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13. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, however, appears to have placed great reliance on the decisions of this Court in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L. Pande ((1965) 2 SCR 713, 718) where this Court held that the Governing Body of the College in that case was a statutory body. In this connection, this Court observed as follows:

"On the other hand, we are of opinion that the provisions of Clause 8 of the ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers' service conditions and, as we have already pointed out, the provisions of the 'College Code' in this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore, the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the 'College Code' creates legal rights in favour of teachers of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous."

This case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. To begin with, in P.R. Jodh's case (supra), this Court was dealing with the College Code which was itself a creature of the statute, namely, the University of Saugar Act. Under ordinance No. 20 Para 1 the Governing body was created by an ordinance passed under the University of Saugar Act. It is, therefore, clear that the statutes are the creature of the Act. Thus the distinction is that in P.R. Jodh's case the Governing Body was the Council of Management established under the Act while here the Managing Committee is not. It is obvious that the Governing Body was created under a statutory provision because the ordinance had undoubtedly a statutory force having been passed under the Act. Para 2(i) (c) of the College Code runs thus:

"2. (i) In this ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:-
(c) 'Governing Body' means the Council of Management established under this ordinance for the control and general management of the 'College'."

The Governing Body was, therefore, established under the ordinance itself and had no independent existence at all. Similarly under Para 3 of the ordinance the constitution of the Governing Body was laid down. It is, therefore, clear that not only was the Governing Body of the College established under the ordinance but even the constitution of the said Governing Body was laid down by the ordinance itself and the functions of the Governing Body were clearly defined by Para 4 of ordinance No. 20. The ordinance itself was called the "College Code" which came into legal existence by virtue of the ordinance. In other words, the position is that before ordinance No.20 was passed under the University Act, the Governing Body had no existence at all. The same, however, could not be said of the present Managing Committee which had its independent existence long before it was affiliated to the Agra University and had also its own constitution, the only exception being that two members had to be taken ex-officio in the Managing Committee. There is, therefore, world of difference between the nature and manner of the establishment of the Governing Body under the University of Saugar Act and the Managing Committee in the instant case. Furthermore, this case was noticed and discussed by a later judgment of this Court in Vidya Ram Mishra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College ((1972) 3 SCR 326) and was distinguished. Speaking for the Court, Mathew, J., observed as follows: (SCC PP.628-629, Paras 9, 11-12) "When once this Court came to the conclusion that the 'College Code' had the force of law and conferred rights on the teachers of affiliated colleges, the right to challenge the order terminating the services of the appellant, passed in violation of clause 8(vi) (a) of the 'College Code' in a proceeding under Article 226 followed 'as the night the day' and the fact that the appellant had entered into a contract was considered as immaterial.

Whereas in the case of Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A.L.Pande and (supra), the terms and conditions of service embodied in clause 8(vi) (a) of the 'College Code' had the force of law apart from the contract and conferred rights on the appellant there, here the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 have no efficacy, unless they are incorporated in a contract."

It is, therefore, clear that in P.R.Jodh's case the College Code was by itself a statutory Code so that the provisions of the statute operated proprio vigore and did not depend on the execution of the agreement between the employer and the employee in accordance with the statutes of the University. In the instant case, which is very much like the case in Vidya Ram Mishra (supra) the statute merely enjoined that the agreement between the employer and the employee should be incorporated according to the form and conditions prescribed by the statute and until the said agreement is executed the provisions of the Statute would not apply proprio vigore. The Allahabad High Court no doubt tried to distinguish Vidya Ram Mishra's case, but with due respect, we might observe that the distinction drawn by the High Court is a distinction without any difference. The High Court has not considered the two basic facts which were present in P.R.Jodh's case but which were not present in the instant case, viz., (1) that the governing body in the case dealt with by this Court in P.R.Jodh's case was in itself a creature of the statute; and (2) that in the instant case the statute did not apply proprio vigore but only after an agreement was executed between the employer and the employee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the statute. The High Court also failed to consider that there was a concurrent finding of fact by all the Courts below that the plaintiff/respondent never executed any agreement with the Executive Committee of the College in the form prescribed by the statutes of the Agra University Act.