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7. In the first place, says Mr. Mazumdar, it is not competent under the Mahomedan law for a talak to be given without just cause assigned. It has never been suggested on behalf of the plaintiff indeed it was not part of his casethat he had really any proper or reasonable grounds for getting rid of his wife and the matter must be discussed upon the footing that there was in fact no justification for divorce and that what the plaintiff did was done entirely capriciously and arbitrarily. The question therefore is whether, in the circumstances, the talak given in this case is valid. Upon that point, there are a number of authorities and I have carefully considered this point as dealt with in the very early authorities to see whether I am in agreement with the more recent decisions of the Courts. I regret that I have to come to the conclusion that, as the law stands at present, any Mahomedan may divorce his wife at his mere whim and caprice. I find that there are passages in one ancient authority, quoted by Mr. Ameer Ali in his treatise on Mahomedan Law, Vol. 2, 5th Edn., p. 472, which run as follows:

The Prophet pronounced talak to be a most detestable thing before the Almighty God of all permitted things. If talak is given without any reason it is stupidity and ingratitude to God.

8. On the next page Mr. Ameer Ali puts the matter thus:

The author of the Multeka (Ibrahim Halebi) is more concise. He says "the law gives to the man primarily the power of dissolving the marriage, if the wife, by her indocility or her bad character, renders the married life unhappy; but in the absence of serious reasons, no Musalman can justify a divorce either in the eyes of the religion or the law. If he abandon his wife or put her away from simple caprice, he draws upon himself the divine anger, for 'the curse of God,' said the Prophet, 'rests on him who repudiates his wife capriciously'.

10. No doubt, in normal cases of Mahomedan marriages, those who are acting on behalf of the bride are careful to see that she is properly protected against capriciousness on the part of the husband in giving talak by adequate provision for the payment of a large sum by way of dower, that is to say, care is taken to ensure that what Mr. Macnaghten calls "the temporal impediments" shall be a real obstacle in the way of a husband acting arbitrarily or unfairly. In the present instance however so far as the provision for dower is concerned, it cannot be said that it is "by no means trifling;" on the contrary, the amount stipulated for, namely, Rs. 201 was extremely trivial. Upon this question of whether talak can be given without any just cause or without assigning any reason the matter can be summed up in the words used by Batchelor, J., in the case of Sarabai v. Rabiabai [1905] 30 Bom 537, with reference to an analogous question, where he said "it is good in law, though bad in theology." I need only make reference to one or two decisions of the Courts on this point. In Asha Bibi v. Kadir Ibrahim Rowther [1909] 33 Mad 22, at p. 25 the Court consisting of Munro and Abdur Rahim, JJ., said:

The first question, which we have to decide is whether the absence of the wife makes the pronouncement of the talak void and inefficacious. In our opinion it does not. The point is dealt with in the book of Mr. Ameer Ali in Section 3, Ch. 12, where he says: 'It is not necessary for the husband himself to pronounce talak in the presence of the wife, but it is necessary that it should come to her knowledge.' The matter is also dealt with in Wilson's Digest at p. 164, but not so decisively. It also seems to be the opinion expressed in Nawab Abdur Rahman's Institutes of Mussalman Law. The matter has twice, as far as we are aware, been dealt with by the Courts; in the first place, in the case of Furzund Hossein v. Janu Bibee [1878] 4 Cal 588 and, secondly in the case of Sarabai v. Rabiabai [1905] 80 Bom 537. In the second of these cases a distinct opinion is expressed that it is not necessary for the wife to be present, when the talak is pronounced although this is an obiter inasmuch as that case dealt with a written instrument of divorce. In the previous Calcutta case, the matter is also dealt with and the point itself is not directly noticed, but talak was there pronounced in the absence of the wife, and it is significant that the case is not decided on that point, which it would have been, if it had been fatal to the effect of the divorce. We therefore hold that it is not necessary for the wife to be present when the talak is pronounced. It is necessary certainly for the purpose of dower that the fact of the pronouncement of talak should come to her notice.