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(II) Second factor which has been highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is based upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam's case (Supra) and in O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan's case (Supra). While placing reliance upon the Constitution Bench in Muthuramalingam's case (Supra), it has been argued that life sentence is to be considered as a sentence for life and thus, any sentence which is sought to run after life sentence, has to necessarily be concurrent inasmuch as, it would be absolutely unworkable and unthought-of that once a life term means whole of one's life, then there could be a term subsequent to whole of one's life. Specific reference has been made to various paras of the said judgment wherein it has been observed that the Court can legitimately direct the prisoner to first undergo the term sentence before commencement of the life sentence but converse of the same is not possible as the term sentence cannot follow the life sentence as the same would be unworkable and thus, by necessarily implication, the term sentence would run concurrent to the life sentence. To similar effect, observations made in O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan's case (Supra) have also been highlighted. Further reference has been made to the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar and Another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported as 2021(5) SCC 560, and in 10 of 69 case titled Vikas Yadav Vs. State of U.P. and others reported as 2016(4) RCR (Criminal) 546, and to the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in case titled as Harwinder Singh @ Pinder and others Vs. State of Punjab and others, reported as 2020(1) RCR (Criminal) 323, to buttress the abovesaid submissions. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has very fairly submitted that as far as the Division Bench judgment is concerned, SLP against the same has also been filed and the same is pending adjudication. It is, thus, submitted that even independent of the conviction warrant, necessary import of the sentence, which had been awarded to the petitioner, is that the two term sentences which follow the life sentence in seriatim as has been directed in the order of sentence, in the absence of any specific direction having been given to the effect that the term sentence is to be completed prior to the life sentence, have to be read concurrently with the life imprisonment. (III). Third aspect highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that in the present case, conviction warrant was issued in the year 2006 and for a period of 13 years, the petitioner was certain that the petitioner would be released after completing his life imprisonment, in accordance with law. The impugned order has not taken into consideration the abovesaid important aspect and has unsettled the position which stood settled for 13 years, resulting in violation of the right to life of the petitioner as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and thus, the impugned order deserves to be set aside on the said ground alone.

10. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has further relied upon judgment in Sunil Kumar @ Sudhir Kumar's case (Supra), which has also been relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. By making specific reference to paras 8.1, 8.3, 10.2 and 12 of the abovesaid judgment, it has been argued that as per Section 31 of Cr.P.C., discretion is vested with the trial Court to direct whether or not the sentences would 16 of 69 run concurrently, when the accused is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, and in a case where the trial Court has not directed for the sentences to run concurrently, then they are to run consecutively. It is further argued that it had been noticed in para 13 of the abovesaid judgment that omission to direct whether the sentences awarded to the accused would run concurrently or would run consecutively, essentially operates against the accused, because unless directed to the contrary by the Court, multiple sentences are to run consecutively, as per the plain reading of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. read with the expositions in Muthuramalingam's case (Supra) and in O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan's case (Supra). It was also submitted that omission to direct consecutive running cannot ipso facto lead to concurrent running of sentences. In furtherance of this argument, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 has referred to Section 31 of Cr.P.C. to contend that since the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is silent with respect to the aspect of running of sentences i.e. whether consecutive or concurrent, thus, it would necessarily imply that the sentences are to run consecutively.

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in several judgments has laid 20 of 69 down various principles in cases where one of the sentences is life imprisonment, as in the present case, and it would be relevant to take note of them at this stage. The judgment of the Constitutional Bench in Muthuramalingam's case (Supra) has dealt with the question "As to whether the consecutive life sentences can be awarded to a convict on being found guilty of a series of murders for which he has been tried in a single trial". Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -

7), as well as in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 20.01.2016 (Annexure P-8) dismissing the criminal appeal of the petitioner, no ground or argument was raised on behalf of the petitioner to state that the trial Court should've ordered the concurrent running of sentence, since as per the petitioner's case, he was certain that he was to be released, after completing the life sentence as the two term sentences were to run concurrently with the life sentence. It was after the period of 13 years that the application dated 29.11.2019 (Annexure P-9) was filed by respondent No.1 under Sections 353 read with Section 362 of Cr.P.C. for issuance of directions to respondent Nos.1 to 3 (respondent No.2 to 4 54 of 69 herein) to comply with the sentence passed against the petitioner and not to act upon the said conviction warrant. In the said application, allegations were made to the effect that the conviction warrant was forged and fabricated. In the reply filed by respondent Nos.1 to 3 (respondent No.2 to 4 herein) i.e. the Superintendent, Model Jail, Chandigarh, Director General of Prisons, Haryana and The Inspector General of Prisons and Correctional Administration, U.T. Chandigarh, specific objections were raised with respect to maintainability of the said application and it was also stated that the conviction warrant was a genuine document and that the conviction warrant, which had been issued by the Hon'ble Court of competent jurisdiction, was part of the Court record and, therefore, allegation levelled by respondent No.1 herein with respect to forgery was vehemently denied. To the similar effect, was the reply filed by the present petitioner, who was respondent No.4 in the said proceedings. The application filed under Section 353 read with Section 362 of Cr.P.C., by respondent No.1 was allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh vide impugned order dated 07.10.2021, without discussing or considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muthuramalingam's case (Supra) and in O.M. Cherian @ Thankachan's case (Supra), although the said two judgments were cited and specifically noticed in the impugned order dated 07.10.2021 and without considering as to whether such an application was maintainable or not. In the impugned order it was held that the sentences were to run consecutively and the conviction warrant in 55 of 69 which it was stated that sentences were to run concurrently, was not to be taken into consideration. In the impugned order, the fact that the petitioner had already undergone 18 years, 8 months and 18 days of actual sentence and undergone the total period, including remission, of 25 years, 2 months and 19 days as per the custody certificate dated 10.11.2021, and also the fact that the said application had been moved after a period of 13 years from the passing of the order of sentence and issuance of conviction warrant, had not been duly considered.