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as appearing in Clause XII of the Letters Patent. A suit simplicitor seeking specific performance of an agreement would be one such instance which would not fall within the expression "suit for land". However, if in a suit for specific performance, a decree for possession of the land sold is also claimed, such a suit would certainly be a "suit for land". This, what we understand, is the law laid down by the Federal Court in Moolji Jaitha's case2 and the Supreme Court in Adcon Electronics' case.3 We may state over here that Mr. Dada referred to several other judgments of Single Judges of this Court on the scope of the expression "suit for land".

Furthermore, the Appellant has even denied the legal ownership of the Respondent over the said land. These disputes, and which we may add are not ancillary in nature, would cerainly amount to a "suit for land" as contemplated under clause XII of the Letters Patent. In this backdrop, we are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Dada that the dispute between the parties in the present case relates only to specific performance simplicitor and that the possession and/or title to the said land was not in dispute.

Furthermore, since the Appellant had denied the legal ownership of the Respondent to the said land, the Respondent has also claimed a declaration that the Respondent has the sole and absolute right, title and interest in respect of the said land along with the unfinished structures standing thereon. We, therefore, find that even on the pleadings before the Arbitral Tribunal the question of title to the said land as well as the possession thereof, is directly in issue which would have to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal. We, therefore, in these circumstances, are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Dada that the dispute between the 572.13.app.doc parties is one relating to specific performance simplicitor, and therefore, would not fall within the expression "suit for land" as appearing in Clause XII of the Letters Patent.

(emphasis supplied) 572.13.app.doc

40. In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held that a development agreement by its very nature has to be inextricably connected to the land to which it relates to. We do not express any opinion on this absolute proposition, save and except, to state that whether the dispute in relation to any development agreement would fall within the expression "suit for land" would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, we are of the view that the disputes between the parties hereto in relation to the development agreement dated 28 February 2008 and the MOU dated 8 June 2012 are of such a nature that they are rooted to the land. The disputes are not such that they relate only to the execution of any document and/or specific performance thereof simplicitor. The disputes relate to possession of the said land which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court as also regarding the percentage of the parties rights, title and interest in the said land and/or their entitlement to a sizable portion of the constructed space thereon. These disputes would certainly fall within the expression "suit for land" appearing in Clause XII of the Letters Patent.