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17. Subsequent to the decision of the learned Single Judge in C.W. No, 1588 of 1972, the Company filed C.W. No. 5653 of 1975 claiming similar reliefs in respect of refund of sales tax/purchase tax and Inter-State Sales Tax for the years 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73 amounting to Rs. 1,74,80,524. This writ petition has been heard by us along with the Letters patent Appeal. Arguments covering a wide ground were advanced before us and we will deal wilh them one by one.

18. At the outset, Shri D.S. Nehra, the learned counsel for the Government of Punjab, argued that no Mandamus could in law be issued for refund of tax. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sugan Mal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1740 and a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Daulat Ram Trilok Nath v. State of Punjab (1976) 78 Pun LR 708: (AIR 1976 Punj & Har 304) (FB). There can be no dispute that a relief for refund of tax simpliciter will not be granled by the High Court in the exercise of its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a High Court may order refund of tax as a consequential relief in a proceeding under the Article 226 of the Constitution in which the validity of the assessment itself is challenged. Sugan Mal's case itself recognises this position. Again, where the statute provides for grant of refund of tax under certain circumstances and subject to cer'tain conditions, but the taxing authority evades dealing with the application for refund, we do not see any legal impediment in the way of the High Court issuing a direction to the authority to consider the application for refund and to grant the refund to which the applicant may be found to be entitled. Similarly, we see no bar to the grant of such a relief if the petitioner establishes successfully the plea of "Equitable Estoppel" raised by him. Rights based on the doctrine of "Equitable Estoppel" have been enforced or have been held to be enforceable by Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, (vide Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. v. Ulhas Nagar Municipality, AIR 1971 SC 1021). Nor is it correct to say that administrative orders cannot confer rights enforceable by a Mandamus, (vide Union of India v. K.P. Joseph. AIR 1973 SC 303). We do not think that we will be justified in dealing with the present case on such preliminary and technical grounds.

"Under our Jurisprudence, the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it in order to claim to be the Judge of its own obligations to the citizens on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."

This decision of the Supreme Court is a clear authority for the proposition that in appropriate cases it is permissible and necessary to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel against the Government. But it also recognises the position that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not absolute and that absolution from title doctrine is permissible where the conduct of the parry claiming the estoppel justifies it or where the general interests of the State require it.

46. This kaleidoscope of precedents, Indian. American and English, shows us that in the final analysis the doctrine of equitable estoppel is but a rule of fair-play founded on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. Good administration demands that rules of fairplay should be observed by all Governmental and Public Authorities. Good administration requires that the Government end other public authorities should be bound by promises made by them, upon which others have acted as much as parties are bound by similar promises. But, there is a difference. The Government acts for the people. It acts in the public interest. The people, for whom the Government acts, require to be protected against the unauthorised, prejudicial or mischievous acts of the persons who act for the Government. The people cannot be bound by promises which are unauthorised, or, which are prejudicial to the public interest or which are productive of public mischief. Therefore, the need to restrict the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to Governmental activity. Therefore, the unwisdom and inexpediency of applying the doctrine too widely. There are, of course, certain obvious limitations: When the Government acts in a sovereign capacity there can never be any question of estoppel. Nor can there ever be an estoppel to prevent Parliament from making a law. Nor can the Government, while functioning as a delegate of Parliament, be estopped from legislating contrary to the promises earlier held out by it in an executive capacity. Nor can there be an estoppel to prevent the Government from carrying out the mandates of Parliament. Parliament is supreme and the executive Government cannot estop itself from discharging the obligations imposed upon it by Act of Parliament. Nor can the Government do something or be compelled to do something which is prohibited by statute or which is opposed to obvious legislative policy. And, the Government cannot be bound by an estoppel to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly; it cannot bind itself to circumvent a statute. Again, a Government cannot bind itself or a succeeding Government, by an estoppel, to a fixed policy. The politic dynamism of the State requires review and revision of policy and a Government must have the right at all times to change its policy. Accrued rights have to be honoured no doubt. But. no rights based on promissory estoppel can ever be considered to accrue which are against the public interest and opposed to the public policy or which affect the public revenues. No one can be permitted to take undue advantage of a representation made by a servant of the people and claim rights as against the people themselves and to their proven detriment, if such rights are not consistent with the public good. A rule of evidence such as equitable estoppel may not be invoked against the people and the State if it is shown to be against the general interest ol the people and the State or against the advancement of their known social policy or if it affects the public revenues. Precise definition of the limits is difficult as this branch of the law is yet evolving-Boundaries will have to be determined in individual cases with reference to the facts of the cases.

54. Finally let us assume the decision of the Cabinet Sub-Committee dated 15-12-66 never took effect; let us assume the revised policy of 14-5-69 was publicised and took effect in 1971 only; let us assume it was in pursuance of the re-presentation contained in the brochure of 1966 and the letter dated 2-7-68 and an assurance held out that the land purchased by the Company would be included within the focal point at Rajpura that the Company established its Vanaspati factory at Rajpura. Would these circumstances vest in the Company a right against the Government to demand a refund of the Sales Tax paid by it? Would the Government be precluded by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from resisting the claim of the Company ? Would social policy and the public interest justify the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel?