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The reply of the respondent was (i) that at its worst the respondent was to the knowledge of the appellant guilty of wrongful conversion of the said trucks from August 1, 1942, and that the appellants were only entitled to damages for wrongful conversion which are commensurate with the price of the trucks at the date of such wrongful conversion and (ii) that even if the appellants were entitled to any further damages since August 1, 1942, they were merely the damages for nonpayment of the value of the trucks by the respondent and should be assessed at only 6% interest per annum from the date of such conversion till payment. The respondent further contended that even on the basis of wrongful detention the appellant would not be entitled to anything more than the price of the said trucks as at the date of the Trial Court's decree plus nominal damages for the wrongful detention of the trucks from August 1, 1942, till July 7, 1944. In so far however as the High Court had awarded to the appellants the sum of Rs. 5,953 in addition to the sum of Rs. 6,032 already awarded by the Trial Court in their favour, the appellants were not entitled to anything more and that therefore the appeal was liable to be dismissed. It would be relevant to consider what is the exact scope of the two forms of action, viz., action for wrongful conversion and action for wrongful detention, otherwise known as action in trover and action in detinue. A conversion is an act of wilful interference, without lawful justification, with any chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is deprived of the use and possession of it. If a carrier or other bailee wrongfully and mistakenly delivers the chattel to the wrong person or refuses to deliver it to the right person, he can be sued as for a conversion. Every person is guilty of a conversion, who without lawful justification deprives a person of his goods by delivering them to some one else so as to change the possession. (Salmond on Torts, 11th Edition, pages 323, 324, 330).

Judgment for the petitioner in trover is for recovery of damages for the conversion: Judgment for the petitioner in detinue is for delivery of the chattel or payment of its value and damages for detention. (Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 33, p. 78, para. 135). These forms of action are survivals of the old forms of action in trover and in detinue and it is interesting to note the evolution of the modern causes of action for wrongful conversion or for detention. Denning J. (as he then was) in Beaman v. A.R.T.S. Ltd. (1) gave the following history of their evolution at page 92:" The modern causes of action for wrongful detention or for conversion are very different from the old forms of action for detinue or for trover, and must not be confused therewith. Detinue in its original form was a real action founded on a bailment which was extended later to cases against a finder. It had, however, many procedural disadvantages, and, in particular, the defendant could wage his law. On this account, it was superseded in the course of time by trover, which for over 150 years was in practice the common remedy in all cases of taking away or detention of chattels or of their misuse or destruction. In 1833 the defendant in detinue lost his right to wage his law. In 1852 the old forms of actions were abolished. In 1854 the plaintiff gained the right to an order for specific delivery of the chattel detained. Since that time there have developed the new causes of action of conversion and wrongful detention, the names of which are derived from the old forms of action, but the substance of which is quite different. I attempt no precise definition, but, broadly speaking, the cause of action in conversion is based on an (1) [1948] 2 All E.R. 89, 92.

427).

In the present case, however, we are not fettered by any such consideration. The respondent was the bailee of the two trucks and was bound to return the same to the appellants on the termination of the bailment. The bailment came to an end on August 1, 1942, and the appellants attended the office of the Officer Commanding 4 M.T.T. Centre, Kamptee on the said date for having the trucks re- delivered to them. When the said trucks were not so delivered the appellants immediately on August 14, 1948, gave the statutory notice to the respondent under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The period of the said notice expired on or about October 14, 1942, and the appellants filed their action for wrongful detention on January 8, 1943. There was no delay on the part of the appellants which would spell out any intention on their part to take advantage of the rising market or to waive their remedy in wrongful conversion with a view to take advantage of the statute of limitation. There is no evidence to show that the market value of the trucks had appreciated perceptibly between August 1, 1942, and January 8, 1943, and it is significant to note that the only claim which the appellants had made in their notice dated August 4, 1942, was for specific delivery of the said trucks by the respondent. Even though the appellants knew that the said trucks had been redelivered by the respondent to Surjan Singh and they could have, if they had been so minded, sued the respondent for wrongful conversion of the said trucks, they elected to have the said trucks re-delivered to them and asked for the specific delivery thereof and filed their action for wrongful detention of the said trucks. They were, in our opinion, perfectly entitled to do so and we have to consider the further questions that arise before us on the basis that the action for wrongful detention had been rightly instituted by the appellants against the respondent. This leads us to the question as to what relief the appellants are entitled to obtain against the respondent. The claim for the rent already due by the respondent to the appellants up to August 1, 1942, has been settled by the judgments of the courts below and we are not called upon to canvass these findings of fact any further. The more important questions that require to be dealt with are: (1) What is the amount which the appellants are entitled to recover from the respondent as and by way of the value of the two trucks in the alternative-the respondent being admittedly not in a position to re-deliver the said trucks to them and (2) what are the damages which the appellants are entitled to recover by reason of wrongful detention of the trucks till the date of judgment.

247) where he finds delight in using a technical rule to award damages against the unjust steward."

It follows from the above that the position in law in regard to the measure of damages in an action for wrongful conversion is far from clear and the law in regard to the same cannot be said to be perfectly well settled. Whatever be the position in regard to the same in actions for wrongful conversion, one thing is quite clear that in actions for wrongful detention the measure of damages can only be the value of the goods as at the date of the verdict or judgment. The tort is complete the moment the goods are wrongfully converted by the defendant and no question can arise in those cases of any continuing wrong. In a case of wrongful detention, however, the cause of action may certainly arise the moment there is a refusal by the defendant to re-deliver the goods on demand made by the plaintiff in that behalf. But even though the cause of action thus arises on a refusal to re-deliver the said goods to the plaintiff the wrongful detention of the goods is a continuing wrong and the wrongful detention continues right up to the time when the defendant re-delivers the goods either of his own volition or under compulsion of a decree of the Court. There is moreover this distinction between actions for wrongful conversion and those for wrongful detention that in the former the plaintiff abandons his title to the goods and claims damages from the defendant on the basis that the goods have been wrongfully converted by the defendant either to his own use or have been wrongfully dealt with by him. In the latter case, however, the plaintiff asserts his title to the goods all the time and sues the defendant for specific delivery of the chattel or for re-delivery of the goods bailed to him on the basis that he has a title in those goods. The claim for the re- delivery of the goods by the defendant to him is based on his title in those goods not only at the time when the action is filed but right up to the period when the same are re-delivered by the defendant to him. The wrongful detention thus being a tort which continues all the time until the re-delivery of the goods by the defendant to the plaintiff, the only verdict or judgment which the Court can give in actions for wrongful detention is that the defendant do deliver to the plaintiff the goods thus wrongfully detained by him or pay in the alternative the value thereof which can only be ascertained as on the date of the verdict or judgment in favour of the plaintiff. Winfield thus enunciates the position in his treatise on Tort, 6th Edition at page 414: