, namely, Park Street, Esplanade

area, Bidhan Sarani, Old Court House Corner, Central Avenue, Chandni

Chowk and various other places and upon clicking of the said website the

link by which online poker games can be played is accessible from the
 aforesaid addresses within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. In Indian

Mineral & Chemicals Co. & Ors. Vs. Deutsche Bank reported at (2004)

12 SCC 376 Paragraph 10 and Exphar SA Vs. Eupharma Laboratories

Ltd. reported at AIR 2004 SC 1682: (2004) 28 PTC 251: (2004) 3 SCC

688, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in no uncertain term has stated that the

objection to jurisdiction must proceed on the basis that the facts pleaded by

the plaintiff are to be taken as true and correct.       These averments are

sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. The truth and veracity of

the statements made in the plaint cannot be questioned at this stage.


      In this regard, it may be useful to refer to the decision of our Court in

Muttra Electric Supply Company Vs. Gopal Saran Kulasresthi reported

at 59 CWN 419 in which the Hon'ble Justice P.B. Mukharji (later on His

Lordship became the Chief Justice of this Court) in his Lordship's inimitable

style discussed the scope of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in the following

words:-


            "The basic character of the jurisdiction of this Court under clause
      12 of the Letters Patent requires a more thorough investigation than it
      has received so far. Under this clause there is first a grant of power to
      this Court to receive, try and determine suits of every description. Then
      there is a broad classification of such suits into two divisions. The first
      classification is concerned with suits for land and immovable property
      and the second classification is with regard to other suits. Regarding
      the first class of suits relating to land and immovable property the
      limitation of jurisdiction of this Court is that such land or immovable
      property must be situated within its jurisdiction. Regarding the second
      class of suits other than those for land and immovable property the first
      limitation is that the cause of action must arise wholly within its
 jurisdiction. Then this clause deals with those cases where part of the
land or part of the cause of action is outside the jurisdiction of this
Court. It is here that the leave of this Court has first to be obtained
before the suit can be instituted in this Court, with the one exception
where the defendant at the time of the suit dwells or carries on
business or personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of the
Court.

         A close scrutiny of this clause, therefore, reveals that there are
certain total and absolute jurisdictions of this Court. They are where
the whole of the land or immovable property is situated within its
jurisdiction when the suit is for such land or immovable property. That
is also the case where the whole of the cause of action arises within the
jurisdiction of the Court in suits other than suits for land and immovable
property. Also that is the case in such cases where the defendant at
the time of the institution of the suit dwells or caries on business or
personally works for gain within the jurisdiction of this Court
irrespective of the fact where the cause of action arises. These three
are the categories of total and absolute jurisdiction of the Court under
the grant of power in clause 12 of the Letters Patent. No question of the
litigant having to take the leave of the Court arises in these three cases.
So long as the litigant satisfies the test laid down in these three cases
his right to institute the suit in this Court is absolute and unfettered.
The court can neither assume nor renounce such jurisdiction.

         But then there is another class of jurisdiction which this Court
can avail under clause 12 of the Letters Patent where the reality or the
cause of action is not wholly but only partly within its jurisdiction. It is
an inchoate jurisdiction which comes into action upon the Court granting
the leave to institute the suit. It is the nascent jurisdiction which lies
dormant in this Court and can only be put into life and operation by an
act of the Court in granting leave to institute the suit. No act of the
Court is necessary to assume jurisdiction in those three cases, which I
have just described where the jurisdiction is total and absolute. There
       the Court in its inception is invested with jurisdiction.     But here the
      Court has to acquire it. Here the jurisdiction does not depend only on
      the fact of the Court but also on the act of the Court." (emphasis added)

      In a fairly recent decision in Chainrup Sampatram v. Punjab &

Sind Bank reported at 2009 (1) CHN 346 at Paragraph 24, the Court

summarized the principle on the basis of which the Court assumes

jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent which reads:-


      "24.   There are three limbs to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent: the first
             limb covers suits for land or other immovable property, which is
             not germane for the present purpose; the second limb speaks of
             the place of accrual of the cause of action in the suit, requiring no
             previous leave if the cause of action arises wholly within
             jurisdiction but requiring previous leave if only a part - however
             infinitesimal or significant - of the cause of action arises within
             jurisdiction; and, the third is the situs of the defendant at the time
             of commencement of the suit. A suit for land (or other immovable
             property) stands on a different pedestal and it is unnecessary to
             go into that aspect of Clause 12 here. But in a suit which is not a
             suit for land (or other immovable property) the plaintiff has a
             choice of invoking the jurisdiction of this Court on either of the two
             remaining limbs of Clause 12. If there is a solitary defendant in a
             suit which is not a suit for land (or other immovable property), the
             plaintiff may unquestionably institute it on the Original Side of
             this Court if the entirety of the cause of action arises within the
             original jurisdiction of the Court and irrespective of where the
             defendant may dwell or carry on business or personally work for
             gain. If there is a solitary defendant in a suit which is not a suit
             for land (or other immovable property), the plaintiff may institute
             it on the original side of this Court if a part of the cause of action
             arises within the original jurisdiction of this Court irrespective of
             where the defendant may dwell or carry on business or
              personally work for gain, subject, however, to obtaining prior
             leave under Clause 12 to institute the suit. If there is a solitary
             defendant in a suit which is not a suit for land (or other
             immovable property), the plaintiff may institute it on the original
             side of this Court if the defendant, at the time of the
             commencement of the suit, dwells or carries on business or
             personally works for gain within the original jurisdiction of this
             Court, irrespective of where the cause of action may be arisen.
             The second and third limbs of Clause 12 that cover suits other
             than suits for land (or other immovable property) are, in a sense,
             mutually exclusive; in that the plaintiff has the choice of either
             founding territorial jurisdiction on situs of cause of action or on
             location of the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit.
             In a suit other than a suit for land (or other immovable property)
             where the plaintiff sues more than one defendant, either of the
             last two limbs of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent has to be
             satisfied in respect of each defendant in the suit for the action to
             be launched on the Original Side of this Court." (emphasis added)




        The averments noted above along with other averments in the plaint

goes to show that the plaint discloses cause of action against the defendant

No.7.


        Turning   on   to   the   question   of   balance   of   convenience   and

inconvenience, it is significant to mention that the defendant No.7 has filed

a suit against the plaintiff No.1 and plaintiff No.3 in Alipore Court during the

pendency of the interlocutory application being G.A. No.687 of 2017 filed by

the plaintiffs which goes to show that the defendant No.7 would not be

inconvenienced in the event trial of the suit takes place in and around
 Kolkata. Moreover, it is significant to mention that State of Maharashtra

does not permit poker gaming and it was for that reason that the poker

gaming business was launched at Kolkata by the defendant No.7 from a

place provided by the plaintiff which is only few kilometres from High Court

within the municipal limits of Kolkata Municipal Corporation but beyond the

territorial jurisdiction of the Original Side, High Court, Calcutta. In fact, the

defendant No.7 was incorporated on 20th March, 2014 but commenced its

business     only   on   25th   March,   2015   upon   launching    of   the   site

"spartanpoker.com" from its registered office at Alipore provided by the

plaintiff.


       The learned Counsel has referred to the decisions of the Delhi High

Court in World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. Vs. Reshma Collection &

Ors. reported at 2014 (58) PTC 52 (Del) for the proposition that access to

website at a place would not confer the jurisdiction of the Court where such

website is accessed and Indian Performing Rights Society Limited Vs.

