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11. Apart from Section 33(1)(g) it is open to the Registrar to support his claim by reference to Section 2(o). It is true that apart from referring to Clause 2 of the agreement the Registrar has not relied on any other facts and circumstances to advance his plea that the Clause in question related to any restrictive trade practice. The learned counsel for the Registrar very fairly stated that she relied on the legal implications of the clause itself for invoking Section 2(o) of the Act and that allowing for all the facts stated by the respondents as correct, still the Clause as it stood had or may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition in any manner. The objection of the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, that the Registrar had failed to set out any facts or circumstances indicating any restrictive trade practice is somewhat misconceived in regard to Clause 2. We have to examine the claim of the Registrar as a pure proposition of law by reference only to Clause 2 in the agreement in the light of Section 2(o). Examining that Clause in that light, however, we are unable to uphold the Registrar's claim. The provision as it stands is completely innocuous as far as its effects on competition are concerned. There can be no suggestion of its having any effect on competition between the respondents and their competitors, that is to say, on interbrand competition. Clause 2 has no relevance at all to the competition between the respondents and their competitors. But even in regard to competition between the respondents' own dealers the effect of Clause 2 is completely neutral. A dealer at one selling point is not precluded from competing with a dealer at another point. Nor is the first dealer immune from competition of the other dealer. There is evidence to show that a dealer at one place had sold goods to customers belonging to Another place or coming from another place. There is also evidence to show that in the same area or territory there were several dealers competing with each other. Even in respect of areas where there was only one dealer each, there would be free competition on the borderline between the two areas. If the customers of one area prefer one selling point to a more distant selling point the blame cannot be put at the door of Clause 2. As it stands, therefore, Clause 2 cannot be said to relate to a trade practice which is restrictive in character. It is necessary before concluding this part of the discussion to refer to the decision in In re Newspaper Proprietors' Association and the National Federation of Retail Newsagents, Booksellers and Stationers Agreement, [1961] 3 All ER 428 ; LR 2 RP 453 since considerable stress was laid on that case by the learned counsel for the Registrar. In that case the agreement between the Newspaper Proprietors' Association and the National Federation of Retail Newsagents, Booksellers and Stationers provided that London daily newspapers should only be sold at or from the places at which they were sold in June, 1944, or at places authorised by the Association. All those desirous of establishing new selling points for newspapers had to obtain a permit from special committees, and the case proceeded on the assumption that restriction regarding selling point was a restriction to which the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 of U.K. applied. It is, however, necessary to remember that the provision of law in U.K. and India are not comparable and before taking any guidance from any decision under the U.K. law, the special provisions of law and the special circumstances of any case have necessarily to be borne in mind. In the U.K. law a Clause in an agreement becomes restrictive if it relates to terms or conditions on or subject to which goods are to be supplied. There is no need in that provision to gauge the effect of the Clause on competition in the trade. In the Indian scheme effect on competition is the touchstone under Section 2(o) and unless there is impact on competition, the Clause is innocuous from the point of view of Section 2(o). In point of fact the U.K. case is concerned with a collective agreement between producers of newspapers on the one hand and the retailers thereof. Ipso facto there was a limitation of competition between the producers on the one hand and between the retailers on the other. Moreover, the restriction related to entry of new persons in the trade of newspaper retailers. There was a clear restriction of competition both at the level of producers and at the level of retailers and the producers agreed not to increase the selling points and the retailers were guaranteed that there would be no further competition from new selling points. The position in the present case is quite different. There is no question here of any collusion or concert between producers. There is similarly no concert or collusion between the dealers. There is a business arrangement between one producer and his dealers which leaves the doors of competition open both vis-a-vis the other producers in the line and between the dealers of the same producers inter se. The ratio of the decision in the Newspapers case [1961] 3 All ER 428 ; LR 2 RP 453 is, therefore, clearly not applicable to the present case.