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7. It is from this decree that the present appeal has been filed by defendants 1 and 2. Learned counsel for the appellants did not press their appeal against the finding of the learned Judge on the pleas of justification and fair comment, but confined their arguments to the plea of "qualified privilege". They also pressed the plea that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were excessive, disproportionate and unreasonable.

8. The defence of "qualified privilege" is set out in the written statement at para 11A and is as follows:

"While newspapers may rely on the defence of fair comment in publishing allegedly defamatory statements about a candidate's fitness for office during an election campaign, they cannot invoke the defence of qualified privilege in so publishing defamatory statements." It was further pointed out in that case-
"There is no such duty on a newspaper during an election campaign as to permit it to defame a candidate, subject to liability only if express malice is shown."

In that case, the editor of the daily newspaper "Globe & Mail" wrote an editorial on 27th May 1957 containing allegations defamatory of the plaintiff Boland who was a candidate for election to the Federal Assembly from Parkdale constituency in the City of Toronto. The Editorial commented on his fitness for office with certain innuendoes. In the suit filed by Boland. the newspaper put forward the plea of qualified privilege. It pleaded that it was the duty of the defendant newspaper to publish and in the interests of public to receive the communications and comments with respect to the candidature of Boland, the plaintiff, and by reason of this, the words complained of were published under such circumstances and upon such occasion as to render them privileged. The learned trial Judge upheld the pleas of qualified privilege in the following words:

"The members of the public have a real, a vital I might go so far as to say -- a paramount interest in receiving those comments."

He also pointed out that it was a matter of vital interest to all the citizens of Canada and, therefore, the defence of qualified privilege was available. The Supreme Court held that there was no qualified privilege and again pointed out that the learned Judge had confused the right which the publisher of a newspaper has, in common with all Her Majesty's subjects to report truthfully and comment fairly upon matters of public interest with a duty of the sort which gives rise to an occasion of qualified privilege. After referring to its earlier decision in 22 Dominion LR (2d) 277 (SC Canada) referred to above, it held that in the absence of proof of special circumstances, there is no defence of qualified privilege with respect to defamatory statements of facts made as comments upon a matter of public interest, and the same holds Roods for newspapers as for anyone else. The 'special circumstances' obviously refer to circumstances giving rise to a legal, social, or moral duty, and recall to mind the words of Buckley, L. J. in (1915) 31 TLR 299 (C. A.) referred to above where he said "More, I think, is wanted."

50. In the result, the appeal is partially allowed, the decree of the trial Court is confirmed with the only modification that for the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-, Rs. 1,50,000/- (Rs. one and half lacs) will be substituted. As regards the costs of the appeal, we are informed that the hearing of this appeal went on for about thirty days. The appeal was on all points decided against the defendants in the trial court, but at the hearing of the appeal, learned counsel for the defendants confined his arguments only to two questions, viz. (i) qualified privilege and (ii) quantum of damages. On the issue of "qualified privilege", the arguments went on for very long, for more than 22 days, and on that point, the appellants have failed. It is true that they have succeeded in the appeal partially to the extent of reduction of quantum of damages by half, but if they had confined their arguments only to the quantum of damages, the appeal would have been disposed of in not more than five or six days. In these circumstances, therefore, we think that the appellants will have to pax four-fifth of the costs of the appeal to respondent No. 1 and bear their own costs.