Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

5. We would like to first discuss the judgments in Mehar Singh (15 supra) and B. Ramakrishna Yadav v. Superintendent of Police, Kurnool District . In Mehar Singh (15 supra), the applicant for the post was prosecuted along with others for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 323, 341 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), before he applied for the post of Constable (Executive) (Male). He was acquitted of the offence under Section 147 IPC for want of evidence as the witnesses turned hostile. As regards the offences under Sections 323, 341 and 427 of IPC, he was acquitted along with others in view of the compromise entered into with the de facto complainant. The applicant has disclosed his involvement in the criminal case and his acquittal during the character and antecedents verification. The screening committee constituted by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, has observed that Mehar Singh and others had assaulted the bus conductor with iron chain, belt and stones in a pre-planned manner and caused injuries to him which showed Mehar Singhs violent nature and scant respect for the law of the land. The screening committee therefore did not recommend his case for appointment to the post of Constable. Based on the recommendations of the screening committee, a show cause notice was issued to Mehar Singh by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), New Delhi. Not satisfied with the explanation offered by Mehar Singh, his candidature was cancelled for the post of Constable (Executive) (Male). The O.A. filed by him before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, was allowed. The Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and others filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, which dismissed the writ petition holding that as Mehar Singh was acquitted of the offences with which he was charged, he cannot be disqualified for appointment. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, The Delhi Police Commissioner and others have filed appeal by Special Leave. The Supreme Court considered Standing Order No.398/2010 issued by the Delhi Administration envisaging various situations. One such situation was that if a candidate had disclosed his/her involvement in criminal case, complaint case, preventive proceedings, etc., both in the application form as well as in the attestation form but was acquitted or discharged by the court, his/her case will be referred to the Screening Committee of PHQ to assess his/her suitability for appointment in Delhi Police. The Standing Order also categorises the offences involved in moral turpitude as under:

if a candidate were to suppress the information relating to his involvement in a criminal case and if it is surfaced before appointment or at the stage of verification of antecedents, more particularly when such an information was specifically sought for, it is open to the appointing authority to deny appointment to or terminate such employee.
The Full Bench further held:
Verification of character and antecedents is one of the important features in service jurisprudence so as to find out whether a selected candidate is suitable to the post. Having regard to the antecedents of a candidate, if appointing authority finds that it is not desirable to appoint such person, in particular to a disciplined force, it can deny employment or even terminate such person, if appointed, within the shortest possible time from the date of verification of character and antecedents. This has to be scrupulously followed in case of recruitment in police force, it being a disciplined force. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mehar Singh (supra), people repose great faith and confidence in the police force, and therefore, the selected candidate must be of confidence, impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents is, undoubtedly, not fit in this category, more particularly when he has suppressed the information about his involvement in criminal case(s) irrespective of the fact whether the case was pending or he was acquitted.