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11. Be that as it may, the law recognizes only two categories of workmen. One, being the permanent workman and the other a temporary workman. On account of legal fiction, a deemed permanent workman, for all purposes, is a permanent workman. In other words, the expression "permanent workman" within the meaning of provisions of the Act and the Rules would cover both the categories of workmen namely de facto permanent workman and de jure permanent workman. A de facto permanent workman is one, who has been appointed by the company by an order in writing, as a permanent workman; whereas a de jure permanent workman is one, who, irrespective of whether such order in writing is issued by the company, is recognised by law to be a permanent workman. With this background, we will have to consider whether the memorandum of settlement in any way provides that the de jure permanent workmen have been excluded from deriving the benefits under the stated settlement.

12. As aforesaid, the Memorandum of settlement has been reached in respect of daily rated permanent workman employed in the petitioner company at Bhandup. The term permanent workmen has not been defined in the memorandum of settlement. For that, we will have to give the natural meaning to that expression which is consistent with the provisions of law. As aforesaid, permanent workman is one who is de facto permanent workmen and also includes de jure permanent workman. Thus understood, it is not possible to suggest that the memorandum of settlement dated 3rd February, 1999 expressly excludes the workmen who fall within the class of deemed permanent workman on the relevant date as such. In other words, it will have to be assumed that all workmen who have acquired the status of permanent workmen as on 3rd February, 1999 would be entitled to enjoy the benefits provided under the memorandum of settlement dated 3rd February, 1999.

16. To my mind, clause 26 preserves the privilege of the Petitioner company to provide for separate service condition only in respect of temporary, casual, badli or other types of workmen(other than the daily-

rated permanent workmen). Since the workmen named in Annexure-A, in law, are covered by the expression daily- rated permanent workmen, it will not be open to the Petitioner company to provide for separate service conditions qua them. According to the Petitioner, the later part of clause 26 is self eloquent as it indicates that the settlement will be applicable only to those daily rated workmen, who are on the roll of the company on the date of signing of the settlement and who sign it. This clause will have to be construed to mean that the settlement is applicable to those daily-rated workmen, who are de facto permanent or de jure permanent on the relevant date. Indeed, the names of the de facto permanent workmen would be on the rolls of the company as permanent workmen; whereas de jure permanent workmen would be deemed to be on the rolls of the company as permanent workmen notwithstanding the fact that the Company has shown them on the rolls of temporary workmen.

As a matter of fact, the stand taken by the Petitioner presupposes that the object of not recognizing the named workmen as permanent workmen was with a view to deprive them of their status and privileges of permanency, which were extended to the permanent employees. It was argued that the Petitioner had consciously provided for separate service conditions for the named workmen and if the Petitioner was required to treat these workmen on par with the other permanent workmen, Petitioner would not be in a position to bear the financial implications. It is not possible to countenance this argument. The fact that the Petitioner would suffer additional financial burden, if the named workmen were to be treated on par with the permanent workmen cannot be the basis to legitimize discriminatory treatment meeted out to similarly placed workmen. As aforesaid, the named workmen though treated temporary workmen by the Petitioner company, in fact, on account of legal fiction were already permanent workmen on completion of 240 days' continuous and uninterrupted service in the aggregate. On completion of such qualifying service they have automatically acquired the status of permanent workmen. In settlement, no reference is made to the fact that the same is applicable only to workmen, who are appointed on or after a particular date. The generality of provisions in clause 22, 26 and 27 cannot be the basis to hold that there was express understanding or for that matter implied settlement that workmen appointed on or after 1996, 1998 will be covered by separate service conditions. That is not the settlement between the Petitioner and the Union. Suffice it to mention that similar argument regarding financial implications was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Chief Conservator of Forests (Supra) and came to be negatived on the reasoning that the same is one of desperation or in terrorem. The Court opined that the fact remains that on the finding that the Petitioner has indulged in commission of unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 as well as Item 9, it is the duty of the Court to issue appropriate direction to meet the ends of justice.