Sanjay Dalia & Anr. reported at (2015) 10 SCC 161 to contend that since

the plaintiffs do not actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business

within the jurisdiction of this Court an action for infringement of trade mark

or of copyright would not be maintainable in this Court.           The applicant

perhaps would contend that since the plaintiff No.1 is also having a place of

business at Mumbai and the defendant No.7 is also having its corporate

office, proceeding at Kolkata would be considered to be a 'far flung' place

deliberately chosen to harass the defendant No.7.
       In World Wrestling Entertainment (supra) the learned Single Judge

was considering the territorial jurisdiction of the Court in relation to Section

134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Sections 62(2), 65A, 65B of the

Copyright Act, 1957. The suit was filed for permanent injunction restraining

Infringement of Copyright, Infringement of Trademarks, Passing Off,

Dilution, Rendition of Accounts, Damages and Delivery up, etc., by World

Wrestling Entertainment Inc. The defendants were located in Mumbai and

were not claimed to be carrying on business within the jurisdiction of this

Court.   The jurisdiction of the Court at Mumbai was involved by relying

upon Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of the

Copyright Act, 1957.


      The Court after taking into consideration the aforesaid provisions and

some of the judgments on this point objectively construed Section 134(2) of

the Trade Marks Act, 1999 which uses the expression "carries on business"

and observed that the criteria required to be applied is that an essential part

of the plaintiff's business coupled with an element of control exercised by

the plaintiff, must exist in such place but the plaintiff claims to be carrying

on business either on its own or through an exclusive agent.          The said

criteria would be equally applicable to a party that concluded transactions

with its customers over the medium of internet as opposed to a physical

retail space.   Internet is another medium which provides audio-visual

interactive facility for doing business.      Merely because a person has

embarked upon an e-commerce business model, the tests which apply for

determination of issues, such as - when and where the contract is made, or
 whether the vendor carries on business at the place where the merchandise

may be sold, or service may be offered, would not change and would be the

same as apply to communications over telephone and fax. It was further

observed that if the plaintiff's submissions were to be accepted, it would

mean that the plaintiff could file a suit at any place which provides internet

access to the plaintiff's website, irrespective of the defendant's location, only

on account of the plaintiff's website being accessible in that State.        The

insertion of Section 134(2) was with a view to enable the plaintiff to institute

a suit where it has actual and substantial business interest so that an

additional forum convenient to the plaintiff is available. The decision of the

Delhi Court in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. Vs. A. Murali Krishna

Reddy reported at 2010 (42) PTC 361 (Del) was considered and applied.

The said decision was founded upon the premise that a part of cause of

action arises at the place where the defendant sells its offending

merchandise/services.


         In Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited (supra), where the question of

jurisdiction for a passing off suit, in which neither the plaintiff nor the

defendant is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court was

considered. The plaintiff is at Singapore and the defendants in Hyderabad,

and the suit is an action for passing off in which neither the plaintiff nor the

defendant voluntarily resides or carries on business within the local limits of

Delhi.
       On a reference of this question by single Judge and after reviewing the

decisions in other common law jurisdictions (Canada, UK, Australia and

India), the Division Bench of the High Court held as follows:


            1. For the purpose of a passing off action, or an infringement
               action where the plaintiff is not carrying on business within
               the jurisdiction of a court, and in the absence of a long-arm
               Statute, in order to satisfy the Forum Court that it has
               jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the plaintiff would have to
               show that the defendant "purposefully availed" itself of the
               Jurisdiction of the Forum Court. For this it would have to be
               prima facie shown that the nature of the activity indulged in
               by the Defendant by the use of the website was with an
               intention to conclude a commercial transaction with the
               website user and that the specific targeting of the forum state
               by the defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the plaintiff
               within the forum state.

            2. For the purposes of Section 20(c) CPC, in order to show that
               some part of the cause of action has arisen in the forum state
               by the use of the internet by the defendant the plaintiff will
               have to show prima facie that the said website, whether
               euphemistically termed as "passive plus" or "interactive", was
               specifically targeted at viewers in the forum state for
               commercial transactions.    The plaintiff would have to plead
               this and produce material to prima facie show that some
               commercial transaction using the website was entered into by
               the defendant with a user of its website within the forum state
               resulting in any injury or harm to the Plaintiff within the forum
               state.

            3. The commercial transaction entered into by the defendant with
               an internet user located within the jurisdiction of the Forum
                Court cannot possibly be a solitary trap transaction since that
               would not be an instance of "purposeful" availment by the
               defendant. It would have to be a real commercial transaction
               that the defendant has with someone not set up by the
               plaintiff itself. If the only evidence is in the form of a series of
               trap transactions, they have to be shown as having been
               obtained using fair means. The plaintiff seeking to establish
               jurisdiction on the basis of such trap transactions would have
               to aver unambiguously in the plaint, and also place along with
               it supporting material, to prima facie show that the trap
               transactions relied upon satisfy the above test.

      In the instant case, apart from the fact that the plaintiff No.1 carries

on business within the jurisdiction of this Court, the averments made in the

plaint clearly show that the defendant is "purposefully availed" itself in the

forum court and the nature of the activity indulged in by the defendant No.1

and defendant No.7 by use of the website was with an intention to conclude

a commercial transaction with the website user inasmuch as the plaintiffs

has disclosed the places where such transactions are likely to be concluded.

Moreover, the poker gaming is allowed in the State of West Bengal unlike

Maharashtra and it was for that purpose "Spartanpoker.com" was launched

on 25th March, 2015 from Calcutta.            The petitioners provided office

accommodation at Poddar Nagar to the defendant No.7 and since then the

defendant No.7 was functioning from that place.           The objection to the

jurisdiction must proceed on the basis that the facts pleaded by the plaintiff

are true and correct and applying that test it cannot be said that no part of

the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court.
     The Trade Marks Act, 1999 in Section 134 provides that a suit in respect

of the following matters shall be filed only before a court, not inferior to a

District Court:-


      (a) For the infringement of a registered trade mark; or


      (b) Relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or


      (c) For passing of arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade

         mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's

         trade mark, whether registered or unregistered.


      Apart from an action for infringement of a registered trade mark, the

law enables a suit for passing off also to be filed, arising out of the use of

any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's

trade mark, whether registered or unregistered.        A suit for passing off

arising out of the use by the defendant of any trademark identical or similar

to the plaintiffs' mark (whether registered or unregistered) can be instituted

only in terms of the provision of Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code

which in the instant case would be subject to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent

as by reason of Section 120 of the CPC Section 20 of CPC would not be

applicable to a chartered High Court.


      In Indian Performing Rights Society (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court applied the purposive construction rule in interpreting Section 62 of

the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The

relevant observation can be found in Paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,

25, 26 and 52 of the said report which reads:-
 "17.           Accrual of cause of action is a sine qua non for a suit
to be filed. Cause of action is a bundle of facts which is required
to be proved to grant relief to the plaintiff. Cause of action not
only refers to the infringement but also the material facts on
which right is founded. Section 20 of the CPC recognises the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts inter alia where the cause of
action wholly or in part arises. It has to be decided in each case
whether cause of action wholly or in part arises at a particular
place. As held by this Court in Rajasthan High Court Advocates
Association v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 2001 SC 416]. Thus, a
plaintiff can also file a suit where the cause of action wholly or in
part arises.

   18.         On a due and anxious consideration of the provisions
contained in Section 20 CPC, Section 62 of the Copyright Act and
Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and the object with which the
latter provisions have been enacted, it is clear that if a cause of
action has arisen wholly or in part, where the plaintiff is residing
or having its principal office / carries on business or personally
works for gain, the suit can be filed at such place(s).            The
plaintiff(s) can also institute a suit at a place where he is residing,
carrying on business or personally works for gain dehors the fact
that the cause of action has not arisen at a place where he / they
are residing or any one of them is residing, carries on business or
personally works for gain. However, this right to institute suit at
such a place has to be read subject to certain restrictions, such as
in case the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a
particular place / having its head office and at such place cause
of action has also arisen wholly or in part, the plaintiff cannot
ignore such a place under the guise that he is carrying on
business at other far-flung places also. The very intendment of
the insertion of provision in the Copyright Act and the Trade
Marks Act is the convenience of the plaintiff.           The rule of
 convenience of the parties has been given a statutory expression
in Section 20 CPC as well. The interpretation of provisions has to
be such which prevents the mischief of causing inconvenience to
the parties.

   19.         The intendment of the aforesaid provisions inserted
in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act is to provide a
forum to the plaintiff where he is residing, carrying on business or
personally works for gain.      The object is to ensure that the
plaintiff is not deterred from instituting infringement proceedings
"because the court in which proceedings are to be instituted is at
a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary
residence". The impediment created to the plaintiff by Section 20
CPC of going to a place where it was not having ordinary
residence or principal place of business was sought to be removed
by virtue of the aforesaid provisions of the Copyright Act and the
Trade Marks Act.       Where the corporation is having ordinary
residence / place of business and cause of action has also arisen
at that place, it has to institute a suit at the said place and not at
other places. The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act
and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act never intended to operate
in the field where the plaintiff is having its principal place of
business at a particular place and the cause of action has also
arisen at that place so as to enable it to file a suit at a distant
place where its subordinate office situated though at such place
no cause of action has arisen. Such interpretation would cause
great harm and would be juxtaposed to the very legislative
intendment of the provisions so enacted.

20.   In our opinion, in a case where cause of action has arisen
at a place where the plaintiff is residing or where there are more
than one such persons, any of them actually or voluntarily
resides or carries on business or personally works for gain would
oust the jurisdiction of other place where the cause of action has
 not arisen though at such a place, by virtue of having subordinate
office, the plaintiff instituting a suit or other proceedings might be
carrying on business or personally works for gain.

      21.    At the same time, the provisions of Section 62 of the
   Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have
   removed the embargo of suing at place of accrual of cause of
   action wholly or in part, with regard to a place where the
   plaintiff or any of them ordinarily resides, carries on business
   or personally works for gain. We agree to the aforesaid extent
   that the impediment imposed under Section 20 CPC to a
   plaintiff to institute a suit in a court where the defendant
   resides or carries on business or where the cause of action
   wholly or in part arises, has been removed. But the right is
   subject to the rider in case the plaintiff resides or has its
   principal place of business / carries on business or personally
   works for gain at a place where cause of action has also
   arisen, suit should be filed at the at place not at other places
   where the plaintiff is having branch offices, etc.

      22.    There is no doubt about it that the words used in
Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act, "notwithstanding anything contained in CPC or any
other law for the time being in force", emphasise that the
requirement of Section 20 CPC would not have to be complied with
by the plaintiff if he resides or carries on business in the local
limits of the court where he has filed the suit but, in our view, at
the same time, as the provision providing for an additional forum,
cannot be interpreted in the manner that it has authorised the
plaintiff to institute a suit at a different place other than the place
where he is ordinarily residing or having principal office and
incidentally where the cause of action wholly or in part has also
arisen. The impugned judgments, in our considered view, do not
take away the additional forum and fundamental basis of
 conferring the right and advantage to the authors of the Copyright
Act and the Trade Marks Act provided under the aforesaid
provisions.

       23.    The provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act
and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act are in pari materia.
Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is applicable to clauses (a)
and (b) of Section 134(1) of the Trade Marks Act.             Thus, a
procedure to institute suit with respect to Section 134(1)(c) in
respect of "passing off" continues to be governed by Section 20
CPC.

       ...

