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"...... that the written representation of the detenu was duly considered by the State Government expeditiously and the same was rejected after due consideration. I further state that at that time due 'to influx of refugees and due to Pakistan aggression, most of the officers of the Home Department were very busy with serious problems which faced the country at that time and as, such the said representation of the petitioner could not be considered earlier. Moreover I further state that due to go-slow movement of workers launched co-ordination committee of the State Government Employees during the period September to November 1971 there was serious dislocation and delay in movement of files and disposal of cases. I further state that delay was also caused due to abrupt increase in number of detention cases during that time as the--re was spate of antisocial activities by Naxalites and other political extremists in the State. 1 state that all the above factors contributed towards the delay of about 28 days in considering the representation of the detenu petitioner."

Shri Chatterjee also submitted that there is no material on the record suggesting that the Special Section itself did not continue to function effectively by reason of the five grounds contained in the explanation for the delay in the considering the petitioner's representation. According to the learned counsel this Section should not havetaken more than just seven days for making-available to theState Government the requisite material for performing its constitutional duty as contemplated by Art. 22(5). Shri Chatteriee indeed went to the length of suggesting that the explanation contained in the counter-affidavit was an after- thought. We are wholly unable to agree with this submission. The very fact that a Special Section of the Home Department was considered necessary to be created in the State of West Bengal for dealing with inter alia the cases of detenues, convincingly suggests that the situation there was far from normal; besides it is a matter of public history of which judicial notice can be taken, and indeed even Shri Chatterjee could not controvert it, that for several months preeceding the Tndo-Pak war which began on December 3, 1971, there was a continuous influx of refugees (running into several millions) from what was then known as East Pakistan and is now free Republic of Bangla Desh and that on our eastern borders the situation was anything but normal, indeed, this unprecedented influx of refugees from the very nature. Of things could not but give rise to colossal problems affecting inter alia the law and order situation and maintenance of security in the State-of West Bengal. Between November 23 and December 16, '1971, therefore, the entire Home Department in West Bengal, including its Special Section which owed its birth to the urgent need of dealing with the detenus and other allied problems, can legitimately be assumed to have been under considerable stress and strain on account of the vexed problem posed by the indiscriminate influx of refugees with unknown antecedents from across our eastern borders. We are, therefor,--, wholly unable to agree with Shri Chatterjee that there is no relevant material for holding that the working of the Special Section of the Home Department was also adversely affected for the reasons contained in the respondent's explanation. The two grounds on the basis of which the petitioner has been detained are :

Shri Chatterjee then said that this ground does not give rise to any problem of public order. We are unable to accept this submission. Attempting to murder police personnel engaged on patrol duty in the residential township area during curfew period in order to overawe them is, in our view, an act which would obviously create a feeling of panic, alarm and insecurity in the minds of the local inhabitants in general : it would also suggest that any one opposing the political ideology of the petitioner's party would be similarly exposed to violence at the hands of the petitioner and his associates, who are not afraid even of the police force. This clearly illustrates how direct and extensive is the reach of this crime on the general public. The faint suggestion that during curfew time the incident mentioned in ground no. 2 could not reasonably raise any problem of public order because there would hardly be many members of the public, present in the streets, seems to us to be misconceived. The incident is said to have taken place at about 8-15 p.m. on October 13. 1971 during curfew hours. The area in question in residential township area. People, though not moving about in the streets. would normally speaking be awake in their own houses and they could not be unaware of such a serious clash between the petitioner and his associates armed with bombs etc., on the one side and the police patrol Party on the other, on whom the bombs were burled. This clash must have caused serious disturbance of peace and tranquillity in the locality and would inevitably had attracted attention of its residents. Attack with bombs and other lethal weapons on police patrol party in the circumstances cannot but have a grave impact on public order and on even tempo of the life of the community. People, though keeping in-door-,; in their houses, would quite naturally get panic-stricken and feel frightened to move about freely in the performance of their normal daily activities: they are also likely to feel scared of moving out during curfew hours with the permission of the autho- rities concerned for doing even most urgent work. Reference was made, by Shri Chatterjee to the decision of this Court in Re : Sushanta Goswami(1) where the incidents relied upon by the (1) [1969] 3 S. C. R. 138.

detaining authority were hold to relate only to the problem of law and order. The incidents there do not seem to bear any comparison with those before us and the petitioner's counsel also ultimately did not seriously press the point. The decision reported as Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner, Calcutta(1) deals with the case of stray incidents and does not constitute any binding precedent for the case in hand. Reference was further made to Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal(1) but there again the acts of the detenu were directed against the family of one individual and not against women in general in the locality. It was held in the reported case that the detenu's conduct however reprehensible did not create the situation where it could be said that the life of the community at large was being seriously disturbed or put out of gear : in other words that there was a breach, or likelihood of a breach- of public order. The reported case is clearly distinguishable acts imputed to petitioner in tilt else in hand directly raise problem of public order. The petitioner and his associates belong to a political party and the two ,,rounds are founded on inter-linked incidents, which are closely related to inter-party clashes preceding the promulgation of the curfew order on October 8, 1 971 following their political opponent Jiten Choudhury's murder. The second incident is a direct violent clash with the police force during the curfew period. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain Shri Chatterjee's contention that these two grounds do not raise the problem of public order. These facts seem to bear a close resemblance to those of Amiya Kumar Karmakar (Supra). On behalf of the respondent our attention was drawn to Shyamal Chakraborty v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta (2) where the question was discussed in those words :