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The Supreme Court, interpreting the terms of that document for the purpose of deciding the claim of the assessee for exemption of its income under the Income-tax Act held that it was not possible from the terms of the document to conclude that, the trust was set out wholly for charitable and religious purposes. The Supreme Court also held that the purposes set out in the document were not the objectives of the trust but only the objects of those who wish to put the trust property to use. The court held (page 421) "on a careful consideration of the language of the trust deed, we are of the view that the intention of the founder was to provide a building for the benefit of the public to be used by them for religious, charitable and/or cultural and social purposes". The court also noticed that there was no mention in the trust deed as to how the income derived from the trust property is to be utilised. It further noticed that the public use the building on payment of rent to the trustees. The trust deed however was silent as to what was to be done with the money so collected, and there was no mandate in the trust deed that the income derived from the trust property is to be spent on religious or charitable purposes. Though the document was examined by the apex court and earlier by this court in a proceeding arising under the Income-tax Act, the interpretation of the trust deed cannot be any different for the purposes of wealth-tax. The document is but one, and the interpretation that it has received from the apex court, is the interpretation which is required to be considered and adopted for the purpose of considering the claim of the assessee for exemption under the Wealth-tax Act, although the Wealth-tax Act does not contain a definition of "charitable purposes" unlike the Income-tax Act. As to what is the effect of the document, so interpreted for the purpose of wealth-tax is of course to be considered de hors the result of the assessee's claims under the Income-tax Act, by applying the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act.

7. The Supreme Court in the case of Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association [1980] 121 ITR 1, while considering the claim for exemption of the income of the trust under the Income-tax Act, observed (at page 11) "the law is well settled that if there are several objects of a trust or institution, some of which are charitable and some non-charitable and the trustees or the managers in their discretion are to apply the income or property to any of those objects, the trust or institution would not be liable to be regarded as charitable and no part of its income would be exempt from tax. In other words, where the main or primary objects are distributive, each and every one of the objects must be charitable in order that the trust or institution might be upheld as a valid charity : Vide Mohd. Ibrahim v. CIT [1930] 57 IA 260 and East India Industries (Madras) P. Ltd. v. CIT . But if the primary or dominant purpose of a trust or institution is charitable, another object which by itself may not be charitable but which is merely ancillary or incidental to the primary or dominant purpose would not prevent the trust or institution from being a valid charity : vide CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce ." The test which has, therefore, to be applied is whether the object which is non-charitable is an independent principal object of the trust or institution or is only ancillary or incidental to the dominant or primary charitable object.

8. The test so laid down by the Supreme Court for the purpose of the Income-tax Act, is equally applicable to a consideration of the claim for exemption under Section 5(1) of the Wealth-tax Act. The object of granting exemption from wealth-tax is to save the property held under legal obligation or trust for public purpose of a charitable or religious nature in India from the burden of wealth-tax, such properties are not to be so burdened in view of the worthy purpose for which the property is utilised and the public benefit arising out of such user. Exemption from wealth-tax is not intended to be extended to properties which though capable of being used for charitable or religious purposes, could also, at the discretion of the trustee used for other purposes, even to the exclusion of user for charitable or religious purposes. Mere use of the words "charitable or religious" in the deed of trust or other document is, therefore, not conclusive as regards the exigibility or otherwise of the property owned by such a trust for levy of wealth-tax. Further, as observed by the Supreme Court, if there are a number of objects in the trust deed some of which are capable of being regarded as charitable or religious purposes, the mention of other purposes which may be ancillary or incidental thereto but not by themselves charitable or religious, would not disentitle the trust or the property from being legarded as created for or held for charitable or religious purposes.

12. Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the property must be held exclusively for charitable or religious purposes and that the predominant object of the trust which owns the property must also be unambiguously charitable and religious in nature before any claim for exemption under Section 5(1)(i) can be granted. While we agree with him that the property must be held for religious and charitable purposes but subject to such purpose being predominant purpose and not necessarily exclusive purpose, we cannot subscribe to the proposition that the object of the trust must be exclusively charitable or religious. The focus in Section 5 of the Wealth-tax Act, is the property and as long as the property is held in the character mentioned therein, exemption can be claimed. It is quite conceivable that a trust which has many purposes also owns several properties some of which may he burdened for use solely for religious or charitable purposes, while others may not be. Exemption cannot be denied on the ground that the objects of the trust are not predominantly religious and charitable.