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31. In any case, all observations made by the learned single judge are purely tentative and not such as may have any lasting effect. Such observations made would have life till the proceedings are concluded and/or till the explanation of the Revising Authority is considered by the learned single judge. They are not and cannot be read as strictures passed by the learned single judge as may warrant any interference at this premature stage. Being ex parte in the context of an explanation called, those are more to sensitize and make aware the Revising Authority, the consequence of the "fundamental flaw" if any.
37. So far as the decisions relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General are concerned, no doubt the principles are well settled in our jurisprudence. In the first place, no strictures may be passed ex parte. Second, no stricture may be offered more than that required by way of a correction or otherwise and, third no disparaging remarks or harsh language may be used, without prior notice.
38. The order of the learned single judge, though inconvenient and not to the personal like of the Revising Authority, it neither contains any final observation nor it is a stricture made nor does it contain any conclusion reached. What the learned single judge has pointed out are his own doubts that the order passed by the respondent-appellant appears to be wholly contrary to law and impermissible as per the rule of law.
"7. That the Hon'ble Court in the order dated 7.8.2023 has passed exparte remarks against the deponent, without even affording an opportunity of hearing to him and the deponent has had a consistently progressive and unblemished career spanning to 27 years, and therefore it is most respectfully prayed that the said remark may kindly be expunged by the Hon'ble Court."

16. As a perusal of Paragraph No.7 of the personal affidavit would show, the former Chairman of the Corporation still regards the remarks as strictures against him and prays that these be expunged. He has cited the credit of his progressive and unblemished career, spanning 27 years, to take umbrage to the remarks that he seeks to be expunged. Here, it may be again worthy of note that their Lordships of the Division Bench, while disposing of M. Devraj's appeal from our order dated 07.08.2023, made it clear that the said order, '..... though inconvenient and not to the personal like of the Revising Authority, it neither contains any final observation nor it is a stricture made nor does it contain any conclusion reached'. In view of the said remarks by their Lordships of the Division Bench, M. Devraj should have felt satisfied that there are no strictures passed by us against him. Still, we are constrained to remark that he did not rest content with the clarification made by the Division Bench that there are no strictures against him. Instead, in his personal affidavit vide Paragraph No.7, he has asked us to expunge the strictures carried in the order dated 07.08.2023. Once, their Lordships of the Division Bench have said that there are no strictures in our order dated 07.08.2023, there is absolutely no occasion or necessity for us to expunge those remarks of non-blemish. Nevertheless, since M. Devraj has asserted that these still, to his understanding, are strictures, which must be expunged, this Court must clarify that those remarks are not at all strictures.

Let M. Devraj, former Chairman Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, wherever he is posted currently, explain the circumstances in which he failed to notice the aforesaid gaping flaw in the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer while passing the impugned order."

18. For one, the remarks, above quoted, are all prefaced with the expression prima facie, which shows them to be tentative and intended to elicit the former Chairman's response to the flaws noticed. If the former Chairman thinks that the remark that prima facie he seems 'to have scant knowledge of law' and apparently is 'not legally trained', are strictures, we think he is mistaken. It is a fact that the former Chairman of the Corporation is an administrative officer, who is not a trained lawyer. The distinction between one who is trained in the law and one who is not, and, therefore, called a 'lay officer', is well-known to the law. If the same remark, again tentative in nature, had been made by this Court in the context of a judicial officer, it might have been regarded as a stricture, albeit still in contemplation. It is never expected that an administrative officer would have knowledge of the law or at least a profound knowledge of it. Therefore, the remark in the context of an administrative officer like M. Devraj, is only a statement of fact with no blame attached. If an administrative office in passing an order discloses legal prowess, it would stand to his credit; if he does not, it would not stand to discredit his stature in any manner. At the same time, since the Chairman of the Corporation, like many other administrative officers, has been entrusted with functions of decision making and the decisions being those that have serious adverse civil consequence on rights of individuals, say employees in the establishment, the decisions have to conform to the basic and broad requirements of the law about procedural fairness etc. laid down by Courts. If a decision falls foul of the settled legal position, the Court has to correct it.