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Showing contexts for: tortious liability in Smt. Maya Rani Ghosh Etc. vs State Of Tripura And Ors. on 31 January, 2007Matching Fragments
27. We may pause here to point out that there is no wholly satisfactory definition of tort. The word "tort" derives its origin from the Latin word "tortious", meaning twisted or crooked and is, generally, used as a synonym for 'wrong'. A tort is, broadly speaking a civil wrong other than a breach of contract, which the law redresses by an award of damages. This definition is, however, not exhaustive. Though laws of tort and crime had their common origin in revenge and deterrence, the fact remains that with passage of time, both these branches of law became distinct. A crime is an offence against the State and as representative of the public, the State will vindicate its interest by punishing the offender. A criminal prosecution is not concerned with repairing an injury that may have been done to an individual, but with exacting a penalty in order to protect society as a whole. Tortious liability, on the other hand, exists primarily to compensate the person injured by compelling the wrong-doer to pay damages for the damage he has done. The horizon of the tortious liability has been expanding with every passing day. Granting of compensation for the victims of sexual abuse or assault or victims of custodial death are examples of this expansion. The common law disclaimed the right to receive compensation for wrongfully inflicted death. This denial made its first appearance in 1808, when Lord Ellenborough, in Baker v. Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, categorically enunciated that "in a civil Court, the death of a human being could not complained of as an injury". The consequence of this pronouncement was that the loss occurring due to the death of the person killed could not be complained of as an injury and was, therefore, not redressable by granting of damages. This principle was based on the archaic, but tenacious rule that when a tort constitutes, at the same time, a felony, no civil action can be maintained until the time the wrongdoer has been prosecuted. The reason for this unbelievable principle was that at one point of time, every felony was punishable with death and the felon's chattels were forfeited to the Crown upon conviction. The result was that in all cases of wrongful death, the wrong doer was punished with death, his chattels were forfeited to the crown and no civil action could, therefore, survive. By introducing the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, popularly known as Lord Campbell's Act, a limited measure of protection, as pointed out above, was accorded to the interests of dependants of a person, who died in fatal accidents.
45. The substantive right given to an aggrieved person to claim damages was, therefore, alternative, in England, meaning thereby that one could have either initiated an 'action' for damages, as understood in English law, in the Court of common law, or a 'suit' for damages, as understood in English law, in the Court of equity. In India, with the introduction of the Codes of Civil Procedure, all civil actions became amenable to the civil Courts unless a class of such civil cases was taken out by the legislature and given to a tribunal or other forum for decision. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, in India, form, as a class, a noticeable example of this class of legislation. Ordinarily, all suits for compensation, arising out of tortious liability, were amenable and are still amenable to the Courts of Civil Jurisdiction unless the legislature choose to take away any class of such cases from the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts and vests the jurisdiction to deal with such cases in a tribunal or other judicial. We may, at once, point out that long after introduction of the Act of 1855, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (which has been replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) was enacted, where-under the cases of compensation, which arose out of death of a person or injury caused to him by neglect or default as a result of use of motor vehicles in a pubic place, are to be tried.
46. In short, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals deal with accidents, which arise out of neglect or default. What is worth pointing out, now, is that the Claims Tribunal, which are constituted under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, decide only those cases of death or injury which arise, because of neglect or default, in the use of motor vehicles, in public place. These Tribunals do not deal with, or determine, any question of damages if a person dies due to wrongful act of a person, who uses a vehicle in a public place. To make it more explicit, we may point out that when an injury or death occurs due to negligence or default, a Claims Tribunal, constituted under the MV Act, 1988, can determine the question of compensation; but if the person is deliberately killed or injured in a public place, the claim for compensation, arising out of such wrongful act, will not lie in the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, constituted under the MV Act of 1988. In such cases, the injured, or the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be, shall have to necessarily take recourse to the provisions of the Act of 1855 and seek their remedy in the ordinary civil Courts. In short, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals deal with specified classes of tortious liability, but in respect of claims for damages arising out of other classes of cases of tortious liability, the jurisdiction still remains vested in the civil Courts and would remain so vested in the civil Courts until legislature creates a tribunal or some other forum for decision of such cases.
47. A claim for damages arising out of tortious liability, ordinarily, lies within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the civil Court under Section 9 of the Code. Since the Act of 1855 is a substantive law and not a procedural law, a person aggrieved, on deriving his right to claim compensation, under the Act of 1855, shall have to necessarily go to the civil Court and institute a suit seeking damages or compensation until a tribunal or some other forum for trial of such suit is created by legislation. Since the Act of 1855, while granting substantive rights to the wife, husband, parent and child of the person, whose death is caused by an actionable wrong, speaks of both 'suit' as well as 'action', it is possible for the legislature to prescribe a forum or a Court or a tribunal other than a regular civil Court for dealing with and deciding the cases of damages arising out of the Act of 1855. However, so long as a Court, tribunal or other forum is not prescribed, a claim for damages, under the Act of 1855, can only be made by way of instituting suits for damages and by no other means. This becomes clear, when one refers to Part VII of the Limitation Act, 1963, and, particularly. Article 82 contained therein. The relevant portion of Part VII is reproduced herein below: