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17. Having appreciated the rival submission, I find no substance in the submission of Shri Mathur. The very assumption of Shri Mathur that Section 65(3) of the Act puts restriction on powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is absolutely misconceived. It is relevant here to state that provisions of Section 65(3) of the Act is akin to Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act as the object of both the provisions are one and the same. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with reference to Section 17B of the I.D. Act came up for consideration before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in case of International Limited v. K.B. Joshi and Ors., (1987-II-LLJ-210 at 225) wherein it has been held as follows:

"8. So far as the challenge to Section 17B of the Act passed on the ground that it either interferes or encroaches upon the constitutional powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court is concerned, from the bare reading of this section, it is clear that it does not even remotely refer to the powers of the Courts under Article 136 or 226, much less of restricting the said powers. This section only guarantees to the workman the payment of wages by the employer during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court, and that too subject to the conditions laid down by the said section and the proviso irrespective of the result of the proceedings. It also imposes an obligation upon the workman concerned to file an affidavit before the Court stating that he has not been employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings. It also absolves the employer of his obligation to pay such wages, if he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been otherwise employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration. As already observed Section 17B operates within a limited sphere. Its operation is subject to the conditions laid down by the section itself. Section nowhere lays down that in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity, or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is debarred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is not possible for us to accept the contention that Section 17B is void as it encroaches upon or overrides the powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court of India under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. The powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 & 136 of the Constitution are paramount and Section 17B does not interfere with nor restrict the said constitutional powers."

(Italicisation mine) The judgment of the Bombay High Court in case of Elpro International Ltd. (supra) was considered by the Supreme Court in case of Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel, 1999 (2) SCC 106 : (1998-I-LLJ-1) in which it has been held as follows at p. 8 of LLJ:

"24. As regards the powers of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, it may be stated that Section 17B, by conferring a right on the workman to be paid the amount of full wages last drawn by him during the pendency of the proceedings involving challenge to the award of the Labour, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in the High Court or the Supreme Court which amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside, does not in any way preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court to pass an order directing payment of a higher amount to the workman if such higher amount is considered necessary in the interest of justice. Such a direction would be de hors the provisions contained in Section 17B and while giving the direction, the Court may also give directions regarding refund or recovery of the excess amount in the event of the award being set aside. But we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay High Court in Eipro International Ltd. that in exercise of the power under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted under Section 17B. The conferment of such a right under Section 17B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution."

Again in the case of C.M. Saraiah v. E.E., Panchayat Raj Department and Anr., (2000-I-LLJ-23) (SC) wherein when a challenge was made to an award passed by the Labour Court directing reinstatement of work-men with back-wages, the Supreme Court has held that this Court has no jurisdiction to direct non-compliance of the provisions of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the said case, it has been held as follows (2000-I-LLJ-23 at 24) :

"3. Having examined the provisions of Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, we are of the considered view that the Court has no jurisdiction to direct non-compliance with the same when the condition precedent for passing an order in terms of Section 17B of the Act is satisfied, and this being the legislative mandate, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the direction of the learned single judge. We accordingly set aside the impugned order passed by the Division Bench and direct that the order of the learned Single Judge requiring compliance with Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act shall be complied with by the employer. This appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs."