Document Fragment View
Fragment Information
Showing contexts for: landless poor in P. Venkataramana vs District Collector on 24 September, 2003Matching Fragments
Legal Position
8. "Assigned land'' is defined in Section 2(1) of the Act as under:
"Assigned land" means lands assigned by the Government to landless poor persons under the rules for the time being in force, subject to the condition of non-alienation and includes lands allotted or transferred to landless poor persons under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to land ceilings; and the word "assigned" shall be construed accordingly.
9. "Landless poor person" and the term "transfer" are defined in Sections 2(3) and 2(6) respectively as under:
10. A plain reading of the above provisions would show that three types of land are treated as assigned lands for the purpose of the Act: (i) the land assigned by the Government to a landless poor person under the rules for the time being in force; (ii) the land allotted/transferred to the landless poor person under relevant law relating to land ceilings; (iii) the land which is allotted or transferred subject to the condition of non-alienation. Any person who owns an extent of less than 1.011715 hectares (Acs.2.50) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (Acs.5.00) of dry land is a landless poor person. Assigned land is heritable and it can be transferred by testamentary disposition. However, any sale, gift, exchange, lease, or any other transaction in relation to assigned land is treated as transfer and Section 3(1) declares that such land shall not be transferred and shall be deemed never to have been transferred. Any such transfer of assigned land shall not confer any right on the purchaser of such assigned land and the land shall not vest in any person acquiring the land by any such transaction.
14. The Act nowhere specifically declares that when a transfer of assigned land by the assignee to a landless poor person and such land is registered in the name of transferee after obtaining permission under Section 5, such land ceases to be assigned land. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that Sub-section (5) of Section 3 read with Section 5 carves out an exception and when once the law declares the transfer of assigned land in favour of a landless poor person as not being null and void, the land loses the characteristics of assigned land. This submission is misconceived. On a plain reading of Section 5, it is clear that the rigor of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3 are not made applicable only to the transfer of assigned land purchased by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration for the purpose of cultivation. Another exception is Section 6 which enables the assignee to raise agricultural loan by mortgaging the assigned land to the State, local authority or any scheduled bank. Further, all transfers of assigned land by the original assignee in favour of landless poor person are not exempted from the provisions of Sections 3(1) to 3(4). A transfer of assigned land and a purchase of assigned land by a landless poor person for the purpose of cultivation only or for the purpose of house site only, as the case may be, are exempted. If the assigned land is purchased by a landless poor person for a purpose other than for the purpose of cultivation, Sub-section (5) of Section 3 has no application. Though Sub-section (5) makes other sub-sections of Section 3 not applicable, the same does not specifically declare that such transferred land ceases to be assigned land. On true construction of Section 3 read with Sections 4, 5 and 6, it is clear that purchase of assigned land by a landless poor person in good faith and for valuable consideration for the purpose of cultivation (in case of agricultural land) alone is exempted from the other sub-sections of Section 3. The land still continues to be assigned land. This is further clear in view of Section 4 of the Act.
23. Heydon 's principle is applied when the Act is obscure and it is necessary to know the true intention of the Legislature from the language used. If interpretation results in absurdity and results in a situation which is quite contrary to the objects and reasons for which the enactment is made, the Court must eschew literal or plain interpretation and find the true intention by purposively construing the statute. Let me briefly refer to this aspect of the matter.
24. From 1-11-1969, the Government of Andhra Pradesh launched a Special Crash Programme for assignment of Government waste lands to the landless poor persons by giving D-Form pattas. By that time, the assignment rules provided for incorporating conditions in D-Form pattas. These conditions inter alia prohibited alienation of such lands and for resumption as well as re-grant to eligible persons. The Government experienced that substantial extents of lands assigned to landless poor persons were actually alienated and are in possession of well-to-do persons. The law as it existed did not contain any provisions for punishment of such persons who purchased assigned lands. The effort made by the Government for assigning lands to landless poor persons was not yielding the desired result. Therefore, it was thought to bring in protective legislation to punish the purchasers of assigned lands and prohibit alienation of lands. Therefore, the State-Legislature undertook the legislation on the model of the then existing legislation with regard to Scheduled Tribes in scheduled areas of Andhra Pradesh. A reference to the statement of objects and reasons for which the Act was brought on the statute book would reveal all these. Looking at the provisions of Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the background of objects and reasons, it is not possible to accept the submission that we should adopt the method of literal construction. Any literal construction which make the assigned lands purchased by a landless poor person to escape from the rigor of the provisions of the Act would defeat the objects of the Act. Therefore, the Court has to adopt the method of purposive construction.