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3. There were 11 accused persons against whom charge sheet was submitted by the police. Out of them Naseem absconded after he was released on bail and therefore could not be tried alongwith the remaining accused. One Purshottam died only a few days after he was released on bail. Farukh Chisty was found to be mentally unbalanced and, therefore, the trial against him was suspended. The remaining eight accused were tried by the Sessions Judge, Ajmer in Sessions Case No. 110 of 1992. The learned Sessions Judge by his judgment and order of May 18, 1998 found all the accused guilty of the offence under Section 120B IPC and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to suffer further 2 years rigorous imprisonment. He also found all the accused guilty of the offence under Section 376/120B and sentenced them to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. He also convicted and sentenced all the accused under Section 292/120B IPC and sentenced them to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Two of the appellants, namely Moijullah @ Puttan and Ishrat Ali were also found guilty of the offence under Section 376 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.

21. Before advertising to the other part of the prosecution case which relates to the involvement of Mahesh Ludhani Harish Tolani, we propose to deal with the cases of the four appellants, namely, Puttan, Ishrat Ali, Sayed Anwar Chisti and Shamsuddin @, Meradona who have been Convicted by the trial court as well as the High Court as also the cases of Parvez Ansari and Kailash Soni, who though convicted by the trial court have been acquitted by the High Court.

22. We may only notice at this stage that though the trial court had convicted the appellants above named of the offences under Sections 120B and 292/120B IPC also, the High Court did not find sufficient evidence to support the charges under these two sections and acquitted them of those charges but affirmed their conviction and sentence under Sections 376/120B IPC. In the case of Puttan and Ishrat they were convicted under Section 376 IPC as well.

23. We may first consider the cases of Parvez Ansari and Kailash Soni. It was alleged that they had raped one Pushpa Sindhi, PW.23 However, Pushpa Sindi, apart from denying the photographs produced by PW-9, Hari Prasad Sharma stated in clear terms that Parvez Ansari and Kailash Soni had never, raped her and nothing had been recovered at their instance. She had never been photographed with them. However, the trial court placed reliance on Articles 1, 2 and 4, which were said to be the obscene photographs of Pushpa Sindhi, Kailash Soni and Parvez Ansari and, therefore, found them guilty of the offences under Section 120B, 376/120B and 292/120B IPC. The High Court, in our view, rightly set aside the convictions and sentences of these two accused. We find that there is no mention about these two names in the deposition of some of the victim girls whose evidence we have noticed earlier. That apart, Pushpa Sindhi (PW-23) did not support the case of the prosecution that she was ever raped by either of these two persons or that she was ever photographed with them. Even if one was to assume that some of these photographs are of Pushpa Sindhi (PW-23) and the aforesaid accused, that would not in any manner connect them with the conspiracy to commit the alleged offences in concert with Puttan, Ishrat and others. There is nothing on record to show that they were ever soon at the house of Farukh or in the company of the co-conspirators at the farm house. Moreover when Pushpa Sindhi herself denied that she was ever raped by them, there is no other evidence to support the conviction of these accused, who are respondents in the State appeals.

33. We are, therefore, satisfied that the evidence on record clearly establishes the offence under Section 376 IPC as against Puttan and Ishrat and the offence under Section 376/120B IPC against Anwar and Meradona. As noticed earlier they have been acquitted of the other charges leveled against them and therefore it is not necessary for us to go into those aspects of the prosecution case.

34. We shall now consider the cases against Mahesh Ludhani and Harish Tolani. Both of them have been acquitted by the High Court of all the charges leveled against them. On facts as well, we find that their cases stand on a different looting. They were more concerned with the developing of films and printing of photographs taken while the victims were in a compromising position. It was the case of the prosecution that that with the help of such photographs the victim girls were sought to be blackmailed. The High Court has acquitted the other accused also of the charge under Section 292/120B IPC. Shri P.S. Mishra, appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the photographs, Articles 1 to 5 clearly establish that the victim girls were photographed in a compromising position. It is true that the evidence does not disclose from where those photographs were procured but according to him that did not affect the admissibility of the photographs as a piece of evidence. It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the photographs, Articles 1 to 5, are admissible as a piece of evidence. What is significant is the fact that the prosecution had led no evidence to show that these photographs were recovered from either Mahesh Ludhani or Harish Tolani. Mahesh Ludhani was concerned with the Bharosa Colour Lab while Harish Tolani was concerned with Ajmer Colour Lab. The prosecution sought to implicate Harish Tolani on the basis of the evidence of Janardhan Sharma PW-143 who had searched the premises of Ajmer Colour Lab. Admittedly no obscene photograph was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Yet the prosecution sought to rely upon the so-called disclosure statement made by Harish Tolani to the effect that he had shown to them the place where the photographs were allegedly burnt. Shri Mishra submitted that the principle enshrined in Section 27 of the Evidence Act will apply if a fact is discovered pursuant to a disclosure statement which gives some material which may be an incriminating fact. After some argument he did not press the point further.