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3. Though no specific plea has been raised in the reply filed on behalf of the respondents, but the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff (respondents in the application) contended that the present application is also not maintainable for the reason that the documents have been forged, if at all, prior to commencement of the judicial proceedings before the Court and as such, the same cannot fall within the ambit and scope of Section 340 Cr.P.C. While raising this argument, he relied upon a Full Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Harbans Singh and Ors v. State of Punjab and judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah 2005(2) Crimes 11 (SC), Sachidanand Singh v. State of Bihar and Anr. . On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the applicant contended that it is a case of apparent forgery, tampering and making false statement by way of evidence and filing false affidavit in Court and it would be immaterial that the documents were forged prior or during the course of judicial proceedings before the Court. In alternative, it is contended that the documents in the present case might have been forged or tampered with after institution of the suit and this itself being a matter of controversy, can only be examined by the Court of competent jurisdiction with the permission or under the directions of this Court. In support of this argument, he relied upon Section 195 of the Code read with Section 340 Cr.P.C and the very two judgments of the Supreme Court relied upon by the plaintiff in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (supra) and Sachidanand Singh v. State of Bihar and Anr (supra).

8. Thus, there would be matters where a person fabricates documents and then produces the same in evidence knowing it fully well that the Court is going to rely upon or form its opinion on the basis of such document. Still in other cases, the affidavit or statement made by a person in evidence or otherwise and where the person was under an obligation to speak truth, files false affidavit to his knowledge, in both these events he renders himself liable to be proceeded against in accordance with law in terms of the afore-referred provisions. In the case of Sachida Nand Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court stated that the scope of enquiry envisaged under Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice is committed in respect of document produced in Court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other words, offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis. Another important aspect, which was clarified by the Supreme Court in that case was that the bar contained under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) against initiation of prosecution proceedings would not apply to cases where the document concerned was produced in Court, albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in Court. The real test is whether the offence alleged to have been committed upon which the Court, was called upon to hold an enquiry constitutes of the acts, which would have affected the administration of justice. Reference to other judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwahand Anr. , (supra) would be necessary as this is the judgment on which both the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties have relied upon.

14. It would be necessary to refer to the facts in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. (supra) in some detail. Mukhtar Singh Marwah, who died on 3rd June, 1993 was stated to have executed a will. According to the Objectors, the will was a forged one. An application was filed under Section 340 Cr. P.C. before the Court of the District Judge, where the case was pending. Reply to this application was filed, however, the same had not been disposed of. During the pendency of the application, a complaint was filed by the respondents under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the will of Mukhtar Singh Marwah set up by the appellants was forged and fictitious document. The complaint was dismissed by the Metropolitan Magistrate keeping in view the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(i).

18. The present case, is thus, a case which will fall outside the ambit of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah's case as this would have to be examined by the Court of competent jurisdiction itself that besides filing false affidavits, Mr. Kuldeep Kapoor and his accomplices, who have tampered and forged the documents i.e. the agreement to sell as well as the cash receipt dated 24.10.2004, when and how these documents were forged. Taking the case in alternative and accepting the objections, at best, it could be said that the applicant can file a complaint under different Penal provisions of the Indian Penal Code in that behalf, even without leave of this Court and bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not operate against the applicant. This does not place the case of the non-applicants on any high pedestal. Keeping in view the complexity of the case and the fact that it is not possible to hold at this stage, as to when exactly the documents were forged, it will be most appropriate and the ends of justice would demand that an Officer of the Court is directed to file the complaint before the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is a matter of fact that until the defendant had produced the photocopies of the documents signed by him, the plaintiff had not produced the original documents before the court. When they were produced, the tampering was visible, even to a naked eye.