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3.8 It is submitted that in a case the accused against whom the FIR is lodged is apprehending arrest, a remedy is available to him to file the anticipatory bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that even when the anticipatory bail application under Section 438 is filed, the same can be granted within the parameters of Section 438 Cr.P.C. and the conditions of the said provision are satisfied. It is submitted that, however, such a blanket order of no coercive steps without imposing any condition whatsoever and without satisfaction of the conditions of Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not permissible at all. 3.9 It is further submitted that, as such, by passing such a blanket order of “no coercive steps to be taken”, even the valuable right of the investigating agency/police to investigate the FIR will be affected. 3.10 It is submitted that assuming that the High Court has jurisdiction to pass an interim order in a given case, regard being had to the parameters of quashing, in that case also, such interim orders cannot be passed mechanically and/or without assigning any reasons. It is submitted that while granting such a protection, even the High Court has to give some brief reasons why stay of investigation and/or such an order of “no coercive steps” is warranted. It is submitted that there must be a reflection of application of mind to the facts of the case; allegations in the FIR and what has come out in the investigation. It is submitted that, as such, when the investigation is in progress at the threshold, it is not appropriate to stay the investigation of the case. It is submitted that only in an exceptional case and rarest of rare case, the powers to quash the FIR are required to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. It is submitted that the same parameters which shall be applicable while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR/investigation shall be applicable while passing an appropriate interim order. 3.11 Shri Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has relied upon the following decisions on when a High Court can grant a stay of investigation or “no coercive measures order” in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C./under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in support of his submissions that (1) inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice and the statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases; (2) power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary; (3) save in exceptional case where non-interference would result in miscarriage of Justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; (4) in case a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his powers in relation to the process of investigation, then the Court has the necessary powers to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders; (5) the High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court; (6) the High Court has no inherent powers to interfere with the investigation, unless it is found that the allegations do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence or the power of investigation is being exercised by the police malafidely; (7) the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of an offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In support of his above submissions, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the following decisions, namely, King- Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18; R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122; Sanapareday Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 13 SCC 165; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah (2009)1 SCC 114; State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2010) 9 SCC 701; and State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan (2012) 4 SCC 547.

ii) that the interim order is a cryptic order;
iii) that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the High Court, while passing such a blanket order of “no coercive steps to be adopted” by the police;
iv) that it is not clear what the High Court meant by passing the order of “not to adopt any coercive steps”, as it is clear from the impugned interim order that it was brought to the notice of the High Court that so far as the accused are concerned, they are already protected by the interim protection granted by the learned Sessions Court, and therefore there was no further reason and/or justification for the High Court to pass such an interim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted”. If the High Court meant by passing such an interim order of “no coercive steps” directing the investigating agency/police not to further investigate, in that case, such a blanket order without assigning any reasons whatsoever and without even permitting the investigating agency to further investigate into the allegations of the cognizable offence is otherwise unsustainable. It has affected the right of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences. While passing such a blanket order, the High Court has not indicated any reasons.

xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.

24. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal succeeds. The impugned interim order/direction contained in clause (d) of the impugned interim order dated 28.09.2020 by which the High Court has directed that “no coercive measures to be adopted” against the petitioners (respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein) in respect of FIR No. 367/2019 dated 19.09.2019, registered at Worli Police Station, Mumbai, Maharashtra (subsequently transferred to Economic Offence Wing, Unit IX, Mumbai, renumbered as C.R. No. 82/2019) is hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is made clear that we have not expressed anything on the merits of the case, more particularly the allegations in the FIR and the High Court to consider the quashing petition in accordance with law and on its own merits and considering the afore-stated observations made by this Court in the present judgment.