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"7A. 'Garden' means land used primarily for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees, cashewnut trees or mango trees;
7B. 'garden produce' means any produce from a garden."

It will be seen from the aforesaid definitions that land used primarily for growing coconut trees falls within the expression 'garden' and any produce therefrom would be covered by the expression 'garden produce' Since garden produce is included within the definition of agriculture in sub-section (1A) of section 2 it is clear that land used primarily for growing coconut could be described as agricultural land. Sub-section (11) (i) defines land inter alia to mean land which is used for agriculture or which is capable of being so used but is left fallow. Section 2(23) defines a tenant to mean 'a person who on or after the date of commencement of this Act holds land on lease and cultivates it personally and includes a person who is deemed to be a tenant under this Act'. Section 7 posits that if any question arises whether any person is a tenant or should be deemed to be a tenant under the Act, the Mamlatdar shall after holding an enquiry decide such question. Section 8(1) stipulates that no tenancy of any land shall be terminated and no person holding as tenant shall be liable to be evicted therefrom save as provided under the Act. Sub- section (2) of section 8 next provides that where any person as is referred to in section 4 (deemed tenant) has been evicted from the land on or after 1st July, 1962 such person shall be entitled to recover immediate possession of the land in the manner prescribed by or under the Act unless the landlord proves that the termination of tenancy was in the manner authorised by section 9. Even in cases of threatened wrongful possession section 8A says that any tenant in possession of any land or dwelling house who apprehends that he may be dispossessed contrary to the provisions of this Act may apply in the prescribed manner to the Mamlatdar for an order safeguarding his right to possession. Section 9 lays down the modes of termination of tenancy which are (a) by the tenant surrendering his right to the landlord in the manner provided in section 10; or (b) by the landlord terminating the tenancy on the grounds specified in section 11; or (c) under any other specific provision of the Act. Section 18 lays down the procedure for taking possession. It says that a tenant entitled to possession of any land under any of the provisions of the Act may apply in writing for such possession to the Mamlatdar. It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that the forum created for determination of the question whether a person is a tenant or a deemed tenant under the Act is the Mamlatdar. Ever where a tenant apprehends that his possession is likely to be interfered with contrary to the provisions of the Act he can make an application in the prescribed manner to the Mamlatdar for safeguarding the, same. So also where a tenant is evicted illegally, section 8(2) permits him to approach the Mamlatdar for recovery of possession. Unless the tenancy is terminated in the manner provided by section 9, the law precludes the landowner from terminating the tenancy and obtaining possession of the land from the tenant. Section 58 bars the jurisdiction of courts. Sub- section (2) thereof provides that save as otherwise provided in the Act no court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar and no order passed by him under the Act shall be questioned in any civil or criminal court. It will thus be seen that the Act sets up an independent machinery and invests the Mamlatdar with jurisdiction to decide questions such as :

(i) Whether any person is a tenant or should be deemed to be a tenant under the Act?
(ii) Whether the possession of any tenant in regard to any land or dwelling house is threatened and if so, whether an order safeguarding the same is required?
(iii) Whether the tenancy of any deemed tenant is legally terminated and if no, whether the tenant evicted from the land held by him as such is entitled to restoration of possession?

The jurisdiction of the civil court is specifically barred by sub-section (2) of Section 58 from settling, deciding or dealing with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided and dealt with by the Mamlatdar. There can, therefore, be no doubt that after the Fifth Amendment became effective in regard to land used primarily for growing coconut trees and garden produce, the jurisdiction of the civil court was ousted by virtue of section 58(2) of the Act.

From the above discussion it emerges that the Civil Court undoubtedly had jurisdiction under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to try and grant eviction till the Fifth Amendment became effective. After that amendment came into force, the provisions of the Act became applicable to the lands in question which were primarily used for growing coconut trees and receiving produce therefrom. By virtue of section 7 any question whether a person is a tenant or a deemed tenant was required to be decided by the Mamlatdar and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court stood ousted by section 58(2) of the Act. The question is whether this subsequent change in the law deprived the Civil Court of jurisdiction which it undoubtedly possessed on the date of the institution of the suit. Three situations, therefore, develop in the context of the provisions of the Act as amended by the Fifth Amendment, namely, (i) the Civil Court retains jurisdiction or (ii) the Civil Court is precluded from deciding, even incidentally, questions failing within the ambit of section 7 of the Act or (iii) the Civil Court's jurisdiction is wholly ousted. Since the Act is silent as to the fate of pending litigation after the Fifth Amendment the situation arising on the amendment of the Act must be decided on first principles. If a suit is filed to recover possession of agricultural land from a trespasser and no dispute arises, the adjudication whereof is required to be done by the special machinery- set up under the Act, the Civil Court will continue to have jurisdiction. If, however, the defendant raises a dispute which is required to be resolved by the special machinery under the Act, a question will arise what procedure the Civil Court should adopt. There may arise a situation where the entire dispute pending before the Civil Court can be adjudicated by the special machinery only and not the Civil Court, what procedure the Civil Court follow in such a situation? In the case of the first mentioned situation there is no difficulty as the Civil Court will continue to have jurisdiction to settle and decide the dispute and grant appropriate relief The problem arises in the two other situations where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is partly or wholly ousted. Take the case of suit where possession of agricultural land is sought on the plea that the defendant is a trespasser and the defendant contends that he is a tenant. The question of the defendant's tenancy in respect of agricultural land would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under section 7 read with section 58(2) of the Act. In such a situation what procedure should the Civil Court follow ? Now take a case where the entire dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the special machinery under the Act and had the litigation commenced after the Fifth Amendment was brought into force it could not have been instituted in a Civil Court. In that case what procedure should the Civil Court follow? These are the questions which arise for determination.

One further situation which may arise under the provisions of the Act may be taken note of. The impact of the Fifth Amendment may give rise to a situation where the remedy lies entirely under the Act and may have to be taken in the manner prescribed by or under the Act. For example, where a person who is a deemed tenant under section 4 of the Act if evicted from the land on or after' 1st July, 1962 his remedy under section 8(2) is to approach the authority under the Act for recovery of possession of the land of which he has been dispossessed. In such a situation the remedy may not be the one available in the case of a tenant other than a deemed tenant whose case is not governed by section 8(2) of the Act. But in the case of a deemed tenant who has been evicted from the land on or after 1st July, 1962 since a remedy has been provided under the Act, the Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts stands wholly barred by virtue of Section 58 (2) of the Act. In such a situation the Civil Court would not be competent to pass any order for restoration of possession to the deemed tenant. His remedy would, therefore, to be entirely under the Act. This is just by way of an illustration. If such a situation arises what procedure should the court follow in a pending suit which was instituted in a competent court having jurisdiction at the date of its institution. It would seem unfair to non-suit the plaintiff altogether for no fault of his own. We think, in such a situation where the entire dispute falls outside the Civil Court's jurisdiction on account of the change in law the proper course would be to follow in spirit the procedure outlined in Order 7 Rules 10 and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure.