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2. Now in this case it is absolutely clear, as found by the Subordinate Judge, that, as regards this village, the temple is not a mere assignee of land revenue but the owner of lands in the village. We cannot indeed tell the date at which it was founded or became so, but we know that temples in this part of India are not at all infrequently the mirasidars or hereditary owners of the cultivable lands in the village, and there is abundant evidence that this is so in the present case. It is sufficient to refer to the paimash register of 1829 in which the temple is described as having the ekabogam miras of the village, a term which is well understood as meaning the whole ownership of the mirasi right in the village as opposed to cases of palabogam where the ownership is divided among many. Further the parties to Exhibit E, through whom the plaintiff claims, undertake in that instrument to pay swamibogam and odavarams to the temple. These payments which are in the nature of rent and fees are payable to a mirasidar by those holding under him, and the fact that they were payable by those under whom the plaintiff claims shows that they held under the temple. The temple is then in the position of an ordinary ryot owning his holding subject to the payment of land revenue either to Government itself or, if the holding be situated in a zamindari to the zamindar as assignee of the Government demand. Now as regards such ryots whether they pay the revenue direct to Government or its assignees, the presumption in this Presidency as laid down in Chidambara Pillai v. Thiruvengadathiengar (1887) 7 M.L.J. 1 and recognised in Cheekati Zemindar v. Ranasooru Dhora (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 318 is against the existence of any occupancy rights in those holding under them and it is for those who set up such a right to prove it. This is the general law of the Presidency and the proper starting point from which to approach the question; but there are also, as I have already said, a long series of decisions as to these temple villages in Tanjore which have to be considered. They all recognize and enforce the presumption just referred to, but the result of course depended in each case on the materials put before the Court. All these temple villages in Tanjore have certain features in common. They were all managed from 1802 by the Collector on behalf of the temple until the East India Company in deference to certain religious bodies in England began to withdraw from management in the forties of last century. They were all included in the paimash or survey of Tanjore which, in this case, took place in 1829, They were also affected by the action taken by Mr. Kindersley, Collector of Tanjore, in 1830 and the following years in substituting money payments for the system till then prevailing of paying revenue in grain. As Collector he had to collect the revenue payable by the temples, and as Manager he had to collect the rents payable to them. In these circumstances he took the engagements or muchilikas which are a feature of all these cases except Krishnasami v. Varadaraja (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 345 by which the executants undertook to pay directly to the Collector in money not only the Government revenue payable by the temple but also the swamibogam or rent and other dues payable to the temple as landowner. Much depends on the proper inference to be drawn from the executiou of these documents. In the first case which came before the High Court in 1863, Alagaiya Thiruchittambala v. Saminada Pillai (1863) 1 M.H.C.R. 264 Scotland, C.J. and Holloway, J., stated that the question was whether ryots under the mirasidar have a title to the permanent occupancy of lands, subject to the payment of mirasidar's share, and observed that such a tenure for the most part depended on long established usage and custom which had to be proved. They were of opinion, however, that the mere existence of a muchilika, such as had been executed by the six ryots describing themselves as ulavadi kanikudi defining the terms of the ryots' holding, was opposed to the existence of an occupancy right; and they held that the terms of the particular muchilika by which the executants agreed to surrender the lands if any one offered more were absolutely inconsistent with it. In the case in Subupalayi Ammal v. Appakutti Aiyangar (1866) 3 M.H.C.R. 106 the muchilika seems to have been taken from a single ryot, the 1st defendant's father. The 1 st defendant claimed to be a perpetual lessee under it, and the Court rejected his contention on the construction of the muchilika which is not set out. In Chockalingam's case, (Chockalinga Pillai v. Vythiyalinga Pandara Sannady (1871) 6 M.H.C.R. 164) the defendant claimed to be a permanent lessee under an izara muchilika granted to him by Mr. Kindersley in 1837, and on the construction of the document the Court held that it evidenced a letting from year to year unless the defendant alleged and proved an established custom of permanent occupancy. The defendant was not precluded, they held, by the terms of the muchilika from alleging and proving such a custom but he had not done so and it could not be presumed. No muchilika was forthcoming in Krishnasami v. Varadaraja (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 34. We have next two judgments of the Court in the same appeal, one reported in Thiagaraja v. Gnanasambantha and Subramania v. Gnansambantha (1883) I.L.R. 7 M. 374 and the other in Thiagaraja v. Giyana Sambhanda Pandara Sannadhi (1887) I.L.R. 11 M. 77 where the case was reheard. Kernan, J's, judgment is in the same terms in both cases, but there is a concurring judgment by Kindersley, J., in the first case and by Brandt, J. in the second. As in Chockalingam's case an inference against the existence of occupancy right was raised from the existence of the muchilika, Both these decisions were approved of by the Privy Council in Mayandi Ghettiar v. Chockalingam Pillai (1904) I.L.R. 27 M. 291. In Chidambara Pillai v. Thiruvengadathiengar (1887) 7 M.L.J. 1 there were a series of muchilikas beginning in 1841 in which the executants bound themselves to cultivate for fixed periods and then restore the lands. The muchilikas also contained other indications opposed to the existence of occupancy right. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that the five persons styling themselves purakudis who executed the first muchilika were not improbably cultivating purakudis, " that they were expected to cultivate together with other purakudis in the village, that they were selected as executants of the lease probably because they were the leading men or chief purakudis in the village for the time being, and that the distribution of the cultivable area among themselves for purposes of cultivation was left to be adjusted by them at each lease or other interval of time". I think that this is probably true of most of the other muchilikas produced in these cases. We have next the case in Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Ghettiar (1896) I.L.R. 19 M. 485 which was overruled by the Privy Council in Mayandi Ghettiar v. Chockalingam Pillai (1904) I.L.R. 27 M. 291. In that case the High Court reversed the judgments of the two lower Courts in Second Appeal. The defendants in support of their claim produced two leases granted in 1813 which entitled the grantees to hold the lands permanently for all time to come by right of "ulavadi kani," and in the muchilikas subsequently executed by the defendants who claim under these leases they were described as ulavadai mirasidars. The Judicial Committee in their reversing judgment appear to have been of opinion that the leases of 1813 were of questionable validity and could not be relied on. On the other hand, they laid great stress on the fact that the dharkast or application pursuant to which the muchilika was taken by the Collector described the two applicants as purakudis of the assessed lands in the village owned by the temple, and on the facts that in it they undertook to pay the revenue for one year and asked that a dharkast izara for one year might be granted in their names. The inferences to be drawn from these facts were not counterbalanced in their Lordships' opinion by the fact that in the muchilika the two executants were styled ulavadai miras. On the materials before them and with reference to the observations of the Subordinate Judge, their Lordships treated the words ulavadai miras as of doubtful signification. Having regard to the further investigation which these tenures have received especially in the judgment of Spencer, J., in Chinnan v. Kondam Naidu (1915) 26 M.L.J. 169, 177 and in the Chingleput Mirasi case, Seshala Chetty v. Chinnasami, (1916) I.L.R. 40 M. 410 : 32 M.L.J. Supp. 1. I have no doubt the word miras in this part of India implies some sort of hereditary right. All that their Lordships said about it came to this, that on the materials before them it was of doubtful signification, and that therefore the decision could not be rested on it. After referring with approval to the decisions in Chockalingam Pillai v. Vythiyalinga Pandara Sannady (1871) 6 M.H.C.R. 164 and Thiagaraja v. Giyana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi (1887) I.L.R. 11 M. 77 and distinguishing Krishnasami v. Varadaraja (1882) I.L.R. 5 M. 345 their Lordships finally observed that the question must be decided on the contract sanctioned by the Collector, that is to say the muchilika. In the next ease, Mahomd Meera Lavvai Marakayar v. Ramalingam Pillai (1911) 1 M.W.N. 84 which came before Munro and Sankaran Nair, JJ., the learned Judges held it sufficient to say that appellants had not proved that they had permanent occupancy rights in the village and that it was not necessary to say that none of the tenants had it. As regards that particular village the question was again most elaborately considered by my learned brother sitting with Napier, J. in Naina Pillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1917) 33 M.L.J. 84 and the same conclusion was come to.

14. We now come to an important document of 1828--29 which is the paimash chittah of the Sellur village prepared in that year. This document again, like the paimash of 1816, has been exhibited not as one document, but as several documents, namely, H(2), WWW series (5 in number), XI (b), XLVIII series (10 in number), LXXXIV and LXXVII. This paimash account was laboriously prepared, though not by the higher grade Revenue Officers. Such an account, it is well known, while fairly reliable as regards the numbers, extents and character of the lands as mentioned in it and as regards broad statements as to rights, is also found to contain statements based on the allegations of interested and ignorant residents of the village and such statements are of very little value especially when there has been no subsequent revision or check by an officer of one of the higher Revenue grades. (See observations in the judgment in a similar case Naina Pillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1917) 33 M.L.J. 84. at page 96. There are even statements of a somewhat (what I may call) absurd character found in such preliminary paimash accounts. In the present case for instance, while Exhibits H2, WWW and in fact every portion of this paimash chitta account of 1829 acknowledges the temple to be the sole ekabhogam mirasidar entitled to the full occupancy and cultivation right in the whole of the village lands, we find in Exhibit XI(b) (See page 438 of the printed documents papers) that 11 persons are described as ulavadai kani mirasi tenants (under the ekabhogam mirasidar) of the village nanjah lands and one of these 11 persons is stated to be the temple itself, that is, the temple is a tenant of land under itself, which is absurd. Again the very next sentence in this Exhibit XI(b) is inconsistent with any kudivaram or occupancy right in all but the temple, because it says that the custom in the village is that only purakudivaram is entered in the Devasthanam accounts as given to tenants and that, because the Government gets its revenue in paddy, there is no mirasivaram in the village. This sentence clearly means that the mirasidar temple takes the whole produce under its kudivaram or direct cultivation right and gives out of it to the purakudi tenants the share due to them for the labour of cultivation.

18. Firstly, the burden of proving that on the date of this muchilika of 1831, the executants had a permanent right of occupancy lies very heavily on them and on those claiming under them. (The contesting defendants have clearly admitted in thia case that they claimed only under the executants of these muchilikas). It is not contended that in all the lands of the village taken together the executants had a joint permanent occupancy right. That the temple was cultivating at least about one-third of the lands through pannai purakudies then is admitted, the paimash of 1829, as I said already, making the statement that as regards those lands, the temple was its own ulavadai kudikani tenant. It is also admitted that these Brahmins and Pillais (who executed Exhibit E,) and numerous other tenants cultivated distinct plots in the village separately and not jointly. The permanent occupancy right was in fact claimed only for those who are described in the paimash of 1829 as ulavadai kudikani mirasidars and not for the numerous persons described as purakudies etc, Mr. T.R. Venkatarama Sastri for the 43rd defendant even argued strenuously that the occupancy right could not be claimed for the lands in the vadapathi (northern half) portion of the village lands but only for the lands in the thenpathi (southern half) portion in the holding of his client, the two halves being separated by a common irrigation channel. That the descriptions given of themselves by these tenants are of little value has been held in almost all the cases Mere assertion by a tenant, especially where his landlord is a temple whose trustee cannot give an occupancy right without breach of trust, would not derogate from the plain rights of the temple. See Satya Sri v. Kartik (1912) 15 C.L.J 227 and Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo (1869) 13 M.I.A. 270. In Chidambara Pillai v. Thiruvengadathiengar (1887) 7 M.L.J. 1 followed in this respect even in Cheekati Zamindar v. Ranasooru Dhora (1899) I.L.R. 23 M. 318 the presumption against the existence of occupancy rights in a tenant, holding under a person who himself owns the kudivaram proprietory right in the soil is stated to be a strong presumption. In the present case, except the vague description of some cultivating tenants in the paimash of 1829 as ulavadi kudikani mirasidars and the fact recorded in that paimash account that some lands in the possession of one of these tenants were mortgaged to the temple and to another person (even assuming such statements to be true and even assuming that the mortgage was in 1811 under (Exhibit XLVI) there is no other evidence to support the contention that in 1831, any cultivable lands, much less all the cultivable lands in the village, were held under permanent occupancy right, whereas the overwhelming probabilities are against the validity of that contention.

20. Thirdly, the areas of the holdings after the date of this "tharam faisal muchilika" Exhibit E of 1831 do not correspond to the areas mentioned in the paimash of 1829, Exhibit XI(b). In Exhibit XI(b) for instance Appasami Appa is alleged to be the tenant of 2 velis plus 7 velis 5 mahs, total 9 1/4 velis. But ha is content to hold after the date of Exhibit E, 2 valis 2 mahs and 65 gulis (see Exhibit F 20) and is described in Exhibit F 20 as a mere purakudi, while in the paimash account he is one of the elevan ulavadai kudikani mirasidars. The learned Subordinate Judge has also shown how the descriptions as regards both the lands and the tenants mentioned in the paimash of 1829 are full of inconsistencies and contradictions, adopting the statement prepared by the plaintiff's vakil in the lower court from the records. (See paragraph 104 of the Subordinate Judge's judgment and the statement marked A appended to that judgment).