25. Considering the first aspect of the aforesaid principle, the common law which was existing before the provisions of law were passed was Section 20 CPC. It did not provide for the plaintiff to institute a suit except in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 20. The defect in existing law was inconvenience / deterrence caused to the authors suffering from financial constraints on account of having to vindicate their intellectual property rights at a place far away from their residence or the place of their business. The said mischief or defect in the existing law which did not provide for the plaintiff to sue at a place where he ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, was sought to be removed. Hence, the remedy was provided by incorporating the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act. The provisions enabled the plaintiff or any of them to file a suit at the aforesaid places. But if they were residing or carrying on business or personally worked for gain already at such place, where cause of action has arisen, wholly or in part, the said provisions have not provided additional remedy to them to file a suit at a different place. The said provisions never intended to operate in that field. The operation of the provisions was limited and their objective was clearly to enable the plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he is ordinarily residing or carrying on business, etc. as enumerated above, not to go away from such places. The legislature has never intended that the plaintiff should not institute the suit where he ordinarily resides or at its or at its head office or registered office or where he otherwise carries on business or personally works for gain where the cause of action too has arisen and should drag the defendant to a subordinate office or other place of business which is at a far distant place under the guise of the fact that the plaintiff corporation is carrying on business through branch or otherwise at such other place also. If such an interpretation is permitted, as rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents, the abuse of the provision will take place. Corporations and big conglomerates, etc. might be having several subordinate offices throughout the country. Interpretation otherwise would permit them to institute infringement proceedings at a far-flung place and at an unconnected place as compared to a place where the plaintiff is carrying on their business, and at such place, cause of action too has arisen. In the instant case, the principal place of business is, admittedly, in Mumbai and the cause of action has also arisen in Mumbai. Thus, the provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi Court in the aforesaid circumstances to entertain such suits. The Delhi Court would have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain it.

26. The avoidance of counter-mischief to the defendant is also necessary while giving the remedy to the plaintiff under the provisions in question. It was never visualised by the lawmakers that both the parties would be made to travel to a distant place in spite of the fact that the plaintiff has a remedy of suing at the place where the cause of action has arisen where he is having head office / carrying on business, etc. The provisions of the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act provide for the authors / trade mark holders to sue at provisions of law never intended to be oppressive to the defendant. The Parliamentary debate quoted above has to be understood in the manner that suit can be filed where the plaintiff ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Discussion was to provide remedy to the plaintiff at convenient place; he is not to travel away. Debate was not to enable the plaintiff at convenient place; he is not to travel away. Debate was not to enable the plaintiff to take the defendant to farther place, leaving behind his place of residence / business, etc. The right to remedy given is not unbridled and is subject to the prevention of abuse of the aforesaid provisions, as discussed above. Parliament never intended that the subject provisions be abused by the plaintiff by instituting suit in wholly connected jurisdiction. In the instant case, as the principal place of business is at Mumbai the cause of action is also at Mumbai but still the place for suing has been chosen at Delhi. There may be a case where the plaintiff is carrying on the business at Mumbai and cause of action has arisen in Mumbai. The plaintiff is having branch offices at Kanyakumari and also at Port Blair, if interpretation suggested by the appellants is acceptable, mischief may be caused by such plaintiff to drag a defendant to Port Blair or Kanyakumari. The provisions cannot be interpreted in the said manner devoid of the object of the Act."

52. In our opinion, the provisions of section 62 of the Copyright Act and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in the purposive manner. No doubt about it that a suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally works for gain. He need not travel to file a suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises. However, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business etc. at a place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has also arisen, he has to file a suit at that place, as discussed above." (emphasis added) The tests laid down are essential considerations in a matter where the Court finds that the discretion exercised by the Court earlier in granting leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is required to be revoked on the ground of forum inconvenience or on a satisfaction being recorded that the dispute is inextricably connected with the other forum. This, in my view, is clear from the observations made in Paragraphs 18 and 52 of the report.

In the instant case, as observed earlier, the defendant No.7 would not be inconvenienced in the event, the suit is tried in this Court inasmuch as there are categorical averments made in the plaint that the website is an interactive website accessible at various places within the jurisdiction of this Court and upon clicking of the said website the link by which online poker games can be played is accessible from the addresses mentioned in Paragraphs 88 and 89 of the Plaint.

Under such circumstances, the application for revocation of leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.

(Soumen Sen, J.)