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A is tried for a crime; the fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit that particular crime is relevant, but the fast that he said something indicating a general disposition to commit crimes of that class is irrelevant.

42. These illustrate the elementary principle that evidence of general disposition, habit and tendencies is not relevant.

43. From the statement of the case by Mr. Justice Chaudhuri it appears that Sections 14 and 15 were the only sections which had been referred to, and I have, consequently, considered up till now, the question of their true construction. Upon a plain reading of these sections, I feel no doubt that they do not, make the evidence admissible. This conclusion is supported by the decisions in Empress v. Moodeliar 6 C. 655 : 8 C.L.R. 197 : 4 Shome L.R. 125 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 425; Baharuddin Mandal v. Emperor 22 Ind. Cas. 187 : 18 C.L.J. 578 : 15 Cr. L.J. 43 and Emperor v. Abdul Wahid Khan 12 Ind. Cas 937 : 34. A. 93 : 8 A.L.J. 1269 : 12 Cr. L.J. 611. In the first of these eases Sir Richard Garth, C.J., pointed out that Section 14 applies to that class of cases where a particular Act is more or less criminal or palpable according to the state of mind or feeling of the person who does it, and added that the Court must be very careful not to extend the operation of the section to other oases where the question of guilt or innocence depends upon actual facts and not upon the state of a man's mind or feeling. Mr. Justice Mitter, if I have read his judgment correctly, did not really dissent from this view the same line of reasoning was adopted in the second case, where it was ruled that proof cannot be offered of an independent offence to show that by reason of such independent offense the accused is more likely to have committed the one for which he is on trial; in other words, evidence of such collateral offence cannot be received as substantive evidence of the offence on trial, though, under Section 14, evidence may be given of intention and like matters where the factum of such intention or like matters is relevant. The destination between oases where intention is, and cases where intention is not, relevant is illustrated by the decisions in Emperor v. Debendra Pershad 2 Ind. Cas. 601 : 35 C. 573 : 13 C.W.N. 973 : 9 C.L.J. 610 : 10 Cr. L.J. 91 and Emperor v. Abdul Wahid Khan 12 Ind. Cas 937 : 34. A. 93 : 8 A.L.J. 1269 : 12 Cr. L.J. 611 which lie on opposite sides of the dividing line. Reference may also be made to the decision of West, J. in R. v. Parbhudas 11 B.H.C.R. 90 where he emphasized the inadmissibility of evidence of one crime (not reduced to legal certainty by a conviction) to prove the existence of another unconnected, even though cognate, crime. On behalf of the Crown reliance was, however, placed upon the decisions in Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales (1894) A.C. 57 : 63 L.J.P.C. 41 : 6 R. 373 : 69 L.T. 778 : 17 Cox C.C. 704 : 58 J.P. 148; R. v. Ball (1911) A.C. 47 at p. 52 : 80 L.J.K.B. 691 : 103 L.T. 738 : 75 J.P. 180 : 22 Cox. C.C. 366 : 55 S.J. 139 : 27 T.L.R. 162; reversing R. v. Ball (1910) 5 Cr. App. Rep. 238, R. v. Smith (1917) 11 Cr. App. Rep. 229 : 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 : 114 L.T. 239 : 80 J.P. 31 : 25 Cox C.C. 271 : 59 S.J. 704 : 31 T.L.R. 617; B v. Bond (1906) 2 K.B. 389 : 75 L.J.K.B. 693 : 95 L.T. 296 : 54 W.R. 586 : 70 J.P. 424 : 21 Cox C.C. 252 : 22 T.L.R. 633 and R. v. Thompson (1917) 2 K.B. 630 : 86 L.J.K.B 1321 : 117 L.T. 575 : 81 J.P. 266 : 61 S.J. 647 : 33 T.L.R. 506 which has been affirmed by the House of Lords in Thompson v. B. (1918) A.C. 221 : 87 L.J.K.B. 478 : 118 L.T. 418 : 82 J.P. 145 : 62 S.J. 266 : 13 Cr. App. Rep. 61 at p. 66 : 34 T.L.R. 204, No useful purpose would be served by a detailed analysis of these decisions; most of them, along with other oases, were reviewed by this Court in Amritalal Hazra v. Emperor 29 Ind. Cas. 513 : 42 C. 957 at p. 997 : 21 C.L.J. 331 : 19 C.W.N. 676 : 16 Cr. L.J. 497 where the principles de-double there from as to the law administered in England were formulated in the following terms:

44. I have re examined these cases and I see no reason to doubt the accuracy of the above statement, which fully accords with the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the cases of R. v. Rodhy (1913) 3 K.B. 468 : 9 Cr. App. Rep. 69 : 82 L.J.K. B. 1070 : 109 L.T. 476 : 27 J.P. 465 : 23 Cox C.C. 574 : 58 S.J. 51 : 29 T.L.R. 700 and R. v. Ellis (1910) 2 K.B. 746 : 5 Cr. App. Rep. 41 : 79 L.J.K.B. 841 : 102 L.T. 922 : 74 J.P. 388 : 26 T.L.R. 535 as also other recent cases, such as Thompson v. B. (1918) A.C. 221 : 87 L.J.K.B. 478 : 118 L.T. 418 : 82 J.P. 145 : 62 S.J. 266 : 13 Cr. App. Rep. 61 at p. 66 : 34 T.L.R. 204; R. v. Fisher (1910) 1 K.B. 149 : 79 L.J.K.B. 187 : 102 L.T. 111 : 74 J.P. 104 : 26 T.L.R. 122 : 22 Cox C.C. 270; R. v. Mason (1914) 111 L.T. 336 : 78 J.P. 389 : 24 Cox C.C. 305; R. v. Baird (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. 1785 : 113 L.T. 608; Perkint v. Jeffery (1915) 2 K.B. 702 : 84 L.J.K.B. 1554 : 113 L.T. 456 : 79 J.P. 425 : 31 T.L.R. 444. It is plain that the principles so enunciated are of no assistance to the precaution. On the other hand, there is an important passage in the judgment of Kennedy, J., in the ease of R. v. Bond (1906) 2 K.B. 389 : 75 L.J.K.B. 693 : 95 L.T. 296 : 54 W.R. 586 : 70 J.P. 424 : 21 Cox C.C. 252 : 22 T.L.R. 633 to which the attention of the Standing Counsel was drawn by the learned Chief justice in the course of the argument, as destructive of his contention:

47. The question next arises, what are the functions of this Court in such circumstances? The answer depends upon the true constructions of Clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent. The matter was reviewed in my judgment in the case of Fateh Chand v. Emperor 38 Ind. Cas. 945 : 44 C. 477 at p. 489 : 24 C.L.J. 400 : 21 C.W.N. 33 : 18 Cr. L.J. 385, I then came to the conclusion that the obvious intention of the clauses, to be gathered from their plain language, was that the case reserved or certified should be finally decided on review and not remitted for re-trial. This was in accord with the view taken in a long line of cases in this Court and elsewhere; R. v. Navroji 9 B.H.C.R. 358; Imperatrix v. Pttamber Jina 2 B. 61 at p. 64 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 469; Emperor v. Narayan Raghunath 32 B. 111 : 9 Bom. L.R. 789 : 6 Cr. L.J. 164 : 2 M.L.T. 414; Queen v. Hurribole Chunder Ghose 1 C. 207 : 25 W.R. 36 Cr. 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 132; Queen-Empress v. O'Hara 17 C. 642 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 967. Upon a fresh consideration of the subject, I see no reason to resile from the opinion previously expressed by me. This view, it may be added, also accords with the accepted interpretation of Section 2 of the Crown Cases Act, 1843, whish furnished the model for the provisions of Clauses 25 and 26 of our Letters Patent R. v. Saunders (1899) 1 Q.B. 490 : 68 L.J.Q.B. 296 : 80 L.T. 28 : 63 J.P. 150 : 15 T.L.R. 186; R. v. Gibson (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 537 : 56 L.J.M.C. 49 : 56 L.T. 367 : 35 W.R. 411 : 16 Cox C.C. 181 : 51 J.P. 742 ; though I am not unmindful that in R. v. Mellor (1858) Dears & B. 468 : 7 Cox C.C. 454 : 27 L.J.M.C. 121 : 4 Jur. (N.S.) 214 : 6 W.R. 322 and R. v. Yeadon (1861) Leigh & Cave 81 : 9 Cox C.C. 91 : 31 L.J.M.C. 70 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1128 : 5 L.T. 329 : 10 W.R. 64, the Court for Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, granted a venire de novo under very exceptional circumstances which vitiated the trial as conducted in a manner unknown to law. See, however, the decisions of the Judicial Committee in R. v. Bertrand (1867) 1 P.C. 520 : 4 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 460 : 36 L.J.P.C. 51 : 16 L.T. 752 : 16 W.R. 9 : 10 Cox C.C. 618 : 16 E.R. 391 and R. v. Murphy (1869) 2 P.C. 535 : 6 Moo. P.C. (N.S.) 177 : 38 L.J.P.C. 53 : 21 L.T. 598 : 17 W.R. 1047 : 11 Cox C.C. 372 : 16 E.R. 693 which dissented from R. v. Scaife (1851) 17 Q.B. 238 : 2 Den. C.C. 281 : 20 L.J.M.C. 229 : 15 Jur. 607 : 5 Cox C.C. 243 : 117 E.R. 1271. But, apart from this analogy, I hold, on the plain language of Clauses 25 and 26 of the Letters Patent, that the intention was that the case should be finally decided on review and not remitted for re-trial.

62. No doubt, evidence tending to show that the accused have been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment is not admissible unless upon the issue whether the Acts charged against the accused were designed or accidental or unless to rebut a defence otherwise open to them. Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales (1894) A.C. 57 : 63 L.J.P.C. 41 : 6 R. 373 : 69 L.T. 778 : 17 Cox C.C. 704 : 58 J.P. 148; R. v. Wyatt (1904) 1 K.B. 188 : 73 L.J.K.B. 15 : 68 J.P. 31 : 52 W.R. 285 : 20 T.L.R. 68 : 20 Cox C.C. 452. In this ease, no doubt, the severed head proved it was murder, and the loss of valuables, theft, but there was something more to be proved, namely, that the motive for the murder was theft and that the two persons who were in the house had combined to commit such theft. The murder and robbery were parts of one transaction, it is the general rule of law to admit evidence of motive. It was urged in this case as it was in Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales (1894) A.C. 57 : 63 L.J.P.C. 41 : 6 R. 373 : 69 L.T. 778 : 17 Cox C.C. 704 : 58 J.P. 148 that evidence is admissible of any Acts or doings of the person accused if such Acts or doings are so connected with the transaction under charge or are of a character so similar thereto as to lead to a reasonable inference that the prisoner committed the Act charged, but it is hardly necessary to discuss any general proposition of that character. Section 11, Evidence Act, was invoked in aid by the prosecution but its terms are so general that I am not prepared to use it. In this ease I am satisfied that the evidence was properly laid before the Jury and dissent from the opposite view.