Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

3) Mr. Nikte, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner would submit that CCRA has erroneously considered the case of the Petitioner under Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act. That Petitioner is entitled for refund of stamp duty under Proviso to Section 47(c)(1) of the 3 September 2025 Megha 1_wp_241_2015_fc.docx Stamp Act. That at the relevant time, the period prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act for seeking refund of stamp duty under Section 47(c)(5) was two years. He would submit that the issue is squarely covered by judgment of this Court in Sangita Sandip Jadhav and Anr. V/s. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.1 Additionally, he would submit that for the purposes of Section 48(1), a development agreement is required to be treated on par with a conveyance as stamp duty payable on a development agreement is also under Article 25 of Schedule -I of the Act. That at the relevant time, the period for registration of cancellation instrument was two years and the permissible period for filing application for refund was 2 years from the date of execution of cancellation deed. That therefore Petitioner's application for refund is clearly covered by the Proviso to Section 48(1) of the Act. That the Division Bench of this Court in Sandeep Dwellers Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur V/s. State of Maharashtra2 has held that stamp duty paid under Article 25 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act is on par with the stamp duty payable under Article 5(g-a)(i) of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. He would also rely upon judgment of this Court in Sanman Trade Impex Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors.3. Mr. Nikte would accordingly submit that the impugned order passed by the CCRA on 12 August 2014 deserves to be set aside. He has also relied on judgment of this Court in Shweta Infrastructure and Housing (I) Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State Writ Petition No.4681 of 2024 decided on 2 April 2025 (2022) 5 Mah LJ 345 (2005) 1 Mah LJ 1037 3 September 2025 Megha 1_wp_241_2015_fc.docx of Maharashtra and Others4 He would submit that the Petitioner is also entitled to interest on refunded amount of stamp duty. In this regard, he would place reliance on judgment of the Apex Court in Dr. Poornima Advani and Another V/s. Government of NCT and Another 5

10) Thus, the normal period of limitation provided for in sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act was six months at the relevant time from the date of execution of instrument. Thus, the Petitioner could have ordinarily applied for refund of stamp duty paid on the Development Agreement dated 2 June 2011 within a period six months from 2 June 2011 and for seeking such refund, it was not even necessary for the Petitioner to execute a registered cancellation Deed. However, in the present case the application for refund of stamp duty was not made by the Petitioner within a period of six months from 2 June 2011 and the same was done only on 22 October 2012. Here, the Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 48 of the Stamp Act comes 3 September 2025 Megha 1_wp_241_2015_fc.docx into play. The said Proviso prescribed a special period of limitation in cases where stamp duty is paid on an agreement for sale of immovable property where stamp duty is paid under Article 25 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. In such cases, parties can execute registered Cancellation Deed within a period of two years from the date of original instrument and thereafter apply for refund of stamp duty within further period of two years from the date of registration of the Cancellation Deed. As per special exception carved out by Proviso to sub-section (1) to Section 48 of the Stamp Act, it was permissible to execute a registered Cancelled Deed within a period of two years from the date of registration of the original instrument and thereafter apply within further period of two years from the date of execution of the Cancellation Deed. 


                               3 September 2025
 Megha                                      1_wp_241_2015_fc.docx

Therefore, the ratio of the judgment in Shweta Infrastructure squarely applies to the present case.

16) Thus, for the purpose of application of Proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act, it has been held that Development Agreement would stand on par with an instrument of conveyance on which stamp duty is paid under Article 25 of the Schedule -I of the Stamp Act. Following the ratio of the judgments in Sandeep Dwellers Pvt. Ltd. and Shweta Infrastructure and Housing (I) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in my view Petitioner would also be entitled to special period of limitation prescribed under Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act.

17) In the present case, the registered Cancellation Deed has been executed within a period of two years, which was applicable at the relevant time. The Development Agreement dated 2 June 2011 has been cancelled by a registered instrument executed on 3 August 2011. Thereafter Petitioner had period of two years to apply for refund of stamp duty from the date of execution of Cancellation Deed. Accordingly, the Petitioner preferred an application for refund of stamp duty on 22 October 2012. In my view, the case is squarely covered by Proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act. The CCRA has thus erred in holding that the case falls outside the ambit of Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Stamp Act. Petitioner is 3 September 2025 Megha 1_wp_241_2015_fc.docx thus entitled to refund of stamp duty on Development Agreement.